Opinion
No. 7:03-CV-181-R.
August 31, 2004
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Came on to be considered the papers and pleadings filed in this action and the Court finds and orders as follows:
This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by an inmate currently confined in the Eastham Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice ("TDCJ") in Lovelady, Texas. Plaintiff claims that, when he was confined in the Baylor County Jail, his life was in danger because he was housed with an inmate who was charged with murder and who "could have snapped at any time." Complaint ¶ V. He seeks monetary damages and asks that the charges against him be reduced. Id. ¶ VI.
To establish a civil rights claim against a prison official for failure-to-protect, a plaintiff "must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his need for protection." Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 533 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994)). "Deliberate indifference" is a subjective standard which occurs only where a prison official knows of and disregards a substantial risk to the inmate's health or safety. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979. Deliberate indifference thus requires that "the [offending] official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Neals, 59 F.3d at 533 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1979). Hendrix claims that, because he was wrongfully housed with a "high risk" inmate who would incite other inmates to harm him, he was forced to defend himself in fights against other inmates. Plaintiff's Answer to the Court's Question No. 1.
Plaintiff was given an opportunity to expound on the factual allegations underlying his complaint. See Eason v. Thaler, 14 F.3d 8 (5th Cir. 1994) (requiring further development of insufficient factual allegations before dismissal is proper); Watson v. Ault, 525 F.2d 886, 892-93 (5th Cir. 1976) (affirming the use of a questionnaire as a useful and proper means for the court to develop the factual basis of a pro se plaintiff's complaint). However, he failed to state facts which would show that Defendant Bob Elliott was deliberately indifferent to his need for protection. See Plaintiff's Answers to the Court's Questions No. 2-3. Plaintiff has failed to articulate any facts or circumstances indicating that Elliott engage in an act or omission that put him in jeopardy or that Elliott failed to take action when a threat to Plaintiff's safety became known. See id.
Similarly, Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable claims against the Baylor County Jail (Baylor County). Plaintiff claims that, when he was booked into the Baylor County Jail, officers failed to follow state mandated classification guidelines.
Where a violation of state law results in a constitutional violation, a plaintiff may have a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act. Doe v. Taylor Independent School Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 464 (5th Cir.) (citing Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 757, 760 n. 7 (5th Cir. 1977) and Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829, 831-32 (5th Cir. 1976)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 815, 115 S.Ct. 70 (1994). However, if no constitutional deprivation is established, there can be no liability under § 1983. Allegations of violations of state law, without more, are insufficient to maintain a constitutional claim. See e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-33, 106 S. Ct. 662, 666 (1986) (noting that violations of state law do not become constitutional violations just because the defendant is a state official); Diamond v. Thompson, 364 F. Supp. 659, 662 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (stating that federal courts "will intervene in the administration of the prison system only where it is necessary to preserve constitutional rights."); Taylor v. Sterrett, 600 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1979) (requiring district court that had intervened on basis of state law violation to discontinue exercise of its jurisdiction and dismiss the cause). Assuming the truth of Plaintiff's allegation, his claim of a state law violation, without more, simply does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.
Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant Elliott failed to protect him from a substantial risk of serious harm and he has not established any custom or policy in existence at the Baylor County Jail which resulted in a constitutional violation. See Plaintiff's Answers to the Court's Questions No. 6-9. Plaintiff's conclusory allegations regarding the risk of harm fail to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act. See Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that "conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss."); Van Cleave v. United States, 854 F.2d 82, 84 (5th Cir. 1988) (requiring specific facts and noting that conclusory allegations are insufficient to maintain a claim under § 1983). In short, Hendrix' subjective belief that Defendants failed to protect him from danger at the Baylor County Jail is insufficient to warrant relief in this action.
In a cause of action under § 1983, it is necessary to specify the personal involvement of each defendant. Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 248 (1983). A plaintiff cannot make generalized allegations. Howard v. Fortenberry, 723 F.2d 1206, 1209 (5th Cir.), vacated in part on denial of rehearing, 728 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1984). There must be an affirmative link between the deprivation and some act by the defendant. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-77, 96 S.Ct. 598, 606-07 (1976). To the extent that Plaintiff is asserting a claim based upon negligence, relief is unavailable under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668 (1986).
A district court may dismiss claims filed by a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis if it determines that the claims are frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Claims are frivolous if they lack an arguable basis in either law or fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-32 (1989); Henson-El v. Rogers, 923 F.2d 51, 53 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1235, 111 S.Ct. 2863 (1991). A claim is without an arguable basis in law if it is "based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327, 109 S.Ct. at 1833. The claims set forth in the case at bar have no arguable basis under federal law.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
The Clerk of Court shall transmit a true copy of this order to Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.