Opinion
NO. 03-15-00258-CR
08-04-2016
Stephanie Maie Heintzlemann, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BURNET COUNTY, 33RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
NO. 42636, HONORABLE J. ALLAN GARRETT, JUDGE PRESIDINGMEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant, Stephanie Maie Heintzlemann, of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in an amount of one to four grams. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.112(a), (c). The jury assessed her punishment at 9 years' imprisonment. In her sole issue on appeal, Heintzlemann challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction. We will affirm the trial court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
The facts recited herein are taken from the testimony and other evidence presented at trial.
On February 15, 2014, Officer Robert P. Chrane, with the Granite Shoals Police Department, observed a vehicle roll through a stop sign without coming to a complete stop. He pulled out behind the vehicle and ran its registration through his in-car system, and the registration came back as expired. He then activated his overhead lights and initiated a traffic stop of the vehicle, whose occupants were later identified as Heintzlemann and Grant Wayne Cole. Officer Chrane requested and received identification information from the vehicle's driver, Cole, and ran the information through his in-car system. Dispatch notified Officer Chrane of Cole's three active warrants, so Officer Chrane handcuffed Cole and took him into custody.
Around that time, another officer, Sergeant Chris Decker, arrived at the scene. Sergeant Decker asked Heintzlemann if the vehicle contained any contraband, including drugs, and she denied that the vehicle contained any drugs. After Heintzlemann consented to a search of her vehicle, the officers discovered: (1) "jeweler-style" plastic bags, some containing "crystalline residue" and some containing a "white crystalline powder"; (2) three glass pipes, two containing methamphetamine residue and one containing "marijuana residue"; (3) a 50-dollar bill and a 1-dollar bill that both "contained crystalized substance on [their] surface"; and (4) "a plastic McDonalds-looking straw" that was "cut about a third in size of the raw length" at a "45-degree angle on each side" and contained "a crystal-like substance." The officers arrested both Heintzlemann and Cole for possession of a controlled substance and transported them to jail. The seven plastic bags containing white crystalline powder were sent to Diana Salas, a forensic scientist with the Texas Department of Public Safety. She tested the substances and concluded that all seven plastic bags contained methamphetamine. She also weighed the substances and obtained a total weight of 3.52 grams. Heintzlemann was tried and convicted, and this appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In making this determination, we consider all evidence that the trier of fact was permitted to consider, regardless of whether it was rightly or wrongly admitted. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Allen v. State, 249 S.W.3d 680, 688-89 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.). We view this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. The jury, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. Id. The jury may choose to believe all, some, or none of the witnesses at trial. Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Walker v. State, No. 03-14-00473-CR, 2016 WL 2942398, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin May 10, 2016, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Therefore, we presume that the jury resolved any conflicting inferences and issues of credibility in favor of the judgment. Nowlin v. State, 473 S.W.3d 312, 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); Walker, 2016 WL 2942398, at *5.
DISCUSSION
The elements for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver are that the defendant: (1) possessed a controlled substance in the amount charged; (2) intended to deliver the controlled substance to another; and (3) knew that the substance in his possession was a controlled substance. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.112(a); Walker, 2016 WL 2942398, at *2. To prove possession, the State was required to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) exercised control, management, or care over the substance; and (2) knew the substance was contraband. Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, must establish a more than fortuitous connection between the defendant and the drugs. Id. Mere presence at the location where the drugs were found is insufficient to prove possession. Id. at 162. But when presence or proximity is combined with other evidence, either direct or circumstantial, it may be sufficient to prove the element of possession. Id.
