Opinion
No. 02-CV-6398P.
June 29, 2004
DECISION ORDER
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff Katherine Hennelly (hereinafter "Hennelly") has filed suit against her former employer, the Greenwood Central School District, alleging that she was subjected to sex discrimination, sexual harassment and retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York Human Rights Law. (Docket #1). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the parties have consented to have a United States magistrate judge conduct all further proceedings in this case, including the entry of final judgment. (Docket #8). Currently before this Court is plaintiff's motion for leave to amend the Complaint. (Docket # 27). For the reasons discussed below, plaintiff's motion is denied.
On April 14, 2003, this case was referred to the undersigned consistent with the terms of the original referral order to former United States Magistrate Judge William G. Bauer and the parties' consent. (Docket #14). On October 3, 2002, United States District Judge David G. Larimer had referred this case to former Magistrate Judge Bauer for the purposes designated above. (Docket # 5).
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
According to her Complaint, Hennelly was hired as a principal for the Greenwood Central School District (the "District") in July 1999, at which time Steven Schoonmaker ("Schoonmaker") was the Superintendent of the District and her immediate supervisor. The Complaint alleges that Schoonmaker was hostile, demeaning, verbally abusive, and made inappropriate sexual comments towards Hennelly. (Docket #1). Hennelly allegedly complained about such behavior to the Greenwood Board of Education on numerous occasions, and, in April 2000, the Board requested Schoonmaker's resignation. According to the Complaint, three weeks later the Board also requested Hennelly's resignation, explaining that "it had been a bad year." Following her resignation, the District combined the positions of principal and superintendent and hired a male to fill the newly-created position. (Docket #1).In July 2000, Hennelly filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the New York State Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR"). On May 1, 2002, Hennelly received a right to sue letter from the EEOC and filed a pro se complaint with this Court on July 26, 2002. (Docket #1). The only defendant named in the Complaint was the Greenwood Central School District — a proper party in a Title VII lawsuit. The Complaint did not include claims against Schoonmaker personally. (Docket #1).
On February 3, 2004, attorney Jeffrey Wicks filed a Notice of Appearance on behalf of Hennelly. Shortly thereafter, Wicks filed the pending motion requesting leave to file an amended complaint. The motion seeks to add Schoonmaker as a defendant and to add various factual allegations detailing the purported discrimination, harassment and retaliation. (Docket # 27).
DISCUSSION
Hennelly argues that leave to amend the complaint should be granted because she only recently has been able to obtain counsel and because defendant will not be prejudiced by the amendment. The District opposes the amendment on the grounds that Hennelly unduly delayed in seeking leave to amend and that such amendment, even if allowed, would be futile. (Docket # 30).A. Amendment to Complaint : Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that once the time for amending a pleading as of right has expired, a party may request leave of the court to amend, which "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by the party seeking leave to amend may be a proper subject of relief, the party should be afforded the opportunity to test the claim on its merits. See United States ex rel. Maritime Admin. v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, 889 F.2d 1248, 1254 (2d Cir. 1989). "In the absence of any apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc. — the leave sought should, as the rules require, be `freely given.'" Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
While the court retains discretion to grant or deny leave to amend under Rule 15(a), "[the] outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules." Id. at 182; Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993); Evans v. Syracuse City School Dist., 704 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1983).
Of particular importance when considering a party's motion to amend is whether the non-moving party will be prejudiced by such amendment. According to the Second Circuit, when evaluating prejudice, a court must consider "whether the assertion of the new claim would: (i) require the opponent to expend significant additional resources to conduct discovery and prepare for trial; (ii) significantly delay the resolution of the dispute; or (iii) prevent the plaintiff from bringing a timely action in another jurisdiction." Block v. First Blood Assoc., 988 F.2d 344, 350 (2d Cir. 2993) (citations omitted).
"One of the most important considerations in determining whether amendment would be prejudicial is the degree to which it would delay the final disposition of the action." Krumme v. WestPoint Stevens Inc., 143 F.3d 71, 88 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1041 (1998) (internal quotation omitted). Mere delay, however, unaccompanied by either bad faith or undue prejudice, does not warrant denial of leave to amend. Block v. First Blood Assoc., 988 F.2d at 350 (citing State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 856 (2d Cir. 1981)).
