Helms v. Helms' Kennels, Inc.

36 Citing cases

  1. Ex parte Moore

    No. SC-2024-0377 (Ala. Oct. 25, 2024)

    ('Although a trial court has "residual jurisdiction or authority to take certain actions necessary to enforce or interpret a final judgment," that authority is not so broad as to allow substantive modification of an otherwise effective and unambiguous final order. Helms v. Helms' Kennels, Inc., 646 So.2d 1343, 1347 (Ala. 1994).'

  2. Bates v. Stewart

    99 So. 3d 837 (Ala. 2012)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to reopen a judgment approving a settlement agree- ment under Rule 60(b) more than eight years after the final judgment was entered

    Stewart and Kasowitz say that despite the Adams plaintiffs' efforts to characterize their argument differently, the Adams plaintiffs are challenging a final judgment entered in 2003, a judgment the trial court had no authority to reopen. In Helms v. Helms' Kennels, Inc., 646 So.2d 1343, 1347 (Ala.1994), this Court quoted the following from United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26, 33 (2d Cir.1977): “ ‘[L]itigation must end somewhere, and we reiterate our firm belief that courts should not encourage the reopening of final judgments or casually permit the relitigation of litigated issues out of a friendliness to claims of unfortunate failures to put in one's best case.’ ”

  3. Bates v. Stewart

    1100063 (Ala. Apr. 27, 2012)

    Stewart and Kasowitz say that despite the Adams plaintiffs' efforts to characterize their argument differently, the Adams plaintiffs are challenging a final judgment entered in 2003, a judgment the trial court had no authority to reopen. In Helms v. Helms' Kennels, Inc., 646 So. 2d 1343, 1347 (Ala. 1994), this Court quoted the following from United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26, 33 (2d Cir. 1977): "'[L]itigation must end somewhere, and we reiterate our firm belief that courts should not encourage the reopening of final judgments or casually permit the relitigation of litigated issues out of a friendliness to claims of unfortunate failures to put in one's best case.'"

  4. Gulf Beach Hotel, Inc. v. Gulf State Park Auth

    58 So. 3d 727 (Ala. 2010)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that, although a trial court retains "residual jurisdiction to enforce its judgment," if the judgment is final, the court has "no authority to consider new claims"

    22 So.3d at 442. To support its argument, Gulf Beach first relies on this Court's statements that a trial court has residual jurisdiction to enforce its judgments, citing State Personnel Board v. Akers, 797 So.2d 422, 424 (Ala. 2000) ("A trial court has inherent authority to interpret, clarify, and enforce its own final judgments. . . . Thus, even after this Court, on the direct appeal, affirmed the trial court's . . . judgment, that court retained jurisdiction to interpret and clarify that judgment."); George v. Sims, 888 So.2d 1224, 1227 (Ala. 2004) ("a trial court has `residual jurisdiction or authority to take certain actions necessary to enforce or interpret a final judgment'"); and Helms v. Helms' Kennels, Inc., 646 So.2d 1343, 1347 (Ala. 1994) ("a trial court does have residual jurisdiction or authority to take certain actions necessary to enforce or interpret a final judgment"). The complete sentence reads as follows: "Although a trial court has `residual jurisdiction or authority to take certain actions necessary to enforce or interpret a final judgment,' that authority is not so broad as to allow substantive modification of an otherwise effective and unambiguous final order."

  5. In re Andrews

    434 B.R. 541 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2010)   Cited 27 times
    Holding that an award of attorney's fees was a “domestic support obligation” for purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 507 even though it was payable directly to the attorney of a divorced spouse

    First, the Court observes that the Supreme Court of Alabama has ruled on more than one occasion that the Alabama state courts have inherent authority to clarify, interpret, and enforce their own orders. Alabama v. Akers, 797 So.2d 422, 424 (Ala.2000)(citing Helms v. Helms' Kennels, Inc., 646 So.2d 1343, 1347 (Ala.1994); Gild v. Holmes, 680 So.2d 326, 329 (Ala.Civ.App.1996)). Second, the Debtor does not argue that he was actually entitled to notice and a hearing under Alabama law before the order was entered.

