Opinion
Case No. 4:99CV2658
December 17, 2001
MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 47). For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an inmate at the Ohio State Penitentiary ("OSP"), a maximum security correctional facility located near Youngstown, Ohio. (ECF No. 47, Ex. B, ¶ 2). The inmate population at OSP — Ohio's only "supermax" facility — consists solely of inmates who have been placed on high maximum security as the result of serious rule violations at other correctional facilities. Id. at ¶ 3. The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections ("ODRC") put Plaintiff under administrative control and transferred him to OSP after a jury found him guilty of murdering a fellow inmate at the Orient Correctional Institution. (ECF No. 61, p. 11). Plaintiff has been at OSP since the facility opened in May 1998. Id at pp. 84-85. On November 2, 1999, Plaintiff, who was then proceeding pro se, filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against R. Wilkinson, Director of the ODRC, and several other persons who are employed or were at one time employed by the ODRC (Warden D. Johnson, Deputy Warden O.H. Wood, II, Mailroom Supervisor Lt. M. Bayless, Institutional Inspector P. Guyton, Prison Chaplain D. York, Deputy Warden of Special Services Linda Taylor).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserted the following causes of action: (1) denial of access to the courts; (2) retaliation for exercise of constitutional rights and denial of freedom to communicate; (3) Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and denial of free exercise of religion; (4) Eighth Amendment claims concerning lack of recreation, exposure to concrete dust and radon, and transfer to OSP for administrative rather than disciplinary reasons; (5) falsification of records; (6) Eighth Amendment, religious discrimination, and Equal Protection Clause claims concerning inadequacy of diet and failure to abide by religious dietary requirements; and (7) violation of ODRC policies including confiscation of mail, ban on staples, denial of right to prayer robes, and refusal to classify Plaintiff as a Nubian Islamic Hebrew. Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and compensatory damages.
On February 8, 2000, the Court issued an Order dismissing Plaintiff's claims for denial of freedom of speech, retaliation, falsification of records, denial of freedom of religion, denial of equal protection, and violation of the Eighth Amendment during the Ramadan fast without prejudice pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. (ECF No. 6). The Court dismissed Plaintiff's RFRA claim with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e), because the Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157 (1997). Id. The Court then dismissed Defendants Ruffin, Taylor, York, and Wood because all claims against them had been dismissed. Id. The Court subsequently dismissed Defendant Bayless as the result of Plaintiff's failure to obtain service upon him. (ECF No. 66).
On April 12, 2000, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (ECF No. 16) with a listing of the grievances that he allegedly exhausted prior to filing his original Complaint. On May 12, 2000, Plaintiff filed a set of documents related to his exhaustion of certain grievances along with a request that the documents be attached to his proposed Amended Complaint. Although the clerk's office time-stamped the letter, it did not note the filing of the documents on the docket because the documents appeared to have been submitted in response to discovery requests and such productions are not noted on the docket unless ordered by the court.
On June 15, 2000, without having reviewed the grievance-related documents submitted by Plaintiff, the Court issued an Order denying Plaintiff the right to file an Amended Complaint. (ECF NO. 18). On February 23, 2001, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Case for Failure to Comply with Discovery Order. (ECF No. 39). While reviewing that motion, the Court discovered the grievance-related documents that Plaintiff had filed several months before. In a letter dated March 2, 2001, the Court informed counsel for the Defendants that it had discovered the documents and enclosed copies of them.
On March 29, 2001, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 52) in which he requested that the Court reconsider its non-prejudicial dismissal of his third and sixth causes of action in light of the Court's discovery of the grievance-related documents previously filed by Plaintiff On May 24, 2001, the Court ordered the parties to file briefs addressing whether the newly discovered documents indicated that defendant had exhausted any of the claims that the Court had previously dismissed. (ECF No. 71). On June 16, 2001, the parties filed their responsive briefs. (ECF Nos. 75 and 76).
