Opinion
C. A. 6:22-cv-03278-RMG-JDA
11-01-2022
Kelvin Toyo Henry, a/k/a Kevin Toyo Banks, Plaintiff, v. Warden of Greenville County Detention Center, Officer T. Kellett, Tameesha Henry, April Young, Amari Young, Robby Reed, South Carolina, Jonathan J. Garrett, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
Kelvin Toyo Henry (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is presently incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at the Greenville County Detention Center (“GCDC”). [Doc. 1 at 2.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the pleadings filed in this matter and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the pleadings in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a standard court complaint form [Doc. 1] as well as a hand-written document containing additional allegations [Doc. 1-1], which the Court construed together as the Complaint. The undersigned previously noted that it was unclear who Plaintiff intended to name as Defendants in this action. [Doc. 9 at 6.] On the standard court form, Plaintiff listed the following Defendants: the Warden of GCDC, Simpsonville Police Department, Officer T. Kellett, the Sheriff of Simpsonville, Detective Shawn Cutting, and the Greenville County Sheriffs Office. [Doc. 1 at 1, 3.] However, Plaintiff also made references to other individuals and entities in the Complaint including Judge Ferguson, Officer Daniel Kelly, Deputy Darren Vaughn, Jonathan Garrett, Craig Hawkins, Joseph Phillips, Deputy Nash, William Brown, Wal-Mart of Greer, McDonalds, April Young, Amari Young, Robby Reed Cleve, Deputy Ruzika, Deputy R. Holcombe, Facebook, James Leathers, Officer Williams, Officer Heather Grabow, Sgt. M. Wolfe, Officer John Redman, Darrell Lee Durham, Pamela Jean Durham, Tameesha Henry, and the State of South Carolina. [Id.; Doc. 1-1 at 2.]
By Order dated October 6, 2022, the Court notified Plaintiff that, upon screening in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the Complaint was subject to summary dismissal for the reasons identified by the Court in its Order. [Doc. 9.] The Court noted, however, that Plaintiff might be able to cure the deficiencies of his Complaint and granted Plaintiff twenty-one days to file an amended complaint. [Id. at 18.] Significantly, the Court explained as follows:
[I]f Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he must clearly identify each Defendant he intends to sue in this action and provide properly completed service documents for each Defendant, including a summons and Form USM-285. Further, Plaintiff is warned that, if he names any Defendant who is not a proper party in this § 1983 action or is immune from suit, they will be subject to summary dismissal.[Id. at 7.] Plaintiff was also notified that “an amended complaint replaces all prior complaints and should be complete in itself.” [Id. at 19 (emphasis omitted).]
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint [Doc. 12], which was entered on the docket on October 17, 2022, along with a number of documents related to pending state criminal and family court proceedings involving Plaintiff [Doc. 12-1] and handwritten notes [Doc. 12-2]. As before, it is unclear to the Court who Plaintiff intends to name as Defendants. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint appears to identify the following Defendants: T. Kellett, April Young, Amari Young, Tameesha Henry, Jonathan J. Garrett, Robby Reed, the State of South Carolina, and the Warden of GCDC. [Doc. 12 at 1-3.] His proposed Summons lists the following Defendants: Tameesha Henry, the Sheriff of Simpsonville, Jonathan J. Garrett, April Young, Officer T. Kellett, Shawn Cutting, the State of South Carolina, and Darren Vaughn. [Doc. 13.] And, he has provided USM-285 forms for the following Defendants: Officer T. Kellett, April Young, the State of South Carolina, Darren Vaughn, Shawn Cutting, and Jonathan J. Garrett. [Doc. 13-1.] The Court has received additional documents and handwritten notes from Plaintiff. [Docs. 16; 16-1; 16-2; 17; 17-1; 17-2.] The notes and allegations in these documents are difficult to decipher, but appear to assert the same allegations as those made in the Amended Complaint. The undersigned has carefully reviewed each of Plaintiff's submissions.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Amended Complaint. [Doc. 12.] Plaintiff contends that Defendants have violated his rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Id. at 4.] Plaintiff contends that he was arrested due to race and sex discrimination and that Officers Garrett and Kellett did not respect his religion and interfered with his marriage. [Id.] Plaintiff contends the police have engaged in racial profiling, stolen his property, refused to set a court date or trial, engaged in misinformation, ignored evidence, and endangered his children. [Id.]
In a document received by the Court on October 31, 2022, Plaintiff contends his claims arise from violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments as well as the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, the “Civil Death Civiliter Mortuus Bouvier,” civil conspiracy under section 1985, neglect of duty, and the Jim Crow Act. [Doc. 17 at 1-3.]