  6. Ex parte Huntingdon Coll.

    386 So. 3d 28 (Ala. 2023)

    Ex parte State ex rel. J.Z., 668 So. 2d 566, 569 (Ala. 1995); see also Bates v. Stewart, 99 So. 3d 837 (Ala. 2012) (holding that the plaintiffs were not entitled to reopen a judgment approving a settlement agree- ment under Rule 60(b)(6) more than eight years after the final judgment was entered); and Helms v. Helms’ Kennels, Inc., 646 So. 2d 1343, 1347 (Ala. 1994) ("Our society benefits from a judicial system that recognizes and respects the finality and definiteness of a trial court’s ‘final judgment’ deciding what was previously disputed and uncertain.

  7. Moore v. Mikul

    359 So. 3d 274 (Ala. 2022)   Cited 1 times

    See also Ex parte Caremark Rx, LLC, 229 So.3d 751, 757 (Ala. 2017)("[A] trial court nevertheless continues to hold `residual jurisdiction' even after that 30-day period [imposed by Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] expires such that it can still take any steps that are necessary to enforce its judgment."); but see George v. Sims, 888 So.2d 1224, 1227 (Ala. 2004)("Although a trial court has `residual jurisdiction or authority to take certain actions necessary to enforce or interpret a final judgment,' that authority is not so broad as to allow substantive modification of an otherwise effective and unambiguous final order. Helms v. Helms' Kennels, Inc., 646 So.2d 1343, 1347 (Ala. 1994)."). If the stay of execution of the circuit court's October 2018 order entered in case no. CV-16-900764 should be dissolved such that the order can now be effectuated, a dissolution should be sought in that action.

  8. Ex parte Scoggins

    No. 1200105 (Ala. Sep. 3, 2021)

    xpires such that it can still take any steps that are necessary to enforce its judgment"); Bates v. Stewart, 99 So.3d 837, 854 (Ala. 2012) (finding that a trial court "clearly exceeded its discretion ... when it reopened a final judgment entered more than eight years before" but concluding that the portion of the trial court's order that sought "to examine the trust documents to ensure that the ... trust was established in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement ... was within the trial court's authority to enforce the terms of the settlement agreement"); George v. Sims, 888 So.2d 1224, 1227 (Ala. 2004) ("Although a trial court has 'residual jurisdiction or authority to take certain actions necessary to enforce or interpret a final judgment,' that authority is not so broad as to allow substantive modification of an otherwise effective and unambiguous final order." (quoting Helms v. Helms' Kennels, Inc., 646 So.2d 1343, 1347 (Ala. 1994))). The "Motion for Authorization" did not ask the circuit court "to revisit ... the efficacy of the purported dismissal itself as a judgment," which the circuit court would have had the authority to consider pursuant to a Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion, but rather the motion asked the circuit court to approve an alteration to the terms of the structured settlement.

  9. Scoggins v. Bailey (Ex parte Scoggins)

    354 So. 3d 429 (Ala. 2021)   Cited 2 times

    George v. Sims, 888 So.2d 1224, 1227 (Ala. 2004) ("Although a trial court has `residual jurisdiction or authority to take certain actions necessary to enforce or interpret a final judgment,' that authority is not so broad as to allow substantive modification of an otherwise effective and unambiguous final order." (quoting Helms v. Helms' Kennels, Inc., 646 So.2d 1343, 1347 (Ala. 1994))). The "Motion for Authorization" did not ask the circuit court "to revisit ... the efficacy of the purported dismissal itself as a judgment," which the circuit court would have had the authority to consider pursuant to a Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion, but rather the motion asked the circuit court to approve an alteration to the terms of the structured settlement.

  10. Lem Harris Rainwater Family Tr. v. Rainwater

    344 So. 3d 331 (Ala. 2021)   Cited 5 times
    Noting that" 'n injunction is defined as " court order commanding or preventing an action." Black's Law Dictionary 788 (7th ed. 1999).'" (quoting Dawkins v. Walker, 794 So.2d 333, 335 (Ala. 2001))

    Southeast Constr., L.L.C. v. WAR Constr., Inc., 110 So. 3d 371, 376-77 (Ala. 2012) (first emphasis added). See also Helms v. Helms’ Kennels, Inc., 646 So. 2d 1343, 1347 (Ala. 1994) (noting that "a trial court does have residual jurisdiction or authority to take certain actions necessary to enforce or interpret a final judgment"). It seems to me that the issue presented in Kappa Sigma and in appeal no. 1190952 is one of enforcement, not finality of a judgment, and I do not believe that an order that does nothing more than approve a settlement and require the parties to fulfill it should be viewed as an interlocutory order, much less an "injunction."