Opinion
No. NA99-177-C-B/G.
November 14, 2000.
James M Gary, Weber Rose, Louisville, KY 40202.
Theresa A Stevens, Office of Indiana Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, 46204.
ENTRY GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
Stephen D. Hemmer, D.V.M., filed suit against the Indiana State Board of Animal Health ("ISBOAH") alleging that Defendant discriminated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., when ISBOAH terminated Hemmer's employment as a meat inspection supervisor. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), and that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff's response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss included a Request for Oral Argument and Hearing. For the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED for lack of subject matter jurisdication, and Plaintiff's Request for Oral Argument and Hearing ("Pl.s' Req.") is DENIED.
Background Information
On October 7, 1997, while working as a meat inspection supervisor, Hemmer, a long-time employee of ISBOAH, was seriously injured. Hemmer claims that he continues to suffer ongoing neurologic injuries and disability. On January 20, 1998, ISBOAH terminated Hemmer's employment. Plaintiff claims that, in violation of the ADA and ADEA, he has suffered a legal injury because (1) he has been without employment since the date of his termination; (2) the manner in which Defendant fired him precluded him from finding alternative employment; and (3) he has been denied access to certain benefits, including vacation pay and sick leave, to which he was previously entitled. As mentioned above, the Motion to Dismiss and the Request for Oral Argument and Hearing followed.
Legal Analysis
Motion to Dismiss
The parties agree that ISBOAH is an instrumentality of the State of Indiana. As such, Defendant claims that the Eleventh Amendment precludes federal subject matter jurisdiction over age and disability discrimination claims against state employers. Def's. Ans., ¶ 4. The Eleventh Amendment generally precludes federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 120 S.Ct. 631, 640 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) (citing College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 2223, 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed.2d 842 (1890)).
When challenging the constitutionality of an act of Congress, Local Rule 24.1(a) of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana requires the challenging party to "advise [the Court], in writing, specifying the act or provisions thereof which are attacked, with a proper reference to the title and section of the United States Code." Regardless of whether Defendant complied with this requirement, the Court must grant the Motion to Dismiss. Local Rule 24.1(c) states that "[f]ailure to comply with this rule will not be grounds for waiving the constitutional issue." Moreover, this Court has determined that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, an issue it must address, even sua sponte, if need be.
There is an exception to this generalization when Congress acts pursuant to its power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits Congress to subject states to suit in order to enforce the substantive provisions of the amendment. Id. However, the Supreme Court specifically held in Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 645, that Congress overstepped the bounds of § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment when it applied the ADEA to the states. In such situations, federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction.
See Kimel, 120 S.Ct. at 638. Hemmer has in no way distinguished his case from Kimel.
Hence, the Court must dismiss his age discrimination claims due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Hemmer fares little better with regard to his disability discrimination claims. While the Supreme Court has not held that the Eleventh Amendment precludes suits against states under the ADA, the Seventh Circuit has so held. Erickson v. Board of Governors of State Colls. and Univers. for Northeastern Illinois Univ., 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2000); Stevens v. Illinois Dept. of Transp., 210 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2000); Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344 (7th Cir. 2000). Because Plaintiff cannot distinguish his case from the broad holdings in these Seventh Circuit cases, he suggests that this Court should wait for a definitive ruling from the Supreme Court on whether the Eleventh Amendment deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction over ADA claims against state employers. In response, the Court notes that until the Supreme Court speaks on an issue, the rulings of the Seventh Circuit are controlling precedent in this jurisdiction. Hence, the Court must dismiss Hemmer's ADA-based discrimination claims.
Request for Oral Argument and Hearing
Plaintiff requests oral argument under Local Rule 7.5(a) for "the purposes of evaluating the status, holdings and finality of certain very recent decisions upon which the Defendant relies in support of its motion." Pl.'s Req. at 1. As explained above, the recent rulings of the Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit are clear and broad. Also, any arguments Plaintiff may have been able to make in order to distinguish his case from Kimler, Erickson, Stevens, and Walker should have been raised in his memorandum opposing the Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff further requests oral argument for "the purposes of fully evaluating the specific outcome or result to which the parties would be entitled, in the event that this Court determines that the Plaintiff's present claims are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity." Id. Like any arguments distinguishing Hemmer's case from Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedents, this evaluation should have been included in Plaintiff's memorandum. Furthermore, Plaintiff's request is simply an argument on the merits, which is exactly what this Court cannot consider once it has determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed, with prejudice. Plaintiff's Request for Oral Argument and Hearing is DENIED.
It is so ORDERED