Plaintiff claims that he was harassed and sexually assaulted by April Young and her daughter on June 20, 2020, at a McDonald's restaurant, and that he was shot by his wife, Tameesha Henry, on December 25, 2021. [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff also claims that he slipped and fell on January 15, 2022, apparently at GCDC, because the door and floor were unsafe. [Id.] According to Plaintiff, the guards knew about it and allowed the door to fall on top of his chest. [Id.] Plaintiff claims he fell and hit his head and back, causing a wound to reopen. [Id.] Plaintiff claims that all of these incidents were recorded on video surveillance that are now under the control of the State of South Carolina. [Id.] Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the incidents were recorded by “lots of people in public places,” police body cameras, GCDC security cameras, drive thru cameras, and “cameras everywhere.” [Id.]
As to his injuries, Plaintiff makes the following allegations, which are quoted substantially verbatim.
Emotional stress from the mistreatment because I am a black man. Then shot and taken from the hospital with no further treatment. Need medicine to stop the pain in fact barely can walk. My foot is in pain. Nothing to stop the pain. So much fear for my life and see how over years this system won't protect me from anything is heart crushing. Sick of not going to Court to really prove what happened. Shower door fell on my chest.[Id. at 6.] For his relief, Plaintiff asks that he be taken to court so that he can give his side about what happened. [Id.]
The Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff has been charged in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions with the following crimes: pointing and presenting firearms at a person at case number 2020A2320400314; assault and battery, 1st degree, at case number 2020A2320400316; criminal sexual conduct with a minor, 3rd degree, at case number 2020A2320400317; pointing and presenting firearms at a person at case number 2020A2320400318; assault and battery, 1st degree, at case number 2020A2320400319; attempted murder at case number 2021A2330211857; possession of a weapon during a violent crime at case number 2021A2330211858; and attempted murder at case number 2021A2330211859. See Greenville County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/PublicIndex/ PISearch.aspx (search by the case numbers listed above) (last visited Oct. 26, 2022). Those charges all remain pending against Plaintiff at this time.
See Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411,417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Balt. City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). “And, although the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) are very liberal, more detail often is required than the bald statement by plaintiff that he has a valid claim of some type against defendant.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotations omitted). This is particularly true in a § 1983 action where “liability is personal, based upon each defendant's own constitutional violations.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). “In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.... Consequently, [defendants] must have had personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation of [plaintiff]'s rights in order to be liable.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, for the reasons below, this action is subject to summary dismissal.
Defendants Entitled to Dismissal
First, many, if not all, of the named Defendants are entitled to summary dismissal as explained below. As noted, it is unclear who Plaintiff intends to name as Defendants in this action despite the Court's previous Order instructing Plaintiff to clearly identify each Defendant he intends to sue in this action, to provide properly completed service documents for each Defendant, including a summons and Form USM-285, and to provide allegations as to each Defendant's personal involvement in the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff has failed to do so. The Court will briefly address the Defendants that appear to be named in this action.
Tameesha Henry, April Young, Amari Young, and Robby Reed
Tameesha Henry, April and Amari Young, and Robby Reed are each entitled to summary dismissal because they are not state actors for purposes of this § 1983 action. As noted, in order to state a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must allege that he was deprived of a constitutional right by a person acting under the color of state law. Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998). Stated differently, “[i]n order to be a proper party defendant in a § 1983 action, the defendant must be, or step into the role of, a public actor.” Palmore v. Wal-Mart, No. 9:08-cv-2484-GRA-BM, 2009 WL 1457136, at *3 (D.S.C. May 22, 2009), aff'd, 332 Fed.Appx. 863 (4th Cir. 2009).
Tameesha Henry appears to be Plaintiff's current or former wife and the mother of his children. [Doc. 12 at 5.] Plaintiff alleges that Tameesha Henry shot him on December 25, 2021. [Id.]
Plaintiff alleges that April and Amari Young harassed and sexually assaulted him in the parking lot of a McDonald's on June 20, 2020. [Doc. 12 at 5.]
Robby Reed appears to be a civilian witness that was interviewed by Officer Kellett as part of a police investigation. [See Doc. 12-1 at 20.] Plaintiff makes no allegations about Robby Reed in his Complaint.
Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that these four Defendants are state actors. Further, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that these Defendants were wilful participants in joint action with the police such that they are subject to liability under § 1983. “Just because employees of a private entity call the police to investigate suspicious activity or allow police officers to patrol its parking lots or common areas and/or arrest individuals on its property, does not make the private entity a public actor for purposes of a § 1983 claim.” Id. at *4. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against these four Defendants are not proper in this § 1983 action because they are not state actors, and they are therefore entitled to dismissal.
