Opinion
No. 2-130 / 00-2111.
Filed March 27, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, BOBBI ALPERS, Judge.
The defendant-appellant appeals from a judgment for the plaintiff in a vehicular negligence action. AFFIRMED.
Brian Heyer of City of Davenport, Davenport, for appellant.
Steven Havercamp of Stanley, Lande Hunter, Davenport, for appellee.
Considered by HAYDEN, HABHAB, and HARRIS, Senior Judges.
Senior Judges assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2001).
The defendant-appellant appeals from a judgment for the plaintiff in a vehicular negligence action. The appellant contends that under the factual setting of this case the trial court erred when it apportioned 100% of the fault to the defendant. We find no error and accordingly affirm.
I. The parties agree that on October 2, 1998, at 3:40 p.m. a bus owned by the defendant City of Davenport and operated by its employee, Edward Kaufman, and a van owned by the plaintiff and operated by its employee, Steven R. Holtman, collided in the intersection of Kimberly Road and Gaines Street in Davenport, Iowa. The trial court, along with a number of other significant findings, found that the defendant driver, Mr. Kaufman, was negligent in operating the bus, in that "he failed to exercise due care, diligence and caution when he entered the intersection of Kimberly and Gaines after receiving a yellow-light and that he failed to properly reduce the speed of the vehicle when approaching or traversing the intersection." The trial court held that the defendant's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. It rejected defendant's argument that plaintiff was at fault and some, if not all fault, should be attributed to plaintiff.
II. In determining the right of way at traffic signal controlled intersections, a number of statutory provisions apply. There are those that regulate traffic flow on a yellow light and others that regulate left turning vehicles.
Under Iowa law, the driver of a vehicle must obey all official traffic-control signals. When a traffic light exhibits a steady circular green light, traffic may turn right or left, or proceed straight through the intersection. Iowa Code § 321.257(2)(c) (1997). All traffic, however, must yield the right-of-way to other vehicles lawfully within the intersection. Iowa Code § 321.257(2).
Iowa Code Section 321.257(2)(b) governs yellow lights. It states in pertinent part:
A "steady circular yello" or "steady yellow arrow" light means vehicular traffic is warned that the related green movement is being terminated and vehicular traffic shall no longer proceed into the intersection and shall stop. If the stop cannot be made in safety, a vehicle may be driven cautiously through the intersection.
(Emphasis in original.)
There is testimony of both drivers supporting their position as to the negligence of the other. The trial court, based on the evidence before it, made detailed and specific findings as to the cause of this accident. It stated:
After full and fair consideration of all of the evidence presented, the Court now finds by a preponderance of the evidence that on October 2, 1998, the city bus driven by Edward Kaufman approached the intersection of Gaines Street on Kimberly Road, coming from the west. The bus was operated in the curb lane and a vehicle driven by Darrin Guffey was in that same lane, traveling about 40 to 50 feet behind the bus.
Based upon credible evidence provided by Mr. Guffey, an impartial witness with no interest in the outcome of the case, when the Davenport city bus was close to the intersection, the light for eastbound traffic on Kimberly turned yellow. Mr. Guffey hit his brakes, believing that the bus would stop ahead of him before entering the intersection. However, this anticipated stop did not occur.
As he traveled eastbound on Kimberly, Mr. Guffey could also see the white van which was being operated by Mr. Holtmann. This van was waiting in the turn lane on Kimberly Road, and then began to make a left turn from Kimberly onto Gaines Street. From his vantage point proceeding eastbound on Kimberly, Mr. Guffey was able to see the bus hit the van on the passenger side. The white van operated by Mr. Holtmann ended up on the curb side in front of a car dealership as the result of the impact of the collision.
The court also finds credible evidence that Mr. Holtmann had stopped the white van at the end of the median in the center of Kimberly Road. The van was stopped at this point while the circular light was green. Mr. Holtmann waited until one vehicle which was proceeding eastbound on Kimberly had gone through the intersection of Gaines Street. The light turned yellow, and in order to clear the intersection, Mr. Holtmann inched the van out into the intersection to begin his left turn into Gaines. Mr. Holtmann had seen the Davenport city bus approaching the intersection in the curb lane. When the light turned yellow, Mr. Holtmann believed that the bus driver would stop before entering the intersection, and thus his vehicle would be able to complete the left turn and clear the intersection.
Based upon those facts, the court concluded that Mr. Kaufman was negligent in his operation of the Davenport city bus on October 2, 1998, and that such negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident.
III. When reviewing this case on appeal we are bound by the trial court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. Evidence is substantial for purposes of sustaining a finding by the trier of fact when a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach a conclusion. Hawk v. Jim Hawk Cheverolet-Buick Inc., 282 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Iowa 1979). The possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the same body of evidence does not prevent a finding from being supported by substantial evidence. City of Davenport v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 264 N.W.2d 307, 311 (Iowa 1978).
We are reminded that when a matter is tried to the court, the court's findings of fact have the force of a jury verdict, and we view the evidence in the light most favorable to those findings. Findings are broadly and liberally interpreted and in the case of ambiguity are construed to uphold the judgment. Murray v. Conrad, 346 N.W.2d 814, 817 (Iowa 1984). In addition, generally questions of negligence, contributory negligence, and proximate cause are for the trier of fact; it is only in exceptional cases that they may be decided as matters of law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(j).
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the findings of the trial court that the defendant's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident. Having determined that the defendant's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident, there was no error on the part of the trial court in not attributing some percentage of fault to the plaintiff. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.