On July 18, 2001, the Court conducted a status conference via video conference. During the Conference, the Court found that Plaintiff had exhausted his administrative remedies with regard to his claims concerning OSP's refusal to amend its records to reflect Plaintiffs religious affiliation, the failure of OSP to serve him an adequate diet, and OSP's refusal to allow him to purchase prayer beads specific to his religion. The Court ordered Defendants to address these issues by: (1) amending their religious records to reflect Plaintiff's religious affiliation; (2) keeping Jello off of Plaintiff's meal tray and serving him an appropriate substitute for Jello; and (3) obtaining the prayer beads specific to Plaintiff's religion and allowing Plaintiff to purchase the beads in the absence of any security-related concerns. The Court further ordered Defendants to report back on their progress in addressing these issues by August 17, 2001. (ECF No. 81). The Court held in abeyance its rulings on Plaintiff's denial of access to the court and denial of recreation claims.
The Court believes that Plaintiff also exhausted his claims regarding the nutritional adequacy of the prison diet (grievance no. 3-99-16), prohibitions on the possession of hardback books (grievance no. 9-98-63), OSP's preference for Sunni Muslims (grievance no. 9-98-63); prison officials' failure to respond to kites in a timely manner (grievance no. 7-99-107), and prison officials' interference with mail (grievance no. 8-99-32). (ECF No. 75). The Court deems Plaintiffs Complaint amended as to these claims and the three claims listed above. The Court finds that Plaintiff had not exhausted the remaining claims in Counts III and VI by the time he filed his original complaint.
Plaintiff informed the Court during the conference that OSP was no longer attempting to serve him pork and that his only remaining religious dietary claim was OSP's refusal to eliminate Jello from his meal tray and to provide him with a substitute for Jello.
On August 16, 2001, Defendants filed a brief with supporting affidavits indicating that the following actions had been taken with regard to the Court's July 2001 Order: (1) On July 20, 2001, Warden Todd Ishee issued a memorandum to OSP's Food Service Coordinator stating that Plaintiff is not to be served Jello and is to receive a dessert substitute for Jello; (2) Prayer beads are available to Plaintiff, but he may not wear them around his neck or swing them due to security concerns; and (3) Plaintiffs religious affiliation has been changed in OSP's files to Ansaaru. (ECF No. 86, at Exs. A, B, and C).
In a Request to Consider Change and/or Accommodation of Religious Practice form submitted to the OSP Chaplain on 1/26/99, Plaintiff described his religion as "Ansaaru Allah Ummah / Islamic Hebrew; commonly called Ansaar Muslims." (ECF No. 75, Ex. 7).
On October 22, 2001, Defendants filed a brief informing the Court that Judge James Gwin had certified a class of OSP inmates in Austin v. Wilkinson, Case No 4:01CV00071, a case which includes a denial of outdoor recreation claim. Defendants noted that because the class had been certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2), Plaintiff was not entitled opt out of the litigation. As a result of the class certification, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's denial of recreation claim. (ECF No. 107).
Plaintiff's only remaining claims are those concerning: (1) denial of access to the courts; (2) denial of free exercise of religion (as to the exhausted claims); (3) violation of the Establishment Clause through OSP's preference for mainstream Islam; (4) the nutritional adequacy of OSP's meals; (4) OSP officials' failure to respond to grievances in a timely manner; and (5) interference with Plaintiff's mail. As the result of previous dismissals, the only remaining defendants are R. Wilkinson, D. Johnson, and P. Guyton.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The court is to determine "whether there is the need for a trial — whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The court views the evidence of record and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See LaPointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 378 (6th Cir. 1993).
Summary judgment is appropriate if a party who bears the burden of proof at trial does not establish an essential element of its case. Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-248. In order for there to be a genuine issue for trial, there must be sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Id. at 249.
As stated by the Supreme Court:
. . . . Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.' [citations omitted] . . . Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis.Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327.
B. Denial of Access to the Courts
Plaintiff contends that he was denied access to the courts with regard to three separate legal actions — an action in the Court of Claims seeking compensation for the alleged destruction of property, a § 1983 action, and the appeal of his criminal conviction. (ECF No. 62, Ex. 4, ¶ 56). For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's denial of access to the courts claims must fail.