Police Officers
Plaintiff appears to name four police officers as Defendants-T. Kellett, Jonathan J. Garrett, Shawn Cutting, and Darren Vaughn. Plaintiff's claims against the Defendant police officers are unclear. However, the undersigned is able to glean the following allegations as to these Defendants. First, Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants Garrett and Kellett arrested him “due to race” and “sex discrimination.” [Doc. 12 at 4.] He also contends these two Defendants did not respect his religion and “separate[d]” his marriage. [Id.] In his attachments to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff appears to make the following additional allegations. He contends that Defendant Kellett knew he worked at McDonald's and attempted to “ambush [Plaintiff] like some evil monster that worked at McDonald's that could not be stopped.” [Doc. 12-1 at 3.] Plaintiff also contends that Defendant Kellett “had [Plaintiff's] supervisor . . . call [him] up to Wal-Mart to stage an arrest.” [Id.] Further, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Kellett “took [his] wallet and used [his] credit card.” [Id.] Plaintiff also contends that Defendant Kellett “did everything but get in contact with [Plaintiff] to see what [he] had to say.” [Id.] Plaintiff also makes general, vague allegations that police officers deprived him of due process, falsely arrested him, endangered his children, failed to properly investigate, and brought “trumped-up” charges against him. [ Id. at 2-9.]
Even accepting these allegations as true and construing them in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Amended Complaint fails to state any claim for relief against the Defendant police officers. Plaintiff's contentions that Defendant police officers engaged in race or sex discrimination are without merit because he has not alleged any facts to support a claim for discrimination. The only allegations that can be liberally construed to relate to a claim for discrimination in the Amended Complaint are Plaintiff's contentions that he is black, that he has been charged under “Jim Crow” laws, and that he is being treated as a “moder[n] day Emmit Till.” [Id. at 7, 9 (internal quotation marks omitted).] These cursory allegations do not satisfy the pleading requirements to state a plausible claim for relief.
As to any claims that Defendant police officers violated the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff cannot pursue any such claims. Significantly, Plaintiff has attached copies of the police officers' incident reports [Doc. 12-1 at 10-14, 20-21] and two separate arrest warrants related to the charges of attempted murder and pointing and presenting a firearm, which both remain pending against him [id. at 15-16]. In light of these facially valid arrest warrants, Plaintiff cannot pursue a § 1983 claim for false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Howell v. Taylor, No. 3:13-cv-2111-JFA-PJG, 2013 WL 6240518, at *6 (D.S.C. Dec. 3, 2013); Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998) (“[A] claim for false arrest may be considered only when no arrest warrant has been obtained.”).
Further, Plaintiff cannot state a claim for malicious prosecution as a matter of law. “An indictment, fair upon its face, returned by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.” Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). To the extent Plaintiff is asserting a claim for malicious prosecution, any such claim fails because he has not alleged the underlying criminal proceedings terminated in his favor and because the prosecution is supported by probable cause as conclusively established by the numerous indictments against him for the many charges pending against him in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions. Id. In sum, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief that is plausible against any of the Defendant police officers.
Supervisory Officials
Plaintiff names certain individuals, such as the Warden of GCDC, who appear to be sued because they are supervisors. Any such supervisory officials are subject to dismissal to the extent that Plaintiff's claims against them are based on supervisory liability because the doctrine of respondeat superior is generally not applicable in § 1983 actions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir. 1999). For a supervisory official to be held liable for constitutional injuries inflicted by his subordinates, certain criteria must be established. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). Specifically, a plaintiff must show that the supervisory official was (1) actually or constructively aware of a risk of constitutional injury, (2) and deliberately indifferent to that risk, and (3) that an affirmative causal link exists between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Carter, 164 F.3d at 221. Here, the Complaint contains no plausible allegations against any Defendant to make such a showing.
No Personal Involvement
Finally, as to any remaining individuals identified in the Complaint or in the proposed service documents, Plaintiff fails to make allegations against them to support a cause of action because he makes no allegations about their direct, personal involvement in the events underlying his claims. Instead, Plaintiff merely names the Defendants in the caption and he makes only general, vague allegations about the injuries he allegedly suffered. However, “such general allegations, absent any specific facts of personal involvement in the events giving rise to this case, are insufficient to state a cognizable § 1983 claim.” Tracey v. Nelson, No. 1:12-cv-1614-JMC-SVH, 2012 WL 4583107, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 4588205 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2012). Because Plaintiff makes no factual allegations in the Complaint of personal involvement against the named Defendants, they are each entitled to summary dismissal. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (“Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed.”); Newkirk v. Cir. Ct. of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (finding the complaint was subject to summary dismissal where plaintiff made no factual allegations against the named defendants within the body of the pleading).
