Opinion
Case No. 2:05cv100.
April 12, 2006
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the August 26, 2005 Motion of Defendants, Kay Coles James, Director, U.S. Office of Personnel Management, the Office of Personnel Management (hereinafter "OPM"), Steven A. Williams, Director, U.S. Fish Wildlife Service, and U.S. Fish Wildlife Service (hereinafter "USFWS") (hereinafter collectively "Defendants"), to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment (Doc. 27). Plaintiff Derrick T. Hicks (hereinafter "Plaintiff") filed a Memorandum Contra on September 16, 2005 (Doc. 28).
I. FACTS
On January 31, 2005, Plaintiff pro se filed the instant action asserting an action for employment discrimination (Doc. 3). On February 4, 2005, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 4). An examination of Plaintiff's filings, and the attached exhibits, reveals the following as the basis of Plaintiff's claim.
On May 22, 2002, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC") alleging discrimination by OPM. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged he was discriminated against on the basis of race, sex, age, national origin and disability when he was not rated high enough by OPM to be referred to the selecting official for the position of Environmental Information and Outreach Specialist, GS-1001-12/13, a position which was posted by OPM in the Spring of 2002.
After a final EEOC interview, on June 20, 2002, Plaintiff filed a formal complaint of discrimination regarding his failure to be referred. OPM accepted Plaintiff's complaint and commenced an investigation. Upon completion of the investigation, Plaintiff requested a hearing from a United States EEOC Administrative Judge. On December 7, 2004, the Administrative Judge concluded Plaintiff failed to establish he was the victim of discrimination when he was not referred by OPM to the selecting official for the position of Environmental Information and Outreach Specialist, GS-1001-12/13 with the employing agency, USFWS.
In addition to the allegations set forth in the EEOC complaint, Plaintiff seeks to assert claims for discrimination with respect to various other, unspecified positions dating back to 1999. Further, he seeks to assert a claim against USFWS with respect to the Spring, 2002 job posting, notwithstanding the fact they were not a defendant to the EEOC action.
II. ANALYSIS
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this Court is limited to evaluating whether the plaintiff is "entitled to offer evidence to support the claims, rather than whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail." Burr v. Bums, 2005 WL 1969532 at *2 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (citing Schuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). A complaint should not be dismissed using Rule 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 724 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). This Court must "construe the complaint liberally in the plaintiff's favor and accept as true all factual allegations and permissible inferences therein." Id. (quoting Gazette v. City of Pontiac, 41 F.3d 1061, 1064 (6th Cir. 1994)). The complaint does not need to specify every detail of a plaintiff's claim, however, it must give the defendant "fair notice of what the defendant's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Gazette, 41 F.3d at 1064. The primary function of pleadings under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "is to give adequate notice to the parties of each side's claims and to allow cases to be decided on the merits after an adequate development of the facts." Lewis v. ACB Business Services, 135 F.3d 389, 405 (6th Cir. 1998).
However, this Court "need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences." Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987); see Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, 859 F.2d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1988). Therefore, a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will not be granted "unless there is no law to support the claims made, the facts alleged are insufficient to state a claim, or there is an insurmountable bar on the fact of the complaint." Burr v. Burns, 2005 WL 1969532 at *2 (S.D. Ohio 2005). While this Court "need not accept as true legal conclusions," it has the authority and responsibility to determine if the plaintiff can prove any facts in support of his legal conclusions. Morgan, 829 F.2d at 12; Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. Legal conclusions that are minimally supported with a factual basis are properly pled if they provide the defendant "fair notice of [the plaintiff's claim] . . . and the grounds upon which it rests." Gazette, 41 F.3d at 1064; see Lawrence E. Jaffe Pension Plan v. Household Intern., 2004 WL 574665 at *3 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (finding that courts need not accept as true legal conclusions alleged in the complaint, though a plaintiff may plead conclusions if they "provide the defendant with at least minimal notice of the claim.").
Additionally, a pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). However, litigants who chose to proceed without counsel must still comply with the procedural rules which govern civil cases. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
Defendants contend Plaintiff's claims, with the exception of those which relate to the EEOC complaint, should be dismissed as he failed to exhaust the necessary administrative remedies to proceed to file suit in federal district court. Defendants argue Plaintiff's Complaint and Amended Complaint expand upon his complaint to the EEOC. In addition to the Spring, 2002 non-referral by OPM, which was ruled on by the EEOC. Plaintiff asserts claims for non-referrals and non-selections by the Department of the Interior going back to 1990. However, Plaintiff failed to comply with the administrative process prior to filing this action.
42 U.S.C. § 2000 proscribes federal employment discrimination and establishes an administrative and judicial enforcement system. It requires exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition precedent to suit in federal district court. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.201 et seq.; Irwin v. Dept of Veteran Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 94 (1990). The statutes reveal the right to file a civil action arises only after either a final disposition by the federal agency or the passage of 180 days from the filing of the administrative complaint. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.408.
Accordingly, the only claim before the Court for which Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies is the Spring, 2002 non-referral by OPM for the position of Environmental Information and Outreach Specialist, GS-1001-12/13. The other non-referrals and/or non-selections which Plaintiff alleges are not properly before the Court as Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Furthermore, the administrative charge requirement serves the important purpose of giving the charged party notice of the claim and narrowing the issues for prompt adjudication and decision. Park v. Howard Univ., 71 F.3d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Currently, the only defendant in the EEOC administrative complaint with respect to the Spring, 2002 non-referral was OPM. Plaintiff did not assert the claim against USFWS, Therefore, USFWS is not a proper party to this action with respect to the Spring, 2002 non-referral by OPM for the position of Environmental Information and Outreach Specialist, GS-1001-12/13.
As such, the sole claim which remains is Plaintiff's claim against OPM for the Spring, 2002 non-referral by OPM. OPM argues it is entitled to summary judgment on the remaining claim as Plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case of discrimination for the non-referral. A review of Plaintiff's Memorandum Contra reveals he failed to address the elements of a prima facie discrimination case and, instead, focused on the Motion to Dismiss. As such, the Court will defer ruling on OPM's Motion for Summary Judgment as to whether Plaintiff established a prima facie case of discrimination as to the Spring, 2002 non-referral and permit Plaintiff to supplement his arguments. As such, fourteen (14) days from the filing of the Opinion and Order, Plaintiff shall file a Supplement Memorandum Contra on this issue. OPM shall have seven (7) days from the filing of Plaintiff's Memorandum Contra to file a Supplemental Reply Memorandum.
III. CONCLUSION
As Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies prior to filing this action with the Court, dismissal of his various non-referrals and/or non-selections dating back to 1990 is appropriate. Moreover, as Plaintiff did not assert his administrative complaint with respect to the Spring, 2002 non-referral against USFWS, it is not a proper party currently. Accordingly, with respect to USFWS and Plaintiff's claims which were not addressed in the Spring, 2002 non-referral by OPM for the position of Environmental Information and Outreach Specialist, GS-1001-12/13, the August 26, 2005 Motion to Defendants to Dismiss (Doc. 27) is hereby GRANTED. Further, a decision on the August 26, 2005 Motion of Defendants for Summary Judgment (Doc. 27) is hereby held in ABEYANCE pending additional briefing by the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.