Opinion
C/A No. 6:19-3014-JFA-KFM
01-28-2020
Terry Lee Hewitt, Jr., Plaintiff, v. Bryan Stirling, Donna L. Cappadonia, Dustin Phillips, Michelle Fox, Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's complaint was entered on the docket on October 25, 2019 (doc. 1). By order filed November 4, 2019, the plaintiff was given a specific time frame in which to bring his case into proper form for judicial screening (doc. 7). The plaintiff complied with the Court's Order, bringing his case into proper form. By order filed December 4, 2019, the plaintiff was informed that his complaint was subject to summary dismissal because it failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that he could attempt to cure the defects identified in his complaint by filing an amended complaint within fourteen days (doc. 11). The plaintiff was informed that if he failed to file an amended complaint or otherwise cure the deficiencies outlined in the order, the undersigned would recommend that his case be dismissed (id. at 6-7). On December 23, 2019, the plaintiff's amended complaint was entered on the docket (doc. 13). However, because the amended complaint likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the undersigned recommends dismissal of the case.
ALLEGATIONS
The plaintiff, a state prisoner in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC") at Lee Correctional Institution ("Lee"), makes various claims against SCDC employees relating to his medical treatment while at Lee (doc. 13). The plaintiff's complaint, consisting of 24 typed pages and one hundred pages of exhibits, asserts a plethora of deliberate indifference claims against the defendants (id.). Liberally construed, the plaintiff's amended complaint alleges that the defendants are being deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in three areas: (1) by not allowing him to be treated by a doctor when he goes to sick call; (2) by delaying his medical treatment despite his request for emergency appointments; and (3) by ineffectively treating his mental health condition (see generally doc. 13).
The plaintiff's alleged injuries include internal and external physical pain, mental anguish, and health deterioration (id. at 14). For relief, the plaintiff seeks an injunction to have the medical and mental health requests placed on the institutional kiosks and money damages (id. at 15).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983, seeking damages from the defendants. However, the plaintiff's amended complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs Claims
Although the Constitution does require that prisoners be provided with a certain minimum level of medical treatment, it does not guarantee to a prisoner the treatment of his choice." Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir. 1985); see Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 318 (4th Cir. 1975) (citing Blanks v. Cunningham, 409 F.2d 220 (4th Cir.1969); Hirons v. Director, 351 F.2d 613 (4th Cir.1965)) ("Prisoners are entitled to reasonable medical care"). The government is "obligat[ed] to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,103 (1976). This obligation arises from an inmate's complete dependency upon prison medical staff to provide essential medical services. Id. The duty to attend to prisoners' medical needs, however, does not presuppose "that every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 105. Instead, it is only when prison officials have exhibited "deliberate indifference" to a prisoner's "serious medical needs" that the Eighth Amendment is offended. Id. at 106. As such, "an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care" will not comprise an Eighth Amendment breach. Id. at 105-106.
In order to state a claim, "[a] plaintiff must satisfy two elements . . . he must show a serious medical need and he must prove the defendant's purposeful indifference thereto." Sires v. Berman, 834 F.2d 9, 12 (1st Cir. 1987). A medical need is "serious" if it is "diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990). "Deliberate indifference may be demonstrated by either actual intent or reckless disregard. A defendant acts recklessly by disregarding a substantial risk of danger that is either known to the defendant or which would be apparent to a reasonable person in the defendant's position." Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851-52 (4th Cir. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (citation omitted). "It is only such indifference that can offend 'evolving standards of decency' in violation of the Eighth Amendment." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. Mere negligence or malpractice does not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. Moreover, disagreements between an inmate and a physician over the inmate's proper medical care do not state a Section 1983 claim unless exceptional circumstances are alleged. Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 849 (4th Cir.1985).
