Opinion
2:19-cv-00743-SB
07-12-2021
TIO CARVAJAL HERNANDEZ, Plaintiff, v. LYLE KINI-KINI, Defendant.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
HON. STACIE F. BECKERMAN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Tio Carvajal Hernandez (“Hernandez”), a self-represented litigant in custody at Snake River Correctional Institution (“SRCI”), filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”). Before the Court is Hernandez's Motion to Reopen Case (ECF No. 62). For the reasons that follow, the district judge should deny the motion.
BACKGROUND
On May 10, 2019, Hernandez filed a complaint alleging that on or about September 3, 2018, SRCI medical personnel medicated him against his will due to “an incorrect/wrong exp[i]ration date in place for [his] involuntary medication order.” (Compl. (ECF No. 2), at 4.) The Court granted Hernandez's application to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 7), and the case proceeded in the normal course.
The filing date reflects the date on which Hernandez signed his complaint and presumably delivered it to prison officials for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988) (determining that a self-represented individual in custody filed his notice of appeal “at the time [he] delivered it to the prison authorities for forwarding to the court clerk”); Douglas v. Noelle, 567 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the prison mailbox rule announced in Houston applies to Section 1983 cases filed by unrepresented individuals in custody).
After engaging in formal discovery, Hernandez filed an amended complaint on June 3, 2020, omitting all but one defendant and adding an additional claim arising from a separate alleged event relating to forced medication in October 2018. (Am. Compl. (ECF No. 48), at 4.) Soon thereafter, the single remaining defendant moved for summary judgment (ECF No. 55). Hernandez did not respond to the summary judgment motion, but instead filed a notice of voluntary dismissal (ECF 59). Hernandez did not explain in the notice his reasons for abandoning his claims, stating only that he “would like to dismiss [his] civil suit[, ] Case No. 2:19-cv-00743-SB.” (Id.) On September 4, 2020, the Court granted the motion and dismissed this case without prejudice. (ECF No. 61.)
The Court provided Hernandez with a Summary Judgment Advice Notice on August 10, 2020 (ECF No. 57).
Approximately eight months later, in a letter dated June 2, 2021, Hernandez requested that the Court reopen this case (ECF No. 62). Hernandez does not explain the underlying circumstances or timing of his request, but acknowledges that he previously dismissed this case “because it was too hard.” The Court construes Hernandez's request as a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 60(b).
STANDARDS
Rule 60 governs the procedure to seek relief from a judgment, order, or court proceeding. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (authorizing a court to “relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding” when specific conditions are satisfied). Under Rule 60(b), a court may relieve a party from a final judgment or order if that party can demonstrate: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence . . .; (3) fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; or (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” Id.
DISCUSSION
“A voluntary dismissal is a judgment, order or proceeding from which Rule 60(b) relief can be granted.” Deere v. CDC Medical Staff, No. 2:16-cv-1695-EFB P, 2019 WL 697157, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2019) (citing In re Hunter, 66 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 1995)). “However, it is a well-established principle that Rule 60(b) does not provide relief from ‘free, calculated [and] deliberate choices' made by litigants.” Scott v. Quinn, No. C07-0265-JCC, 2007 WL 4111382, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 16, 2007). Accordingly, the Court may set aside Hernandez's voluntary dismissal only if he can demonstrate that the asserted grounds for relief fall within one of the categories enumerated in Rule 60(b).
Hernandez does not assert that he moved to dismiss his case as a result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. He does not identify any newly discovered evidence or fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by the defendant, and he does he appear to challenge the validity of the judgment. Accordingly, Hernandez must demonstrate that relief is appropriate under the catchall “any other reason” provision in Rule 60(b)(6). See Scott, 2007 WL 4111382, at *3 (explaining that “[i]f the asserted ground for relief from the prior judgment does not fall within one of the specific categories enumerated in Rule 60(b)(1)-(5), relief may be available under the residual provision of the rule”)
The Ninth Circuit has instructed that Rule 60(b)(6) is to be used “‘sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice.'” Lal v. California, 610 F.3d 518, 524 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 984 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir. 1993)). Hernandez therefore may obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(6) only if he demonstrates “‘extraordinary circumstances which prevented or rendered him unable to prosecute [his case].'” Gradford v. Tiexiera, 2020 WL 5362404, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2020) (citing Cmty. Dental Servs. v. Tani, 282 F.3d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Hernandez presents no argument or evidence from which the Court could conclude that extraordinary circumstances prevented or rendered him incapable of prosecuting this case. Instead, Hernandez simply states that he moved to dismiss this action “because it was too hard.” That Hernandez found litigating this case difficult, without more, is not enough to warrant relief under Rule 60(b)(6). See Gradford, 2020 WL 5362404, at *2 (finding that “[p]ersonal, emotional, mental and social conditions do not justify setting aside the [voluntary] order of dismissal under [R]ule 60(b)(6)” because relief is appropriate only where extraordinary circumstances rendered the moving party incapable of prosecuting his case). Hernandez has failed to demonstrate that any of the grounds for relief enumerated in Rule 60(b) apply here, and therefore the district judge should deny his motion to reopen this case.
The Court notes that although the instant decision does not preclude Hernandez from asserting his claims in a new lawsuit, it appears such efforts would be futile because the statute of limitations has expired with respect to the claims Hernandez asserts here. See Sain v. City of Bend, 309 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that Oregon's two-year statute of limitations applies to Section 1983 claims).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court recommends that the district judge DENY Hernandez's Motion to Reopen Case (ECF No. 62).
SCHEDULING ORDER
The Court will refer its Findings and Recommendations to a district judge. Objections, if any, are due within fourteen (14) days. If no objections are filed, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date. If objections are filed, a response is due within fourteen (14) days. When the response is due or filed, whichever date is earlier, the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement.