Opinion
C. A. 8:23-cv-01114-SAL-JDA
05-18-2023
Christopher Scott Henry, a/k/a Chicken Man, Plaintiff, v. Nurse Lydia, Nurse Tamara, Nurse Brittany, Officer Lewis, Officer Wells, Cherokee County Detention Center, Officer Blackwell, Officer Beloe, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austi United States Magistrate Judge
Christopher Scott Henry (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff is presently incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at the Cherokee County Detention Center (the “Detention Center”). [Docs. 1 at 2; 13 at 2, 4.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B), D.S.C., the undersigned
Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the pleadings filed in this matter and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the pleadings in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to dismissal.
BACKGROUND
Procedural History
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on the standard court form. [Doc. 1.] By Order dated April 27, 2023, the Court notified Plaintiff that, upon screening in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the Complaint was subject to summary dismissal for the reasons identified by the Court in its Order. [Doc. 11.] The Court noted, however, that Plaintiff might be able to cure the deficiencies of his Complaint and granted Plaintiff twenty-one days to file an amended complaint. [Id. at 15.] Plaintiff was notified that “an amended complaint replaces all prior complaints and should be complete in itself.” [Id. at 6.] Further, Plaintiff was specifically warned as follows:
If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint that corrects those deficiencies identified [in the Court's Order], this action will be recommended for summary dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A.[Id. (emphasis omitted).] Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, which was entered on the docket on May 17, 2023. [Docs. 13; 13-2.]
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is comprised of a standard civil rights complaint form [Doc. 13] and a handwritten attachment [Doc. 13-2], which are both construed together as the Amended Complaint.
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Amended Complaint, which are nearly identical to those made in the original Complaint. Plaintiff alleges that black mold will cause pneumonia and death; that overcrowding causes diseases, sickness, and death; that life is not fair; and that, as long as he is in the Detention Center, he will not ask the nurses for help because he knows he will not receive care. [Doc. 13-2 at 1.] Plaintiff alleges that there are 48 beds in the E Unit but there are 105 inmates, which constitutes overcrowding. [Id. at 2.]
The original Complaint named the following Defendants: the Cherokee County Detention Center, Nurse Lydia, Nurse Tamara, Nurse Brittany, Officer Lewis, Officer Wells, Officer Blackwell, and Officer Beloe. [Doc. 1 at 1.] The Amended Complaint names the following Defendants: the Cherokee County Detention Center, Nurse Lydia, Nurse Tamara, Nurse Brittany, and all officers that work at the jail. [Doc. 13 at 1-3.]
Plaintiff alleges “[t]here are many possible health hazards that make [the Detention Center] unfit for living conditions” and that black mold can cause pneumonia and death. [Id. at 5.] He alleges that black mold “can cause[ him] lot's of health hazards as [he] get[s] older” such as lung diseases like COPD, black lung, and tuberculosis. [Id.] He alleges that overcrowding can cause diseases, sickness, and death, and that “overcrowding [i]s a crime for smelling inmate's gas all the time and is a punishment.” [Id. at 6.]
Plaintiff alleges that it is “[p]oor and unlawful [for him to] lay in the floor for 90 to 120 days in [p]ain and [h]ollering for help and care.” [Id. at 7.] Plaintiff alleges that he was coughing up green mucous; that he asked for help for his headache, sinus pain, and a fever; and that “she” gave him three pills and one sinus pill but nothing else. [Id.]
Plaintiff alleges that he was given knit panties to put on as boxers, which was offensive to him. [Id. at 9.] Finally, Plaintiff alleges he has been denied access to a law library. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if Plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court would still be charged with screening Plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the Complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Balt. City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). “And, although the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) are very liberal, more detail often is required than the bald statement by plaintiff that he has a valid claim of some type against defendant.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotations omitted). This is particularly true in a § 1983 action where “liability is personal, based upon each defendant's own constitutional violations.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). “In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.... Consequently, [defendants] must have had personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation of [plaintiff]'s rights in order to be liable.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, for the reasons below, this action is subject to summary dismissal. Defendants Entitled to Dismissal
As an initial matter, the undersigned finds that all Defendants are entitled to dismissal from this action because they are not proper parties subject to suit under § 1983 or because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts against them to demonstrate their personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations.