The plaintiff's medical indifference allegations rely on the plaintiff's preference for different medical treatment than received (including providers and type of treatment) (see generally doc. 13). However, the plaintiff's exhibits—totaling more than 100 pages—show that the plaintiff received consistent medical treatment for his ailments (see docs. 13-1 through 13-3). These voluminous records evince the medical treatment given to the plaintiff for his various ailments, and while the plaintiff is dissatisfied with the care he received, as noted, he is not constitutionally entitled to the treatment of his choice. See Sharpe, 621 F. App'x at 733 (noting that "mere disagreement between an inmate and medical staff regarding the proper course of treatment provides no basis for relief" under § 1983 (citing Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 319 (4th Cir. 1975))). The same analysis is fatal to the plaintiff's assertion that his mental health treatment was inadequate. Additionally, of note, the plaintiff's mental health treatment claim appears to assert deliberate indifference because the treatment offered by MHC Fox was ineffective. However, the Constitution does not mandate a cure in order to find medical care sufficient. See Hooks v. Delaney, C/A No. 2:12-305-MGL-BHH, 2013 WL 353275, at *7 (D.S.C. Jan. 7, 2013), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2013 WL 353559 (D.S.C. Jan. 29, 2013).
Moreover, the plaintiff's conclusory assertion that his rights were violated because diagnoses (including MRSA) were delayed does not present a medical indifference claim because he has not plausibly alleged that the defendants were aware of the appropriate diagnoses (nor that they were deliberately indifferent to such diagnoses). Indeed, the plaintiff's amended complaint includes only vague and conclusory allegations that Nurse Phillips failed to treat the plaintiff "on multiple occasions" based upon a later MRSA diagnosis by a Dr. Black and that Nurse Cappadonia did not treat him on one occasion because her shift was about to end (doc. 13 at 12). See Griffith v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., C/A No. 2:12-239-DCN, 2012 WL 2048200, at *1 (D.S.C. June 6, 2012) (noting that the plausibility standard requires more than "'an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.'" (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009))). Nevertheless, even liberally construed, the plaintiff's allegations against the defendants, at best, amount to negligence or medical malpractice, both of which are not actionable under § 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328-36 & n.3 (1986); Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 78 (4th Cir. 1995). As such, in light of the foregoing, the plaintiff has failed to state a deliberate indifference claim.
Director Bryan Stirling
Dir. Stirling does not appear in the plaintiff's amended complaint beyond the caption and being named as a defendant (see doc. 13). Indeed, the amended complaint contains no factual allegations with respect to Dir. Stirling beyond noting that the plaintiff's father contacted Dir. Stirling's assistant requesting mental health treatment for the plaintiff (id. at 11). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a pleading against a party to state a claim for relief. A plaintiff must do more than make generalized and conclusory statements to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (noting that § 1983 liability requires personal involvement). As no allegations are made against Dir. Stirling, he should be dismissed.
To the extent the plaintiff seeks relief against Dir. Stirling in his supervisory capacity at SCDC, the plaintiff's claims against Dir. Stirling are still subject to summary dismissal. The doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior are generally not applicable to § 1983 suits. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 ("Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution."); Polk Cty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (noting that "Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability" (emphasis in original)). As noted, the plaintiff's amended complaint does not contain any personal allegations of wrongdoing by Dir. Stirling; thus, the plaintiff's claims against Dir. Stirling are subject to summary dismissal.
Abandoned Claims
The plaintiff's amended complaint appears to abandon his claims against defendants Nurse Bostick and Nurse Allen (doc. 13). As such, it is recommended that these defendants be dismissed.
RECOMMENDATION
By order issued December 4, 2019, the undersigned gave the plaintiff an opportunity to correct the defects identified in his complaint and further warned the plaintiff that if he failed to file an amended complaint or failed to cure the identified deficiencies, the undersigned would recommend to the district court that the action be dismissed with prejudice and without leave for further amendment. Despite filing an amended complaint, the plaintiff has not cured the deficiencies identified in the order dated December 4, 2019 (doc. 11). Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court dismiss this action with prejudice and without issuance and service of process. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x 280, 281 (4th Cir. 2018) (in a case where the district court had already afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to amend, the district court was directed on remand to "in its discretion, either afford [the plaintiff] another opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order") (citing Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 630 (4th Cir. 2015)). The plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Kevin F. McDonald
United States Magistrate Judge January 28, 2020
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).