1. Action in the Court of Claims
When Plaintiff arrived at OSP he had an action pending for the alleged destruction of some of his property when he was incarcerated at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility in Lucasville, Ohio. (ECF 61, 126-127). Plaintiff claims that the Court of Claims ruled against him in that case because he failed to submit receipts indicating that he owned the property that he claimed had been destroyed. Id. at 127, 143-144. According to Plaintiff, the receipts were among property OSP officials sent out of the institution when Plaintiff arrived at OSP. Id. at 128. Plaintiff claims that his case was further hindered by the fact that OSP did not have a law library from May 1998 until September 1998. Id. at 146.
Even if the Court accepts each of Plaintiff's allegations regarding his case in the Court of Claims as true, Plaintiff's claim must fail. Although prison inmates have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1997), that right is limited to direct appeals, habeas corpus actions, and civil rights actions. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996) (prisons must provide tools "inmates need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to change the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration."). Because Plaintiff's Court of Claims action was not a direct appeal, a civil rights action, or a habeas corpus action, he does not present a viable § 1983 claim for denial of access to the courts.
2. Section 1983 Action in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
On January 8, 1996, Plaintiff filed a § 1983 action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio against various state prison officials contending that he was denied due process and deprived of life's necessities after he was charged with the murder of another inmate. (ECF No. 47, Ex. J). On March 14, 2000, the district court entered judgment in favor of the defendants in that case. Id. Plaintiff claims that the lack of legal services at OSP and Lt. Bayless' confiscation of copies of his opposition brief in July or August 1998, hindered his ability to respond to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 61, pp. 150, 201-203).
The fact that an inmate's access to the courts may have been impeded is not in itself sufficient enough to present a constitutional claim. In order to have standing to bring a claim for denial of access to the courts, the inmate must establish that he suffered an actual injury as the result of the alleged denial. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 349-351. A prisoner's contentions that the prison library is inadequate or that he was not provided with free supplies or copying of legal materials does not establish such an injury. See, e.g., Bell-Bay v. Bur, 802 F.2d 456, table (6th Cir. 1986) ("Access to the courts is not equated with the adequacy of a prison law library . . . nor is meaningful access equated with free supplies and copying of legal material.") (internal citations omitted)).
The docket sheet for Plaintiff's criminal appeal indicates that he filed motions in that case during the same period that he claims he was unable to meet deadlines in his § 1983 case. (ECF No. 47, Ex. L). These filings as well as the affidavit of Tracy Brown, indicate that plaintiff was not denied access to legal services during the relevant time period. (ECF No. 86, Ex. D). Even if Plaintiff did face obstacles in filing his response brief, the Southern District of Ohio granted him several extensions so that he was eventually able to file his brief. (ECF No. 61, p. 153). The opinion of the district court indicates that it fully considered Plaintiff's claims and disposed of them on the merits. (ECF No. 48, Ex. J). Consequently, Plaintiff cannot establish that he suffered an actual injury as the result of the alleged lack of legal services or the confiscation of his response brief.
3. Plaintiff's Criminal Appeal
On September 25, 1996, Plaintiff appealed his conviction for the murder of another inmate. (ECF No. 47, Ex. L). On May 18, 1998, the Pickaway County Court of Appeals affirmed Plaintiff's conviction. Id. at Ex. K. On June 10, 1998, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Appointment of Counsel for Representation in the Supreme Court of Ohio. Id. at L. The Court denied that motion on July 2, 1998. Id. On July 8, 1998, the Court of Appeals sent Plaintiff pleadings that he had requested. Id. On September 28, 1998, Plaintiff filed a pro se petition for a rehearing en banc. Id. On November 13, 1998, the Court of Appeals issued a decision granting Plaintiff's request for reconsideration, but rejecting the grounds for reversal that he raised in his motion. Id. at Ex. M. On or about December 16, 1998, Plaintiff sent a Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion in Support of Jurisdiction to the Ohio Supreme Court. (ECF No. 62, Ex. 12). Plaintiff claims that the Ohio Supreme Court never responded to his motion. Id. at Ex. 4, ¶ 73. Plaintiff made no additional efforts to file a delayed appeal. (ECF No. 61, p. 258).
Plaintiff was represented by counsel at both the trial and appellate court levels. (ECF No. 47, Ex. K).