Here, Hennelly contends that the amended complaint should be allowed so that she may assert claims she "overlooked" in her original pro se complaint. (Docket #27). According to Hennelly, the amendment will not result in undue delay because little discovery has taken place and no trial date has been set. Defendant counters that Hennelly unduly delayed by not retaining counsel until a year and one-half after she filed the original complaint. Moreover, according to defendant, depositions have already been taken and factual discovery has been completed. Indeed, this Court's Final Amended Scheduling Order required that all factual discovery be completed by May 3, 2004 and that all motions to compel be filed by April 3, 2004. (Docket #25). See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Amerford Int'l Corp., 22 F.3d 458, 462 (2d Cir. 1994) (court did not abuse discretion in denying leave to amend when plaintiff moved four months after deadline for amendments).
During oral argument on May 18, 2004, counsel for Hennelly moved orally for an extension of the discovery deadlines to permit him to depose Schoonmaker, who had not been deposed in this action. This Court granted such motion, giving counsel until July 6, 2004 to conduct the requested deposition. Counsel has advised the Court that Schoonmaker's deposition is scheduled to occur within that time frame.
This Court does not find that Hennelly acted in bad faith in delaying her request for leave to amend. Hennelly asserts that she incorrectly believed Schoonmaker was automatically included as a party in this lawsuit due to the fact that he was employed by Greenwood Central School District during the relevant time period. Accepting that assertion as true, her delay in seeking the amendment until counsel appeared in the case is understandable — until that time, she did not realize that such amendment was even necessary. When she did, which presumably occurred after retaining counsel, she promptly sought leave to amend. B. Futility of Amendment : Defendant claims that even if Hennelly did not unduly delay in seeking to amend her complaint, the motion should be denied because the proposed causes of action against Schoonmaker are time-barred under both federal and New York law. Thus, according to defendant, granting an amendment to the Complaint would be an act of futility. This Court agrees. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Amerford Int'l Corp., 22 F.3d at 462 ("[u]ndue delay and futility of the amendment, among other factors, are reasons to deny leave"). 1. Futility of Federal Claims: Under Title VII, a claim must be filed within ninety days of receipt of a right to sue letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(e)(f). Here, Hennelly states that she received a right to sue letter on April 24, 2002. However, Hennelly did not seek to amend her complaint to add Schoonmaker as a party until March 18, 2004, well after the ninety-day limitations period had expired.
Although the District contends that Hennelly unduly delayed in securing counsel, Hennelly maintains that she was unable to afford to hire counsel until earlier this year.
Hennelly's Complaint indicates that she received the right to sue letter on both April 24, 2002 and May 1, 2002. Because the EEOC's letter is dated April 24, 2002, this Court assumes for purposes of this motion that it was not received by Hennelly until May 1, 2002. (See Docket #1, Attachment).
Despite the expiration of the statute of limitations, Hennelly's proposed amendment may nonetheless be considered timely if she can demonstrate that it relates back to the date upon which the original Complaint was filed. Under Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an amendment relates back to the date of original pleading when:
(1) relation back is permitted by the law providing the statute of limitations;
(2) the claim asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct alleged in the original pleading; and
(3) a party being added to the complaint (a) received notice within 120 days of the filing of the complaint; and (b) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party.
Hennelly cannot satisfy the third element of the relation-back doctrine — that Schoonmaker knew or reasonably should have known that but for a mistake in identity, Hennelly would have included him as a party in the original Complaint. "[A]n amended complaint adding individual defendants [does] not relate back where the plaintiff [has] shown neither factual mistake ( i.e., that she misapprehended the identities of the individuals she wished to sue), nor legal mistake ( i.e., that she misunderstood the legal requirements of her cause of action)." Soto v. Brooklyn Corr. Facility, 80 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 1994)).
In Cornwell v. Robinson, the plaintiff, a former employee at a New York State juvenile offender facility, asserted claims that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her gender and race in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d at 694. In her original complaint, the plaintiff named as defendants various New York State officials and departments. The plaintiff did not, nor was she required to, name as defendants the individual employees involved in the alleged discrimination. Thereafter, the plaintiff moved for leave to amend the complaint to add as defendants the alleged responsible employees. Such motion, however, was filed after the statute of limitations had expired on the plaintiff's causes of action. Id. The Second Circuit denied the plaintiff's motion to amend, finding that it was untimely and that the relation back doctrine did not apply. According to the court, the plaintiff "[p]lainly . . . knew the identities of the employees who she contended had harassed and discriminated against her," and thus she could not demonstrate that she had been mistaken as to the identities of the proper parties. Id. at 705.
Here, Hennelly has not alleged that she was mistaken as to Schoonmaker's name or identity. Indeed, Hennelly's original Complaint identifies Schoonmaker as the individual who sexually harassed her. Instead, Hennelly asserts that she was mistaken in her belief that Schoonmaker was automatically included as a party because he was employed by the District during the time of the alleged harassment and discrimination. Such a mistake, however, does not constitute either a misapprehension in the identity of the proper parties (mistake of fact) or a misunderstanding of the legal requirements of the cause of action (mistake of law). See Soto v. Brooklyn Corr. Facility, 80 F.3d at 35 ("under section 1983, Soto was required to sue the individual defendants to maintain an action arising out of the [alleged] attack[;] [h]is failure to do so [but rather to sue an entity not subject to suit for the claims alleged] cannot be considered a matter of choice") (emphasis in original); see also Hickey v. City of New York, 2004 WL 736896, *3, (S.D.N.Y. April 2004) (relation back doctrine inapplicable where plaintiffs moved to amend complaint asserting that they "did not know the proposed defendants' roles and involvement in [the] case until the filing of their motion to amend their complaint") (internal quotations omitted); Harris v. Butler, 1996 WL 403053, *3 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (relation back doctrine inapplicable "[b]ecause [p]laintiff had successfully pled a cause of action [against the originally-named defendants] under the legal theory in his original complaint").
Hennelly's original Complaint naming only the District as a defendant was legally sufficient. Thus, nothing on the face of the Complaint should have raised a suspicion that Hennelly was mistaken as to the identities of the proper parties. Hennelly "was not required to sue [Schoonmaker], and her failure to do so in the original complaint . . . must be considered a matter of choice, not mistake," Soto, 80 F.3d at 36-37 ( quoting Cornwell, 23 F.3d at 705).
On these facts, Schoonmaker could not reasonably have known that but for Hennelly's erroneous understanding of the law, he also would have been named as a defendant. Indeed, Hennelly's claims asserted against the District (i.e., harassment on the basis of unequal terms and conditions of employment and retaliation for complaining about discrimination or harassment) are different and distinct from those likely to be asserted against Schoonmaker personally. Moreover, at the time of Hennelly's Complaint, as she well knew, Schoonmaker was no longer employed by the District — another fact upon which Schoonmaker reasonably could have relied in concluding that Hennelly had elected to sue only the District, and not its former Superintendent who had since resigned.
In sum, I find that Schoonmaker, as plaintiff's former supervisor, could reasonably have believed that Hennelly, whom he knew to be intelligent and well-educated, made a calculated and conscious decision to sue only the District and not him. Hennelly thus has not satisfied the relation back doctrine, and the proposed amendment to her federal claims is therefore futile.
Indeed, plaintiff's proposed amended complaint alleges that Schoonmaker verbally abused her when she advised him of her desire to enter a doctoral program. (Docket #27).
2. Futility of New York State Claims: Hennelly's proposed amendment is similarly futile as to her New York claims. Claims brought pursuant to the New York Human Rights Law are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. Hennelly submitted her letter of resignation to the District on June 13, 2000, and thus the statute of limitations on her NYHRL claims expired on June 12, 2003, well before the instant motion to amend was filed on March 18, 2004.
As above, Hennelly's proposed amended complaint adding Schoonmaker as a party cannot relate back to the original filing of her New York claims. Under New York law, a claim asserted against a defendant in an amended filing can only relate back to claims previously filed against a co-defendant if:
(1) both claims arose out of the same conduct;
(2) the new party is united in interest with the original defendant, such that the new party was already on notice of the action; and
(3) the new party knew or should have known that, but for a mistake by plaintiff as to the identity of the proper parties, the action would have been brought against that party as well.Ramos v. Cilluffo, 714 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89 (2d Dept. 2000) (citing Austin v. Interfaith Med. Ctr., 694 N.Y.S.2d 730, 732 (2d Dept. 1999); Buran v. Coupal, 87 N.Y.2d 173, 177 (1995)).
For the reasons discussed above, Hennelly cannot show that Schoonmaker knew or reasonably should have known that but for a mistake by Hennelly regarding the identity of the proper parties, this action would have been brought against him as well. See Pappas v. 31-08 Café Concerto, Inc., 773 N.Y.S.2d 108, 109 (N.Y.App.Div. 2004) ("Where the party suing intentionally decides not to assert a claim against a party known to be potentially liable, there has been no mistake and the party suing should not be given a second opportunity to assert the claim after the limitations period has expired"); Brucha Mortgage Bankers Corp. v. Comm'r of Labor of New York, 697 N.Y.S.2d 674, 676 (N.Y.App.Div. 1999) (denying leave to amend because petitioner failed to demonstrate mistake as to identity of proper party; instead, "petitioner's mistake was one of law, which is not the type of mistake contemplated by the [New York] relation-back doctrine"). Accordingly, the New York claims Hennelly seeks to include in her amended complaint do not relate back to the date of original pleading and are thus untimely. As a result, Hennelly's motion to amend her New York claims is futile.