In addition, in the course of considering challenges to state obscenity statutes and the actions of state officials concerning allegedly obscene publications or films in § 1983 actions, the courts have made determinations as to the obscenity vel non of the subject material. Cambist Films, Inc. v. State of Illinois, 292 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Ill. 1968); Henley v. Wise, 303 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Ind. 1969). For these reasons, I find that it is proper for this court to consider the subject issue of Kaleidoscope and to determine whether or not, as a matter of law, it is obscene.

Roth v. U.S. (1957), 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498. See also Henley v. Wise, 303 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Ind., Hammond Div., 1969). Appellant's second argument is that the statute in question is unconstitutional as applied.

The Supreme Court's candid recognition of the "too elusive" quality of the line separating allegedly "contentless" obscenity from "socially valuable" communication is particularly appropriate at this time when a "cultural revolution" in our society has illustrated the potential role of profane or "obscene" language as political expression. (See Henley v. Wise (N.D.Ind. 1969) 303 F. Supp. 62, 70.) In challenging the values and prevailing morality of American society, dissenters have often consciously cast off traditional linguistic shibboleths, not intending to appeal to anyone's "prurient interest," but rather attempting to shock their audience into reexamining and reevaluating commonly held norms.

The judge observed that a commentary accompanying the picture demonstrates that its intent was not to arouse lustful instincts but to ridicule other publications which do attempt such an appeal. In Henley v. Wise (N.D.Ind.) 303 F. Supp. 62, the contents of the newspaper were almost completely a verbal expression of political views, with liberal use of profanity and four-letter words. Apparently there was much vulgarity but nothing sexual about the subject matter. These few cases do not carry the weight which appellant ascribes to them.

We believe, therefore, that our statutory definition of "obscene," applied according to the standards enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court for judging obscenity, gives adequate warning of the proscribed conduct and affords sufficient guidelines for fair administration of the anti-obscenity statute. Henley v. Wise, 303 F. Supp. 62 (N.D.Ind. 1969); See also State v. Locks, 91 Ariz. 394, 372 P.2d 724 (1962). Finding no "jurisdictional" impediment to the continuation of these criminal proceedings, the petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied.