Opinion
2012-11-28
Yolanda HERRERA, appellant, v. MTA BUS COMPANY, respondent.
Helen Dalton & Associates, P.C., Forest Hills, N.Y. (Roman Avshalumov of counsel), for appellant. Morris Duffy Alonso & Faley, New York, N.Y. (Anna J. Ervolina and Andrea M. Alonso of counsel), for respondent.
Helen Dalton & Associates, P.C., Forest Hills, N.Y. (Roman Avshalumov of counsel), for appellant. Morris Duffy Alonso & Faley, New York, N.Y. (Anna J. Ervolina and Andrea M. Alonso of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., PETER B. SKELOS, ANITA R. FLORIO, and THOMAS A. DICKERSON, JJ.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Brathwaite–Nelson, J.), dated September 22, 2011, which denied her motion pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(1) to vacate an order of the same court dated November 24, 2010, granting the defendant's unopposed motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the order dated September 22, 2011, is affirmed, with costs.
To vacate her default in opposing the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her default and a potentially meritorious opposition to the motion ( seeCPLR 5015[a][1]; Tsikotis v. Pioneer Bldg. Corp., 96 A.D.3d 936, 936, 946 N.Y.S.2d 491; Walker v. Mohammed, 90 A.D.3d 1034, 1034, 934 N.Y.S.2d 854;Roche v. City of New York, 88 A.D.3d 978, 979, 931 N.Y.S.2d 533;Casali v. Cyran, 84 A.D.3d 711, 711, 921 N.Y.S.2d 879;Simpson v. Tommy Hilfiger U.S.A., Inc., 48 A.D.3d 389, 392, 850 N.Y.S.2d 629). Whether an excuse is reasonable is a determination within the sound discretion of the Supreme Court ( see Walker v. Mohammed, 90 A.D.3d at 1034, 934 N.Y.S.2d 854;SS Constantine & Helen's Romanian Orthodox Church of Am. v. Z. Zindel, Inc., 44 A.D.3d 744, 745, 843 N.Y.S.2d 414), and the Supreme Court has the discretion to accept law office failure as a reasonable excuse ( seeCPLR 2005) where that claim is supported by a “ ‘detailed and credible’ ” explanation of the default at issue ( Swensen v. MV Transp., Inc., 89 A.D.3d 924, 925, 933 N.Y.S.2d 96, quoting Henry v. Kuveke, 9 A.D.3d 476, 479, 781 N.Y.S.2d 114).
Here, the plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable excuse for her default in opposing the defendant's motion for summary judgment. Her claim of law office failure was conclusory and unsubstantiated and, under the circumstances presented here, did not constitute a reasonable excuse for her default ( see Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Cervini, 84 A.D.3d 789, 790, 921 N.Y.S.2d 643). Since the plaintiff failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for her default, it is unnecessary to determine whether she demonstrated the existence of a potentially meritorious opposition to the motion ( see generally Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Cervini, 84 A.D.3d at 790, 921 N.Y.S.2d 643;HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Roldan, 80 A.D.3d 566, 567, 914 N.Y.S.2d 647;see also Tsikotis v. Pioneer Bldg. Corp., 96 A.D.3d at 936, 946 N.Y.S.2d 491). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff's motion to vacate the order dated November 24, 2010.