Plaintiff contends that his criminal appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court was hindered because Lt. Bayless confiscated copies of his appellate brief and removed an exculpatory statement and trial transcript from the box of legal materials that Plaintiff's mother sent to him. (ECF No. 62 at ¶¶ 72, 73). Although OSP officials eventually returned the exculpatory statement, they did not return the trial transcript. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants prevented him from contacting the court-appointed attorney who handled his appeal in the Pickaway County Court of Appeals. Id. at ¶ 74.
In order to proceed with his denial of access to the court claim, Plaintiff must establish actual prejudice to a non-frivolous legal claim. Hadix v. Johnson, 182 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1999). Actual prejudice does not exist in the absence of proof that "a claim has been lost or rejected, or that the presentation of such a claim is currently being prevented." Root v. Towers, 238 F.3d 423, table (6th Cir. 2000). Consequently, Plaintiff's claims that he was denied access to his trial transcript, the exculpatory statement, and that he was prevented from contacting his former attorney do not in themselves amount to actual prejudice. Id.; see also, Root v. Towers, F.3d 423, table (6th Cir. 2000) ("Significantly, a defendant is not entitled to a transcript to search for potential grounds for relief."); Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587 (1982) (there is no constitutional right to counsel for discretionary state appeals). Plaintiff's claim that he was unable to file his appellate briefs because they were seized by Lt. Bayless is of little consequence because Lt. Bayless is no longer a party to this lawsuit and there is no evidence that any of the remaining defendants was personally involved in seizing Plaintiff's briefs. See, e.g., Shehee v. Lutrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999); Mithrandir v. Brown, 37 F.3d 1499, table (6th Cir. 1994).
Even if the Court assumes actual prejudice, Plaintiff has not put forth evidence of a nonfrivolous legal claim that he could have raised in an appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court. The only basis that Plaintiff cites for an appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court is the exculpatory evidence that Lt. Bayless purportedly removed from his box of legal materials. In his deposition, Plaintiff described the evidence — which had since been returned to him — as a one-page summary investigative report which "specifically states that Inmate Sanders pulled the shank out on Heyward, who took it away and inflicted injuries that resulted in Inmate Sanders' death." (BCE No. 61, pp. 215, 228-229). Plaintiff believes that "that alone would have overturned my conviction." Id. at 215.
The only evidence submitted by Plaintiff that meets his description of the purported exculpatory evidence is a letter from Peter Davis, Executive Director of the Correctional Institution Inspection Committee, to the warden of the Orient Correctional Institution. (ECF No. 62, Ex. 4). The letter states in pertinent part:
I am in receipt of a Special Incident summary regarding the death of inmate Rondel Sanders 298-217. Reportedly, Mr. Sanders stole headphones from inmate Miliner, who got inmate Hayward [sic] to help him. Mr. Sanders pulled a shank on Hayward [sic] (252-187) who took it away and inflicted injuries which resulted in Mr. Sanders' death shortly thereafter on or about December 31, 1994 in front of the 3E dorm. This is to request that you respectfully provide me with a summary of the facts and circumstances surrounding Mr. Sanders' death.Id. This document does not establish that Plaintiff had a non-frivolous legal claim. Davis' use of the word "reportedly" reveals that he was not a witness to the event and suggests that he was merely summarizing the information included in an incident report prepared by the prison. The letter is, therefore, not an official finding and has no exculpatory value. In any case, the opinion of the Fourth District Court of Appeals reveals that Plaintiff presented his self-defense argument to the jury, but that the jury rejected his version of the incident and found him guilty of murder. State v. Heyward, 1998 WL 290238, *1-2 (Ohio App. May 18, 1998). Plaintiff points to no other arguments that he would have raised in an appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court. Consequently, Plaintiff presents no sustainable denial of access to the courts claim.
C. Denial of Free Exercise of Religion
Plaintiff has raised the following claims regarding OSP's infringement upon his right to exercise his religious beliefs: (1) denial of access to prayer beads; (2) denial of access to hardback religious books; (3) failure of OSP to accommodate his religious dietary needs; (4) favoritism of mainstream Islam; and (5) the refusal of OSP to officially recognize him as an Ansaar Muslim.
