Opinion
April 12, 1962.
June 13, 1962.
Unemployment Compensation — Voluntary termination of employment — Dissatisfaction concerning earnings — Evidence — Burden of proof — Findings of fact — Appellate review.
1. Dissatisfaction concerning earnings does not place an employe in the position of being compelled to quit.
2. In unemployment compensation cases, findings of fact made by the compensation authorities, if supported by the evidence, are conclusive upon appeal.
3. In unemployment compensation cases the board is not required to accept even uncontradicted testimony as true.
4. In an unemployment compensation case, in which it appears that claimant was not laid off or discharged, and that continuing work was available, the burden of proof is upon claimant to justify his voluntary termination of employment.
5. In this case, in which claimant contended that she actually quit because of a hazardous working condition, it was Held that there was no capricious disregard of competent evidence in the board's refusal to find that she had met the burden of proof, particularly in view of prior statements made by her.
Before RHODES, P.J., ERVIN, WRIGHT, WOODSIDE, WATKINS, MONTGOMERY, and FLOOD, JJ.
Appeal, No. 133, April T., 1962, by claimant, from decision of Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, No. B-68957, in re claim of Agnes Herko. Decision affirmed.
Andrew J. Gleason, with him Gleason Krumenacker, for appellant, submitted a brief.
Sydney Reuben, Assistant Attorney General, with him Raymond Kleiman, Deputy Attorney General, and David Stahl, Attorney General, for Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, appellee.
Argued April 12, 1962.
Agnes Herko was last employed by Birch Brothers, Johnstown, Pennsylvania, as a sewing machine operator. Her final day of work was August 18, 1961. Her application for benefits was disallowed by the Bureau of Employment Security, the Referee, and the Board of Review on the ground that she had voluntarily terminated her employment without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature, and that she was therefore disqualified under the provisions of Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law. Act of December 5, 1936, P.L. (1937) 2897, 43 P.S. 751 et seq. This appeal followed.
The Board's decision was based upon the following finding of fact: "3. On August 18, 1961, the claimant terminated her employment because she was dissatisfied with her wage rate". This finding is fully supported by claimant's statement at her original interview, and by her testimony at the hearing before the Referee. Findings of fact made by the compensation authorities, if supported by the evidence, are conclusive upon appeal: Cochran Unemployment Compensation Case, 197 Pa. Super. 149, 177 A.2d 26. Dissatisfaction concerning earnings does not place an employe in the position of being compelled to quit: Mollo Unemployment Compensation Case, 186 Pa. Super. 86, 140 A.2d 354; Davis Unemployment Compensation Case, 195 Pa. Super. 361, 171 A.2d 558.
It is contended on this appeal that claimant actually quit because of a "hazardous working condition". Claimant attempted to support this theory at the remand hearing. However, the Board was not required to accept her testimony, Novak Unemployment Compensation Case, 193 Pa. Super. 49, 164 A.2d 17, particularly in view of her prior statements. The record clearly discloses that claimant was not laid off or discharged, and that continuing work was available. She therefore had the burden to justify her voluntary termination of employment: Rosell Unemployment Compensation Case, 184 Pa. Super. 556, 135 A.2d 769. We find no capricious disregard of competent evidence in the Board's refusal to find that she had met that burden. Cf. Sable Unemployment Compensation Case, 197 Pa. Super. 177, 177 A.2d 115.
Decision affirmed.