Cherokee County Detention Center
First, to the extent Plaintiff intends to name the Detention Center as a Defendant, it is entitled to dismissal from this action. It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law, and, therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). The Detention Center is a facility or building and, as such, is not subject to suit because it cannot be sued as a “person” in a § 1983 lawsuit. See Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-cv-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that the detention center is “a building and not a person” and thus is not amenable to suit under § 1983); see also Harden, 27 Fed.Appx. at 178 (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983). Accordingly, the Detention Center is entitled to summary dismissal from this § 1983 action.
Individual Defendants
As noted, the original Complaint named Officers Lewis, Wells, Blackwell, and Beloe [Doc. 1 at 1], while the Amended Complaint names “[a]ll that work at this Jail[,] [a]ll officers.” [Doc. 13 at 1-3]. Additionally, both the original Complaint and the Amended Complaint name Nurse Lydia, Nurse Tamara, and Nurse Brittany. [Docs. 1 at 1; 13 at 1-3.]
The individual Defendants all should be dismissed as Plaintiff fails to make allegations against them about their direct, personal involvement in the events underlying his claims. Instead, Plaintiff merely names the these Defendants in the caption and makes only general, vague allegations about the injuries he allegedly suffered. However, “such general allegations, absent any specific facts of personal involvement in the events giving rise to this case, are insufficient to state a cognizable § 1983 claim.” Tracey v. Nelson, No. 1:12-cv-1614-JMC-SVH, 2012 WL 4583107, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 4588205 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2012). Because Plaintiff makes no factual allegations in the Amended Complaint of personal involvement against any of the individual Defendants, they are each entitled to summary dismissal. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (“Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed.”); Newkirk v. Cir. Ct. of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (finding the complaint was subject to summary dismissal where plaintiff made no factual allegations against the named defendants within the body of the pleading).
Claims Subject to Dismissal
Additionally, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's claims are subject to dismissal from this action because they are not cognizable or because Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to state a plausible claim for relief.
Overcrowding
First, Plaintiff appears to allege that he has been subjected to overcrowding. Such a claim is construed as one challenging the constitutionality of the conditions of Plaintiff's confinement. A pretrial detainee's conditions of confinement claim is evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment, which is used to evaluate conditions of confinement for those convicted of crimes. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). Unlike convicted inmates, pretrial detainees have not been adjudicated guilty of a crime and may not be subjected to any form of “punishment.” Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). In any event, “[t]he due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the [E]ighth [A]mendment protections available to the convicted prisoner.” Id. at 870. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition on “cruel and unusual punishments” imposes certain basic duties on prison officials. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Under the Eighth Amendment, protection against cruel and unusual punishment includes protection against inhumane conditions of imprisonment. Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff is a prisoner in a county detention center, not a guest in a hotel, and it should be expected that conditions in such a setting are often less than ideal. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979) (“[T]he fact that such detention interferes with the detainee's understandable desire to live as comfortably as possible with as little restraint as possible during confinement does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into ‘punishment.'”); Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1236 (7th Cir.1988) (“Inmates cannot expect the amenities, conveniences and services of a good hotel.”). To establish a cognizable claim of overcrowding, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the overcrowding combined with other substandard conditions of confinement had “a mutually enforcing effect that produce[d] the deprivation of a single, identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise,” or that the overcrowding created an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health, and that the defendants deliberately disregarded that risk. Williams v. Griffin, 952 F.2d 820, 824 (4th Cir. 1991); Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35-36 (1993).
Here, Plaintiff has only made conclusory allegations regarding overcrowding and has failed to allege facts showing that any conditions of overcrowding have created an unreasonable risk of harm to his health or that Defendants deliberately disregarded that risk. See Plyler v. Leeke, 804 F.2d 1251, 1986 WL 18030, at *3 (4th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table decision) (noting that it is “well settled” that overcrowding of prisons, including double or triple celling, does not necessarily violate the Constitution); Jenkins v. Cannon, No. 0:09-cv-283-TLW-PJG, 2009 WL 3233484, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2009) (finding the plaintiff failed to state a cognizable constitutional claim where “seven men are in a cell made for four men, which is not quite double capacity” because “[t]he complaint does not allege any deprivations of food, medical care, or sanitation due to the overcrowding”).
The only allegation in the Amended Complaint that even hints at a risk of harm to Plaintiff's health is his contention that overcrowding “[i]s a crime for smelling inmate's gas all the time.” [Doc. 13-2 at 6.] Such an allegation is insufficient to state a claim for relief of a constitutional magnitude. See, e.g., Bailey v. Rife, No. 1:21-cv-00424, 2021 WL 6496561, at *7 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 19, 2021) (“[T]he mere smell or presence of human waste or body fluids does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2022 WL 130746 (S.D. W.Va. Jan. 13, 2022).