1. Prayer Beads
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he had been denied the right to purchase prayer beads specific to his religion. In the July 18, 2000 status conference, the Court ordered Defendants to obtain a set of the prayer beads Plaintiff wishes to purchase and investigate whether they would pose a security threat. In the absence of a finding that the beads would somehow threaten security, OSP was to grant Plaintiff the right to purchase the beads. On August 16, 2001, Defendants informed the Court that prayer beads specific to Plaintiff's religion are now available in the commissary, but that prison officials were still deciding whether allowing Plaintiff to wear the beads around his neck would pose a security risk. (ECF No. 86). Based upon Defendants' assurances, the Court finds that this issue has been sufficiently resolved and that Plaintiff's claim is now moot. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in relation to this claim, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because there is no clearly established law in this jurisdiction regarding the entitlement of inmates in supermax facilities to possess religious articles. See, e.g., Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398, 405 (6th Cir. 1999) (prisoner has no constitutional right to possess religious articles deemed to be a security threat by prison officials); Poe v. Hayden, 853 F.2d 418, 423-24 (6th Cir. 1988) ("The relevant inquiry focuses on whether a reasonable official in defendant's position could have believed his conduct to be lawful, considering the state of the law as it existed when the defendant took his challenged actions.").
2. Hardback Books
Plaintiff contends that OSP's refusal to allow him to obtain hardback religious books violates his constitutional right to freely exercise his religious beliefs. The Court disagrees.
"[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). In determining whether a policy or action by prison officials is constitutional, courts must accord prison administrators "wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security." Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979).
As the Sixth Circuit noted in Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1991), a prison's refusal to permit inmates to possess hardback books does not constitute a violation of the Free Exercise Clause when it is reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining security. Id. at 103 (hardback book could be used as a weapon of assault or inmate might hollow out such a book in order to hide contraband). Given the maximum security environment of OSP, prison officials must be hypersensitive to any potential threat to security. Consequently, the Court finds that OSP's ban on hardcover books is reasonably related to its interest in maintaining institutional security.
Although the Court believes that Plaintiff did not exhaust his claims concerning prohibitions on religious jewelry and religious mail order publications obtained without prior approval, the Court finds that such prohibitions also would be reasonably related to OSP's interest in maintaining security. See, e.g., Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398, 405 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that prison's refusal to permit inmate to possess an alter cloth, a pillow, a wooden fish, incense, and a picture of Buddha was rationally related to legitimate security concerns).
3. Religious Diet
Plaintiff claims that he is a Nubian Islamic Hebrew and that his religion requires him to refrain from eating pork, non-halal meat, gelatin, and soybeans. Plaintiff claims that although he has made repeated requests for accommodation of his religious diet, he was repeatedly served foods forbidden by his religion.
During the July 18, 2000 status conference, the Court questioned Plaintiff about the extent to which OSP continued to serve him foods prohibited by his religion. Plaintiff informed the Court that his only remaining complaint regarding his religious dietary needs was OSP's refusal to serve him a Jello substitute, or at the very least, to keep Jello off of his meal tray. The Court responded to Plaintiff's complaint, by ordering Defendants to abide by Plaintiff's wishes that he not be served Jello and that he be served a dessert substitute. On August 16, 2000, Defendants informed the Court that OSP had officially granted Plaintiff's request. Based upon Defendants' assurances, the Court finds that this issue has been sufficiently resolved and that Plaintiff's claim is now moot. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in relation to this claim, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because there is no clear case law in this jurisdiction regarding the dietary requirements of Ansaar Muslims and Plaintiff's proof of his religion's dietary requirements (pages from a religious newspaper and a letter from a Sunni Muslim religious leader) was not an official statement from a religious leader for his faith. See, e.g., Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 1999) (prisoner has no right to diet that is stricter than actual requirements of his religion); Poe v. Hayden, 853 F.2d 418, 423-24 (6th Cir. 1988) ("The relevant inquiry focuses on whether a reasonable official in defendant's position could have believed his conduct to be lawful, considering the state of the law as it existed when the defendant took his challenged actions.").
