" In reference to statements that there would be problems or serious problems if the secondary employer used a non-union subcontractor, the court noted that the NLRB has often held that such statements are ambiguous and do not constitute threats unless accompanied by economic actions such as strikes or picketing that resolve any ambiguity. 591 F.2d at 288. Herbert Burman, Inc. v. Local 3 Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 214 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), involved a union which told the secondary employer that a contract with a subcontractor belonging to another labor organization would violate the secondary employer's agreement with the union. The court held:

Citing Webster's New International Dictionary, one court in an opinion has said that to threaten is to express an intent to "inflict evil or injury on another;" to coerce is to "compel to any action" and restrain is to "limit, confine or restrict." Herbert Burman, Inc. v. Local 3 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 214 F. Supp. 353, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).

We are willing, for removal purposes, to presume this to be an adequate allegation of the rest. See Herbert Burman, Inc. v. Local 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 214 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Cf. Tucci v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 316 F. Supp. 1127 (W.D.Pa. 1970).

The Board followed its decision in Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 131 N.L.R.B. 1196, 1198-1200, which reasons that the building and construction industry is "an industry affecting commerce" within the meaning of § 8(b)(4). Similar reasoning has been followed in National Labor Relations Board v. Plumbers Union, 2 Cir., 299 F.2d 497, 500 (enforcing the order of 131 N.L.R.B. 1243), and in Herbert Burman, Inc. v. Local 3, IBEW, S.D.N.Y., 214 F. Supp. 353, 356-357. By analogical reference to the broad definition of "industry affecting commerce" in 29 U.S.C.A. § 142(1), these cases would support the Board's position here upon the grounds that Layne-Western is engaged in commerce (a fact conceded by all parties).

"The legislative history does indicate, however, that Congress was primarily concerned with strengthening the prohibition of secondary boycotts, and that it acted in the belief that the statute, as amended, would prohibit all activity of this sort which was `covered by the present law' and other activities not previously covered as well. Senate Resolution 181, Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Vol. II) pp. 1382, 1383." Burman, Inc. v. Local 3 Inter. Bro. of Elec. Wkrs., 214 F. Supp. 353, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The amended statute reads:

In re Burke, 9 O.C.D. 350, 17 Cr.Ct.R., N.S., 315 (1899). A threat often takes its meaning from the circumstances in which it is spoken and words that are innocuous in themselves may take on a sinister meaning in the context in which they are recited. Herbert Burman, Inc. v. Local 3 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 214 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N Y 1963)."

In re Burke, 9 O.C.D. 350, 17 Cr.Ct.R., N.S., 315 (1899). A threat often takes its meaning from the circumstances in which it is spoken and words that are innocuous in themselves may take on a sinister meaning in the context in which they are recited. Herbert Burman, Inc. v. Local 3 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 214 F. Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The court in that case stated that a threat is an expression of an intention to inflict evil or injury on another.

Thus, the second clause of Section 6(2)(d) of the PLRA and Section 8(b)(4)(ii) of the NLRA require a more strict standard of coercion or threats in order to find a violation. Herbert Burman, Inc. v. Local 3 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL–CIO, Local 144, 214 F.Supp. 353, 359 (D.N.Y.1963). Because of the differentiation between the two standards—inducement versus coercion—our interpretation of Section 6(2)(d) gives both clauses full effect.