All of these orders were unobjected to by the United States. Plaintiffs also argue that the government should now be bound by its "affirmative representations" made to the Court and urges the Court to find that the government has now stipulated to subject matter jurisdiction. It is well established, however, that lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable defect which may be raised by any party at any time — pretrial, at trial or on appeal. Campanella v. Commerce Exchange Bank, 137 F.3d 885 (6th Cir. 1998); Von Dunser v. Aronoff, 915 F.2d 1071, 1074 (6th Cir. 1990); Hess v. Hess, 950 F. Supp. 226 (E.D. Tenn. 1996). "[T]he federal courts have made it clear beyond per-adventure that not only is it impossible to foreclose the assertion of this defense [lack of subject matter jurisdiction] by the passage of time or the notion of estoppel, but also it is impossible to cure or waive a defect of subject matter jurisdiction by consent of the parties."

This court has resisted previously attempts to use federal civil rights law to bring before the court domestic relations matters not otherwise within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. In Hess v. Hess, 950 F. Supp. 226 (E.D.Tenn.) (per Jordan, USDJ), affirmed, 103 F.3d 129 (6th Cir. 1996) (Table), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3783 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1997) (No. 96-1827), this court noted that it had no jurisdiction to sit as an appellate court to review decisions made in the courts of the various States, and that federal district courts are not possessed of the comprehensive domestic relations jurisdiction of the State trial courts.