Opinion
03 C 50251
November 26, 2003
ORDER
Plaintiff, Saul Herrera, brought a two-count complaint against defendants Angela Hite-Carter, in her individual and official capacities, and the Board of Education of the Rockford School District, Number 205, alleging violations of plaintiffs civil rights. Count I alleges racial and gender discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 1983; Count II alleges racial and gender discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because the claims arose in this judicial district. Before the court is defendants' motion to dismiss portions of plaintiff's complaint.
Defendants have presented the following six requests in their motion: (1) to dismiss with prejudice plaintiffs claims of gender discrimination and sex harassment brought pursuant to § 1981 in Count I; (2) to strike allegations of gender discrimination and sex harassment contained in ¶¶ 8, 13, and 21 in Count I; (3) to dismiss with prejudice defendant Angela Hite-Carter as a party to Count II; (4) to dismiss plaintiffs § 1983 claims against all defendants in Counts I and II; (5) to strike the § 1983 allegations from paragraph 1 of Count I, paragraph 1 of Count II, and from the prayer for relief of Count I; and (6) to strike Plaintiffs request for punitive damages.
Defendants properly point out that § 1981 only pertains to racial discrimination and not gender discrimination or sex harassment, See Morris v. Office Max., Inc., 89 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 1996), and their motion to dismiss with prejudice Plaintiffs claims of gender and sex discrimination in Count I ((1) above) is granted.
Defendants contend Angela Hite-Carter should be dismissed as a party to Count II because there is no individual liability under Title VII. Supervisors cannot be held liable in their individual capacities under Title VII. Gastineau v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., 137 F.3d 490.493-94 (7th Cir. 19981 Defendants' motion to dismiss Angela Hite-Carter with prejudice as a party to Count n ((3) above) is therefore granted.
Defendants next contend plaintiffs § 1983 claims should be dismissed because the § 1983 cause of action is "preempted by the exclusive remedial scheme of Title VII." Def.'s Mot. Dismiss Portions of PL's Compl. ¶ 2(c). However, a plaintiff may bring a § 1983 claim even where the same facts suggest a Title VII claim. Trigg v. Fort Wayne County. Sch., 766 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1985). In Count I, plaintiff allege defendants "committed racial and gender discrimination" by "applying different standards of job allocation and evaluation" to himself and another "similarly situated" assistant principal. Compl. ¶¶ 20, 21. Plaintiff has therefore sufficiently made a constitutional racial violation claim and defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs § 1983 claims ((4) above), as well as various other matters regarding such claim, is denied ((2) and (5) above).
Finally, defendants ask that plaintiffs request for punitive damages be stricken because punitive damages are not recoverable against a public entity or against individuals in their official capacities. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages for both Count I and Count II. The Supreme Court has declared that "a municipality is immune from punitive damages under Section 1983." Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). While federal or state law may waive that immunity, Illinois has reaffirmed it for local public entities. Andersen v. Board of Education of City of Chicago, 169 F. Supp.2d 864 (N.D. III. 2001). Defendant's request to strike plaintiffs request for punitive damages in Counts I and II ((6) above) is therefore granted.