Id. (quoting Colton v. Colton, 127 U.S. 300, 319 (1888)) Therefore, "words of request or expectation are presumably indicative of nothing more, unless the context, or circumstances surrounding the testator at the time of making the will, show that he, though using the language of request, really meant to leave the legatee no option in the matter." Id. at 364-65; see also Henry v. Curb, 430 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. Civ. App.—Eastland 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Accordingly, we must determine whether the manner in which Clarence and Mildred used "request" in section 14.02 shows an intent that there was a mandatory duty to arbitrate this dispute.

Byars v. Byars, 143 Tex. 10, 182 S.W.2d 363, 365 (1944). Also see: Goldring v. Goldring, 523 S.W.2d 749, 757 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1975, ref'd n.r.e.); Woods v. Wedgeworth, 453 S.W.2d 385 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1970, n.w.h.); Henry v. Curb, 430 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1968, ref'd n.r.e.). The mother of the appellees (sister-in-law of Lacy and Ruby Hunt) testified that there was an agreement between Lacy and Ruby Hunt that half of the estate would go to Ruby Hunt's sisters and half would go to Lacy Hunt's nephews.

The case is clearly distinguishable in view of the fact that the word held to be precatory in that case was the word "request', and the words "will" and "desire" were not before that court for consideration. The case of Henry v. Curb, 430 S.W.2d 29 (Tex.Civ.App., Eastland 1958, wr. ref., n.r.e.) held the words "desire" and "request" as precatory and not testamentary, but there the words in question were used after a fee simple estate had been granted. A reading of the case shows the distinction.