In sum, Plaintiff “has failed to show that the overcrowding or cramped cell conditions resulted from prison rules which can be characterized as ‘vindictive, cruel, or inhuman' or that the overcrowding resulted from an ‘arbitrary or capricious' exercise of judgment by prison officials.” Ross v. Russell, No. 7:20-cv-000774, 2022 WL 767093, at *16 (W.D. Va. Mar. 14, 2022) (quoting Crowe, 540 F.2d at 742). As such, Plaintiff's claim regarding overcrowding is subject to dismissal as he has not alleged facts to state a plausible claim for relief.
Conditions of Confinement
In addition to alleging that he has been subjected to overcrowding, Plaintiff makes other general, vague allegations concerning various conditions of his confinement at the Detention Center. For example, Plaintiff makes reference to black mold and “combined public communications” [Doc. 13-2 at 5, 9] and he asserts he was given knit panties to use as boxers, which was offensive to him [id. at 9].
The applicable standard for a conditions-of-confinement claim was summarized in the section above. In light of that standard, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief that is plausible for the following reasons.
First, Plaintiff's vague, general allegations simply fail to state a claim for relief. Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se pleadings, Plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements to state a claim. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing that the asserted conditions of his confinement resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights and his cursory allegations do not rise to the level of a Fourteenth Amendment violation. The deprivations alleged in a conditions-of-confinement claim must be serious and the defendants must be deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's needs. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992); Wall v. Knowlin, No. 9:07-cv-3199-HMH-GCK, 2007 WL 3232129, at *5 (D.S.C. Oct. 31, 2007). Here, the Amended Complaint contains no such allegations as Plaintiff simply lists black mold and combined public communications and asserts he was given knit panties. Plaintiff does not allege any other facts to demonstrate that those conditions violate his constitutional rights.
Likewise, Plaintiff has failed to allege any actual injury as to the conditions of his confinement. To state a claim for relief of a constitutional magnitude, Plaintiff must allege more than unpleasant or uncomfortable living conditions. Hammonds v. Wolfe, No. 3:18-cv-1377, 2020 WL 1243609, at *4 (S.D. W.Va. Mar. 13, 2020). “[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), and “[o]nly extreme deprivations are adequate to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim regarding conditions of confinement,” De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003). As to his injuries, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]here are many possible health hazards that make [the Detention Center] unfit for living conditions”; that black mold can cause pneumonia and death; and that black mold “can cause[ him] lot's of health hazards as [he] get[s] older” such as lung diseases like COPD, black lung, and tuberculosis. [Doc. 13-2 at 5.] However, “the allegation that a plaintiff will suffer a future injury at the hands of a defendant must be non-speculative and must evince more specificity than the future harm will occur ‘some day.'” Virginia Animal Owners All. v. Herring, 543 F.Supp.3d 302, 312 (E.D. Va. 2021) (citation omitted). “In the majority of instances, [a] claim should be dismissed as unripe if the plaintiff has not yet suffered injury and any future impact ‘remains wholly speculative.” Brown-Thomas v. Hynie, 441 F.Supp.3d 180, 198 (D.S.C. 2019) (alteration in original; internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Additionally, Plaintiff has not identified any specific person responsible for the alleged deprivations and therefore has failed to present facts showing that any particular individual was deliberately indifferent. Plaintiff's “claims may proceed only if he identifies the individuals responsible for each of these alleged actions” and he must “provide sufficient facts to show that each named defendant participated in the alleged violations that [Plaintiff] is asserting against that defendant.” Manners v. Fogan, No. TDC-21-cv-1444, 2022 WL 1501086, at *2 (D. Md. May 12, 2022); see also Ashworth v. S. Cent. Reg'l Jail, No. 2:20-cv-00041, 2022 WL 17365732, at *5 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 8, 2022) (“Plaintiff has not alleged or demonstrated any actual injury from these conditions of confinement, and he has not identified any individual prison or medical staff who allegedly subjected him to these conditions. Thus, his allegations fail to give rise to any plausible claim for relief under § 1983.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2022 WL 17365713 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 1, 2022).
