Opinion
Civil Action No. 99-5834 (NHP).
May 31, 2000
Sherrance Henderson, Newark, N.J., Plaintiff Pro Se.
Lynne Anne Anderson, Esq., SILLS CUMMIS RADIN TISCHMAN, EPSTEIN GROSS P.A., The Legal Center, Newark, N.J., Attorneys for Defendant.
THE ORIGINAL OF THIS FINAL LETTER ORDER IS ON FILE WITH THE CLERK OF THE COURT
Dear Litigants:
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of defendant Roxane Laboratories, Inc. to dismiss plaintiff Sherrance Henderson's Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78, this matter was resolved without oral argument. For the following reasons, defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Sherrance Henderson (hereinafter "plaintiff" or "Henderson"), a pro se litigant, filed a Complaint with this Court on January 12, 2000. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that her former employer, defendant, Roxane Laboratories, Inc. (hereinafter "Roxane"), illegally discriminated against her based on her race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. and the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff also claims that she was denied access under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. The alleged discriminatory acts occurred in February, May and June of 1999, culminating in plaintiff's termination.DISCUSSION
I. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1367 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993). The pleadings of a pro se plaintiff are to be construed liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). The Court may dismiss the case if "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
II. The Title VII Claim
Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Roxane discriminated against her based on her race in violation of Title VII. In order to successfully state a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must satisfy the precondition to suit specified by Title VII by exhausting all administrative remedies.See Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1022 (3d Cir. 1997). Failure to exhaust is "in the nature of statutes of limitation" and "do[es] not affect the District Court's subject matter jurisdiction." Anjelino v. The New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 87 (3d. Cir. 1999) (quoting Hornsby v. United States Postal Service, 787 F.2d 87, 89 (3d Cir. 1986)). Thus, where a plaintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1022; Lombardi v. Cosgrove, 7 F. Supp.2d 481, 493 (D.N.J. 1997); Schanzer v. Rutgers University, 934 F. Supp. 669, 673 (D.N.J. 1996); Metsopulos v. Runyon, 918 F. Supp. 851, 857 (D.N.J. 1996).
In this case, plaintiff filed an EEOC charge against defendant on July 16, 1999. Henderson's EEOC charge, however, alleged disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and not racial discrimination. Indeed, the EEOC charge contains no allegations of racial discrimination. As a result, a question arises whether plaintiff's racial discrimination claim is encompassed in the EEOC charge alleging a violation of the ADA.
The test in determining whether the EEOC charge encompasses plaintiff's racial discrimination claim, thereby relieving her from the responsibility of filing a racial discrimination EEOC charge, is whether the acts alleged in the "subsequent Title VII suit are fairly within the scope of the prior EEOC complaint, or the investigation arising therefrom." See Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1295 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1984)). Here, plaintiff's disability discrimination claim does not fairly encompass a claim for racial discrimination. The gravamen of Henderson's EEOC complaint was that she was discriminated against based on a disability which arose out of an automobile accident. Neither the EEOC nor Roxane were put on notice by Henderson's EEOC complaint of a Title VII racial discrimination claim. The EEOC's investigation focused solely on the ADA claim. The intent of the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement is to "afford the EEOC the opportunity to settle disputes through conference, conciliation, and persuasion, avoiding unnecessary action in court." Antol, 82 F.3d at 1296. Therefore, because Henderson failed to exhaust the administrative remedies for her Title VII racial discrimination claim, the Title VII claim is dismissed without prejudice.
III. The Fourteenth Amendment Claim
Plaintiff also alleges that Roxane violated the Fourteenth Amendment by segregating employees "due to race and skin color." Construing the Complaint liberally, it is possible to assume, as defendant has, that plaintiff here attempts to plead a § 1983 claim. Although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, courts have not been willing to abrogate basic pleading essentials in pro se lawsuits. See Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (duty to be less stringent with pro se complaints does not require courts to conjure up unpled allegations); Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987) (pro se plaintiffs should plead with requisite specificity so as to give defendants notice); Holsey v. Collins, 90 F.R.D. 122, 128 (D.Md. 1981) (even pro se litigants must meet some minimum pleading standards).
Here, plaintiff's Complaint is not only deficient under the standards of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a), which requires a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," but it is devoid of any factual allegations supporting a cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment or § 1983. A complaint must provide the defendant with "fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Plaintiff's Complaint, which merely states "Fourteenth Amendment violation segregation of employees due to race and skin color," is much too short and conclusory, and fails to state adequate factual allegations. Roxane would in no way be alerted to the factual basis upon which plaintiff's claims are grounded, and, in all likelihood, would be unable to form a responsive pleading. Thus, the Complaint fails to meet the minimal threshold of notice pleading. Even considering plaintiff'spro se status and construing the Complaint in a most liberal light, there exist no factual allegations from which any type of claim can be reasonably inferred. Accordingly, any claims purportedly pled under either the Fourteenth Amendment or § 1983 claim must be dismissed.
Furthermore, to the extent that Henderson is seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of rights under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause, such a claim must be dismissed regardless of the Complaint's sufficiency under the pleading rules. Absent state action or conduct fairly attributable to the state, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor § 1983 support a claim against a private actor. See Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1996). See also Trigg v. Fort Wayne Community Schools, 766 F.2d 299, 302 n. 2 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that Fourteenth Amendment protection not available where defendant was private actor); Dixon v. Universal Atlas Cement Division, 437 F. Supp. 1071, 1074 (W.D.Pa. 1977) (holding that absent governmental action, no claim was stated against labor union or private employer under either Fourteenth Amendment or § 1983 as regards allegedly discriminatory discharge of plaintiff employee). Therefore, because Roxane is a private employer whose conduct cannot be attributable to the state, any Fourteenth Amendment or § 1983 claim alleged by plaintiff cannot state a claim upon which relief can be granted and must be dismissed.
IV. The FMLA Claim
Lastly, plaintiff's Complaint alleges she "was denied access under [the] Family and Medical Leave Act U.S. 2601." As articulated above, and plaintiff's pro se status notwithstanding, there exists a certain minimum standard which even the most inartful pleadings must satisfy. Here, plaintiff's bald and conclusory statement that she was denied access under the FMLA does not suffice. Plaintiff's Complaint is bereft of any factual allegations supporting a cause of action under the FMLA. Roxane is without notice of the factual basis upon which plaintiff's claims are grounded, and, in all likelihood, could not prepare a responsive pleading. Thus, the FMLA claim fails to meet the minimal threshold of notice pleading. Even construing the Complaint liberally in light of plaintiff's pro se status, there exist no factual allegations from which any type of claim can be reasonably inferred. Accordingly, plaintiff's claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the motion of defendant Roxane Laboratories, Inc. to dismiss plaintiff Sherrance Henderson's Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is GRANTED as follows: plaintiff Sherrance Henderson's Title VII claim alleging racial discrimination is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claim and plaintiff's § 1983 claims, to the extent they are pled in the Complaint, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE; and plaintiff's Family and Medical Leave Act claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
This case is hereby CLOSED.
SO ORDERED.