4. Recognition of Plaintiff as an Ansaar Muslim
Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that OSP officials repeatedly refused to recognize his request that his prison records reflect that he is "Ansaaru Allah, a Nubian Islamic Hebrew, commonly called Ansaar Muslims." (ECF No. 75, Ex. 3, p. 2). During the July 18, 2001 status conference, the Court ordered Defendants to amend its records to reflect Plaintiff's religious affiliation. On August 16, 2001, Defendants informed the Court that Plaintiff's records had been amended to reflect that he is Ansaaru Muslim. (ECF No. 86). Based upon Defendants' assurances, the Court finds that this issue has been sufficiently resolved and that Plaintiff's claim is now moot. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks monetary damages in relation to this claim, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because there is no clearly established law in this jurisdiction regarding the entitlement of inmates in supermax facilities to have prison records reflect their religious beliefs. See, e.g., Spies v. Voinovich, 173 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 1999) (prisoner has no constitutional right to dictate how prison officials keep their prison records); Poe v. Hayden, 853 F.2d 418, 423-24 (6th Cir. 1988) ("The relevant inquiry focuses on whether a reasonable official in defendant's position could have believed his conduct to be lawful, considering the state of the law as it existed when the defendant took his challenged actions.").
D. Establishment Clause
Plaintiff claims that OSP violates the Establishment Clause by favoring the beliefs of mainstream Islam over those of Ansaaru Muslims. He alleges that this favoritism forces him to practice a religion that is not his own. (ECF No. 75, Ex. 3).
The Court finds that Plaintiff's claim is without constitutional basis. It is obvious that a prison cannot possibly recognize every single religious sect to which an inmate professes to belong. See, e.g., Johnson v. Baker, 67 F.3d 299, 1995 WL 570913, *5 (6th Cir. 1995) ("The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that in the prison context, actions taken for one inmate may legitimately be viewed in the context of its ripple effect on the entire prison population. What is done for one will have to be done for others."). As the Sixth Circuit has recognized:
One would have to be naive to overlook the fact that inmates sometimes adopt religious postures to gain other ends. If an orthodox established religion does not satisfy those ends, then one may be invented or modified. Religion du jour is alive and well in the prison system.Id. Because institutional preferences for larger religious groups rather than smaller religious sects are within the penological interest of correctional institutions, Plaintiff does not have a sustainable claim regarding OSP's alleged preference for mainstream Islam.
E. Nutritional Adequacy of OSP's Meals
Plaintiff contends that OSP has violated the Eighth Amendment and internal prison regulations by serving meals that are cold and nutritionally inadequate. Plaintiff contends that he has lost weight and has experienced headaches, cramps, and nausea as the result of these practices.
In response to Plaintiff's contentions, Defendants submitted the affidavits of: (1) Theresa Bell, ODRC's Dietary Operations Manager; (2) Anthony Ruffin, OSP's Corrections Food Service Manager; and (3) Dr. Manish Joshi, OSP's physician. (ECF No. 47, Exs. C, D, and F). The affidavit of Theresa Bell establishes that OSP provides prisoners with three meals per day that meet the recommended daily allowances set by the U.S.D.A. Id. at Ex. C, ¶¶ 6, 7. The affidavit of Anthony Ruffin establishes that OSP abides by ODRC requirements regarding food portion size and sanitation. Id. at Ex. D, ¶¶ 6, 7. Ruffin further attests to the fact that OSP uses food trays designed to keep food at the proper temperature. Id. at ¶ 6. The affidavit of Dr. Ruffin establishes that Plaintiff has had no serious health problems since his arrival at OSP and that on average, his weight while at OSP in May 1998 has been higher than it was in the year and a half prior to his arrival at OSP. Id. at Ex. F, ¶¶ 6, 7. Plaintiff's evidence consists of his own affidavit.
In order to establish a violation of the Eighth Amendment, a Plaintiff must prove that he has been denied "the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities" and that the conduct at issue demonstrates a "deliberate indifference" to the plaintiffs needs. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298-303 (1991). The affidavits presented by Defendants indicate that Plaintiff has been provided with the "the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities" and that prison officials have not been deliberately indifferent to his nutritional needs. Plaintiffs own conclusory affidavit does not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to Defendants' conduct. Ashbrook v. Block, 917 F.2d 918, 921 (6th Cir. 1990) ("Although the non-moving party's evidence in opposition to summary judgment need not be of the sort admissible at trial, he must employ proof other than his pleadings and own affidavits to establish the existence of specific triable facts.").
Plaintiffs claim that OSP fails to abide by ODRC regulations concerning food quantities and preparation is a state law claim that is not properly before this Court. Although states may consent to be sued in federal court, the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that the State of Ohio has waived its sovereign immunity only as to actions first brought in the Court of Claims of Ohio. See, e.g., Leaman v. ODMRDD, 825 F.2d 946, 954 (6th Cir. 1987); State of Ohio v. Madeline Marie Nursing Homes, 694 F.2d 449, 460 (6th Cir. 1982). Plaintiff's state law claims against Defendants are similarly barred because pursuant to Ohio Revised Code §§ 9.86 and 2743.02(f), individual state employees are immune from such claims unless the Ohio Court of Claims determines that they are not entitled to immunity. Haynes v. Marshall, 887 F.2d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 1989). There is no evidence that the Court of Claims ever made such a determination with respect to the individual defendants in this case.
F. Failure to Respond to Grievances in a Timely Manner
Plaintiff contends that OSP officials failed to respond to his grievances in a timely manner. As one basis for this claim, Plaintiff points to a copy of his appeal to the Chief Inspector indicating that a number of his informal complaints and kites went unanswered by the Unit Manager, Mr. G. Burt, and Unit Manager Administrator, Mrs. Howard. The Chief Inspector issued a response indicating that the deputy wardens would speak to the staff about the need to respond to such grievances. Any claim Plaintiff may have with regard to the unresponsiveness of Burt and Howard cannot be raised here because neither were named as defendants to the lawsuit and there is no evidence that any of the individuals who were named as defendants were directly involved in such conduct.
To the extent that Plaintiff has alleged that any of the current defendants failed to respond to his grievances, the Court finds that such claims must be dismissed because they fail to implicate a constitutionally protected right. See, e.g., Mahammad v. Serrett, 860 F.2d 1079, table (6th Cir. 1988) ("[I]nmate grievance procedures are not constitutionally required in state prison systems, therefore, the defendant's alleged failure to follow grievance procedures does not give rise to a § 1983 claim."); Henry v. Pogats, 35 F.3d 565, table (6th Cir. 1994) ("A combination of knowledge of a prisoner's grievance and failure to respond or remedy the complaint is insufficient to impose liability upon supervisory personnel under § 1983."). G. Interference With Plaintiff's Mail
Plaintiff contends that his mail was repeatedly intercepted and defaced. Although Plaintiff fully grieved this issue, it cannot be addressed in this case because the claims all concern the actions of Lt. Bayless who is no longer a defendant in this case. The only mail-related claim that Plaintiff has raised against any of the existing defendants is his allegation that Defendant Guyton falsified records to cover up Lt. Bayless' activities. (Ex. 61, 136-137). As support for this claim, Plaintiff points to a U.P.S. tracking statement allegedly obtained by his mother. Plaintiff claims that the tracking statement establishes that OSP received a package for him on a date for which Defendant Guyton claimed there had been no delivery. Id. at Ex. D.
Lt. Bayless has not been an employee of OSP or ODRC since November 1, 1999. (ECF No. 47, Ex. G, ¶ 4). The Court dismissed Lt. Bayless from the lawsuit on May 15, 2001, because Plaintiff failed to obtain service upon Lt. Bayless even after the Court granted a lengthy extension of time for Plaintiff to do so. (ECF No. 66).
Setting aside concerns about the authenticity of the tracking statement, the Court finds that the document does not establish that Defendant Guyton was involved in any wrongdoing. It is unclear whether OPS was the sender or recipient of the package because Plaintiff's mother's address appears to be listed as both the sender and receiver. Id. Furthermore, the statement indicates that the package was left "on the front porch" — an unusual way to delivery a package to a correctional facility. Id. Finally, even if a package was delivered to OSP on the stated date, there is no reason to believe that Defendant Guyton's investigation revealed such a delivery. Consequently, Plaintiff cannot sustain his claim concerning interference with his mail.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to each of Plaintiff's claims. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 47) is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
JUDGMENT ENTRY
This Court, having filed its Memorandum of Opinion and Order granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 30), hereby enters judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff. Accordingly, this action is hereby terminated pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58.
IT IS SO ORDERED.