Opinion
Civil No. A3-97-59.
Filed May 11, 1999.
Summary: Plaintiff's petition for attorney's fees and costs arising out of plaintiff's federal and state law overtime, gender discrimination, harassment, and emotional distress claims. Defendants oppose the requested amount. Court grants plaintiff's application and awards attorney fees in the amount of $65,000.00, plus costs in the amount of $14,121.38, for a total of $79,121.38.
ORDER
I INTRODUCTION
Before the court is plaintiff's petition for attorney's fees and costs (doc. #84). Though defendants do not challenge plaintiff's prayer for reasonable fees and costs in this matter, they oppose the requested amount (doc. #92).
II BACKGROUND
This fee application arises out of plaintiff's federal and state law overtime, gender discrimination, harassment, and emotional distress claims. These claims will be dismissed via a voluntary settlement, pursuant to which the parties have agreed that plaintiff is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs. However, the parties were unable to agree on an amount, and submit the matter to this court for disposition. Plaintiff has requested $99,991.25 in attorney's fees, plus $14,121.38 in costs, for a total award of $114,112.63. Defendants maintain that a reasonable award of fees and costs in this case should fall in the range of $40,000-50,000.
III ANALYSIS A. LEGAL STANDARDS
Plaintiff makes her application pursuant to four different fee-shifting statutes: Title 29, United States Code Section 216(b), Title 42, United States Code Section 2000e-5(k), and Sections 14-02.4-20 and 34-06.1-05 of the North Dakota Century Code. The court will apply the standards generally considered in civil rights cases in order to arrive at a reasonable fee award under these provisions. See generally Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983); St. Louis Firefighter's Ass'n v. City of St. Louis, 96 F.3d 323, 332 n. 10 (8th Cir. 1996) (referring to the factors enumerated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)). These standards generally apply to all cases featuring statutes authorizing an award of fees to a prevailing party. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 n. 7 (1983).
The starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the lodestar amount — the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. at 433. This figure is presumptively reasonable and should only be adjusted in rare circumstances. Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986).
The fee applicant bears the burden of supporting her request, and where the documentation is inadequate or the reported hours unreasonably expended, the requested amount may be reduced.Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 437; DeGidio v. Pung, 920 F.2d 525, 533-34 (8th Cir. 1990). Consequently, the applicant must make a good faith effort to exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours from her request. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. In other words, the applicant should exercise appropriate billing judgment and avoid billing to her adversary any hours that could not properly be billed to her client. Id. at 437. This court has broad discretion in arriving at the lodestar amount, and will invoke its own knowledge, experience and expertise in determining whether a requested amount is reasonable. Id. at 437-38; Gilbert v. City of Little Rock, 867 F.2d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 1989).
B. PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION 1. Hourly Rate
"Reasonableness" in the context of an hourly rate is based upon prevailing market rates in the relevant community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation. McDonald v. Armontrout, 860 F.2d 1456, 1458-59 (8th Cir. 1988) (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895-96, 896 n. 11 (1984)). Though a "useful starting point," an attorney's regular hourly rate is not dispositive of the issue. McDonald, 860 F.2d at 1459.
This court has reviewed the hourly rates claimed by plaintiff for all of the attorneys who worked on the case and, notwithstanding defendants' arguments to the contrary, finds them reasonable in light of the prevailing market in this community. The court notes that employment disputes such as this are often complex, requiring a high degree of specialized knowledge and skill, and plaintiff's experienced and able counsel are uniquely qualified to handle such cases. See City of St. Louis, 96 F.3d at 332 n. 10.
The court further finds reasonable the rates claimed by plaintiff for law clerks and legal assistants. Such support work is compensable under the applicable fee shifting statutes. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 285 (1989); Miller v. Alamo, 983 F.2d 856, 862 (8th Cir. 1993).
2. Number of Hours Expended
The court is more troubled, however, by the number of hours plaintiff's counsel expended upon the litigation. As an initial matter, the court will not reduce the Lodestar amount to reflect plaintiff's pursuit of state law overtime and emotional distress claims. Plaintiff's counsels' time was not "neatly divided" between her respective claims, and her claims clearly "arose out of the same set of facts and were pursued together." See deLlano v. North Dakota State Univ., 951 F. Supp. 168, 171-72 (D.N.D. 1997).
At the same time, however, this court must consider the relationship between the requested amount and the results of the litigation when calculating an award. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434. Along these lines, the court notes that the parties settled during the pretrial stage of the litigation on an amount significantly less than plaintiff's initial demand. Moreover, though this court is mindful of the notion that counsel should be adequately compensated for vindicating plaintiff's civil rights, this is a private interest case, the results of which may or may not benefit others. See Jaquette v. Black Hawk County, 710 F.2d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 1983). Based upon these factors, this court finds that the level of success achieved by plaintiff does not justify the amount of hours expended by her counsel on this litigation. Consequently, the court will reduce the requested award to reflect the level of success achieved.
The court will not reduce plaintiff's requested costs and expenses, however. The requested amounts "were indeed charged to plaintiff, . . . are of the type normally passed on to clients, and the amounts are reasonable." See DeLlano, 951 F. Supp. at 172. To the extent these amounts are not recoverable as "costs," they will be attributed as expenses within the category of attorney's fees. See id.
3. Calculation of the Award
Under Hensley, this court may either identify specific hours that should be eliminated from plaintiff's request, or simply reduce the requested amount to account for its findings. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 436-37. The court sees no reason to engage in the former exercise. The foregoing clearly and concisely sets out the basis for the court's actions. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's application for reasonable attorney fees and costs (doc. #84) is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff be awarded attorney fees in the amount of $65,000.00, plus costs in the amount of $14,121.38, for a total award of $79,121.38.
IT IS SO ORDERED.