Access to a Law Library
Next, Plaintiff appears to assert a claim for denial of access to a law library. [Doc. 13-2 at 9.] However, any such claim is subject to dismissal.
Plaintiff is being temporarily held in a county detention center. The law is clear that those being temporarily detained in county facilities awaiting criminal trials do not have a constitutional right to a law library, and Plaintiff's claim, therefore, fails as a matter of law. Jones v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., 586 F.Supp.2d 444, 448 (D.S.C. 2008). This is so because, while “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries,” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977), the Fourth Circuit has unambiguously held that local jails, designed for temporary detainment, are generally not required to have a law library, see Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451, 452 (4th Cir. 1987). See also United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1360 (4th Cir. 1978) (discussing applicability of Bounds to pretrial detainees). A careful review of the allegations in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint shows that his contentions do not raise a plausible federal claim under § 1983 because there is no constitutional right to a law library in a local, short-term detention facility such as the Detention Center. Furthermore, Plaintiff has made no allegations of any real injury and/or prejudice that he actually suffered as a result of the alleged inadequate access to legal materials while he was held in pretrial detention. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350-55 (1996) (explaining a plaintiff must allege actual injury resulting from an allegedly inadequate jail library in order to state a claim under § 1983). Plaintiff has not identified any specific claim that he was unable to litigate because of the alleged denial of access to a law library, other than to assert that he suffered deliberate indifference to medical needs and various unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to show an actual injury. In the absence of an alleged actual injury and prejudice to a constitutional right resulting from Plaintiff's lack of access to a law library, any such claim is without merit. See, e.g., Payne v. Lucas, No. 6:11-cv-01767-DCN-KFM, 2012 WL 988137, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 988133 (D.S.C. Mar. 22, 2012); Crawford v. Nash, No. 4:08-cv-4092-GRA-TER, 2009 WL 580348, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 5, 2009).
Deliberate Indifference
Finally, liberally construed, the Amended Complaint appears to assert a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that he was coughing up green mucous; that he asked for help for his headache, sinus pain, and a fever; and that “she” gave him three pills and one sinus pill but nothing else. [Doc. 13-2 at 7.]
To state a claim for denial of medical care, a plaintiff must allege facts showing prison officials were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976) (explaining that, to show inadequate medical treatment rises to the level of a constitutional violation, a plaintiff “must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs”). “Thus, plaintiff must allege two distinct elements to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. First, he must allege a sufficiently serious medical need. Second, he must allege deliberate indifference to that serious medical need.” Quick v. Hercules, No. 1:12-cv-962-TSE-TCB, 2012 WL 4758679, at *2 (E.D. Va. Oct. 4, 2012) (citations omitted). However, “[a] § 1983 claim is not stated by disagreements between an inmate and a physician over treatment, diagnosis, or other questions of medical judgment.” Barton v. Dorriety, No. 9:10-cv-01362-RBH, 2011 WL 1049510, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2011). Further, “[t]he mere failure to treat all medical problems to a prisoner's satisfaction, even if actual medical malpractice is involved, is insufficient to support a claim under § 1983.” Id. (noting the plaintiff's allegations that medical staff conspired to fabricate medical records did not state a claim for deliberate indifference and finding the plaintiff's claim to be essentially “one of disagreement with his medical treatment plan”).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts under the applicable standard to show that any Defendant acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Beyond conclusorily asserting that he was denied care, his pleadings are void of plausible allegations regarding injuries or illness that required medical care beyond that which he actually received. See Griffith v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 2:12-cv-00239-DCN, 2012 WL 2048200, at *1 (D.S.C. June 6, 2012) (finding that the plausibility standard requires more than “‘an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.'” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)). Indeed, Plaintiff concedes that he was given medication for his symptoms. [Doc. 13-2 at 7.] However, he appears to disagree with the medical care he received. Nevertheless, he is not entitled to the treatment of his choice. See Sharpe v. S.C. Dep't of Corrs., 621 Fed.Appx. 732, 733 (4th Cir. 2015) (noting that “mere disagreement between an inmate and medical staff regarding the proper course of treatment provides no basis for relief” under § 1983). And, Plaintiff fails to identify any individual responsible for the denial of any medical care. As such, Plaintiff's Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for medical indifference.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A without further leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
As Plaintiff has been afforded an opportunity to file an Amended Complaint, but failed to correct his pleading deficiencies, the undersigned recommends that this action be dismissed without further leave to amend.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
250 East North Street, Suite 2300
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).