Failure to State a Claim
It is unclear to the Court what causes of action Plaintiff intends to state in his Amended Complaint. To the extent Plaintiff asserts claims for false arrest and/or malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, those claims fail for the reasons already stated.
Further, liberally construed, the Amended Complaint might be asserting claims for deliberate indifference to his medical needs. Specifically, the Amended Complaint contains various confusing and conclusory allegations concerning Plaintiff being shot and slipping and falling in the shower. However, Plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim for relief that is plausible.
To the extent Plaintiff intends to assert a claim related to being shot by Tameesha Henry, he is unable to state a claim for relief as she is not a state actor, as discussed above. To the extent Plaintiff intends to assert a claim related to any deliberate indifference as to his treatment for any injury arising from being shot by his wife, he has failed to state a claim for relief because he provides no allegations regarding the personal involvement of any individual who is responsible for his medical treatment or how any such treatment or lack of treatment rises to the level of deliberate indifference. Likewise, to the extent Plaintiff intends to state a claim related to his slip and fall in the shower, he has failed to allege any facts against any individual to state a claim for deliberate indifference.
Abstention under Younger
Finally, the Court should abstain from hearing Plaintiff's claims related to his pending state court criminal charges. Plaintiff makes various confusing and cursory allegations regarding the underlying incidents and investigations related to the criminal charges pending against him. Thus, the crux of this action appears to be a challenge to the charges pending against Plaintiff in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions as well as his current detention in the GCDC.
To the extent Plaintiff is seeking release from custody, such relief is not available in this civil rights action. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (stating that “habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983”); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 487-88 (1973) (explaining a challenge to the duration of confinement is within the core of habeas corpus). “Release from pretrial detention is simply not an available remedy in a § 1983 action.” El v. Fornandes, No. 2:19-cv-3045-RMG-MGB, 2019 WL 7900140, at * 4 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 2019) (explaining a plaintiff cannot use § 1983 to get out of jail), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 6712057 (D.S.C. Dec. 10, 2019).
Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief related to his pending state court criminal charges, including dismissal of those charges, such claims are not properly before this Court based on the Younger abstention doctrine. Liberally construed, the Complaint appears to assert that the pending state court criminal proceedings against Plaintiff are improper and violate his constitutional rights, and he asks that his criminal charges be dismissed. Granting Plaintiff's requested relief, however, would require this Court to interfere with or enjoin the pending state court criminal proceedings against him. As discussed below, because a federal court may not award relief that would affect pending state proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances, this Court should abstain from interfering with it.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not equitably interfere with state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Younger Court noted that courts of equity should not act unless the moving party has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief. Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44; see also Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013) (explaining the circumstances when Younger abstention is appropriate).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has culled the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: “[1] there are ongoing state judicial proceedings; [2] the proceedings implicate important state interests; and [3] there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Rels., 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). Here, Plaintiff is involved in ongoing state court criminal proceedings, and Plaintiff asks this Court to award relief for alleged constitutional violations related to his pending criminal actions; thus, the first element is satisfied. The second element is satisfied for reasons the Supreme Court has explained: “[T]he States' interest in administering their criminal justice systems free from federal interference is one of the most powerful of the considerations that should influence a court considering equitable types of relief.” Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 49 (1986). The third element is also satisfied, as the Supreme Court has noted “that ordinarily a pending state prosecution provides the accused a fair and sufficient opportunity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.” Gilliam, 75 F.3d at 903 (quoting Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124 (1975)).
A ruling in Plaintiff's favor in this case would call into question the validity of the state court criminal proceedings against him and would significantly interfere with those ongoing state proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-45; Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989) (“[F]ederal courts should abstain from the decision of constitutional challenges to state action, however meritorious the complaint may be, ‘whenever [the] federal claims have been or could be presented in ongoing state judicial proceedings that concern important state interests.'”) (citation omitted); Washington v. Tilton, No. 2:10-cv-997-HFF-RSC, 2010 WL 2084383, at *1 (D.S.C. May 19, 2010). This Court finds that Plaintiff can adequately litigate his federal constitutional rights in the state court proceedings. Thus, this Court should abstain from adjudicating Plaintiff's claims related to the pending criminal charges against him and his present detention at the GCDC.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A without further leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).