Texas courts have considered the following nonexclusive factors that may link a defendant to contraband and establish knowing possession: (1) the defendant's presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant's proximity to and the accessibility of the narcotic; (4) whether the defendant was under the influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the defendant made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the defendant attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether the defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were found; (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed; (13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of cash; and (14) whether the conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt. Id. at 162 n.12; Walker, 2016 WL 2942398, at *2. The factors are not a litmus test; instead, they are merely some factors that may circumstantially establish the sufficiency of the evidence to prove knowing possession. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12; Walker, 2016 WL 2942398, at *2; see also Allen, 249 S.W.3d at 692 n.13. Also, the number of links is not dispositive; instead, it is the logical force of the complete evidence, direct and circumstantial. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162. The absence of some links does not constitute evidence of innocence that must be weighed against the links that are present. Walker, 2016 WL 2942398, at *4; Santiesteban-Pileta v. State, 421 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. App.—Waco 2013, pet. ref'd); Satchell v. State, 321 S.W.3d 127, 134 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd). The facts must be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine whether sufficient evidence exists to link or connect a defendant to illegal contraband. Walker, 2016 WL 2942398, at *2.
In her sole issue on appeal, Heintzlemann challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the basis that no evidence exists to establish her care, custody, and control over the methamphetamine discovered in her car. Heintzlemann argues that very few, if any, of the link factors are present in this case, and, if any are present, they have little or no logical force to link her to the methamphetamine.
In her brief, however, Heintzlemann concedes that she was present when the search was conducted, and had access to and was in close proximity to the bags, establishing two links. Furthermore, at trial, Sergeant Decker testified that Heintzlemann said she owned the vehicle and everything inside of it. Heintzlemann argues that the link regarding her ownership of the place where the drugs were found is not applicable here because the drugs were found in a vehicle. But, in her brief, Heintzlemann replaces "place" with "premise" and argues that the link is not applicable here because a vehicle is not a "premise." As the State points out, Heintzlemann cites no authority to show that ownership of the vehicle should not be considered. Thus, we conclude that her ownership of the vehicle satisfies this link factor.
Similarly, both officers discovered drug paraphernalia throughout the vehicle, satisfying an additional link. Officer Chrane testified that, in the vehicle's center console, he discovered a bag containing a pipe, which was later confirmed to contain methamphetamine residue. Sergeant Decker testified that he discovered a bag, located between Heintzlemann's left leg and the center console of the vehicle on the floorboard, that contained female items, such as sunglasses and makeup. He testified that, inside the bag's zipper pocket, he found "a plastic McDonalds-looking straw" that was "cut about a third in size of the raw length" at a "45-degree angle on each side." He stated that, inside of the straw, he "noticed a crystal-like substance reflecting in the light of [his] flashlight," which he believed "to be crystal methamphetamine." Sergeant Decker stated that he continued to search the bag and found a "pink gator skin coin purse," which contained two glass pipes. He stated that one of the pipes "contained a white substance" that he believed "to be methamphetamine" and the other pipe contained "marijuana residue."
Furthermore, Sergeant Decker testified that he searched another bag, "located underneath where [Heintzlemann] had been sitting," that "had women's contents in it, pictures of children" and "different documents and things of that nature" with Heintzlemann's name on them. He testified that, inside the bag, he discovered a "cheetah print purse," and inside of that he discovered a "dragon-style drawstring pouch." He stated that, inside of the drawstring pouch, he discovered a 50-dollar bill and a 1-dollar bill that both "contained crystalized substance on [their] surface." Sergeant Decker also testified that he discovered "jeweler-style" plastic bags. He stated that several of the plastic bags did not contain "any substantial amount of product" but eight bags contained "crystalline residue." He stated that other plastic bags "actually contained" a "white crystalline powder," later confirmed as methamphetamine. Sergeant Decker also testified that he discovered a backpack behind the driver's seat that contained "male clothing" but no "female products" or contraband.
Counter to the officers' testimony, Cole provided the sole testimony in support of Heintzlemann's defense. Cole testified that he shoved the contraband into the "closest bag that [he] could reach" when he saw Officer Chrane's vehicle behind him. Cole testified that Heintzlemann did not see him put the contraband into the bag because "[s]he was passed out." He also testified that all of the plastic bags containing methamphetamine and the pipes belonged to him, and that he told multiple officers at the scene that it belonged to him but "[t]hey didn't believe [him]." Cole testified that the methamphetamine was in his possession for "less than 24 hours" and that he was hiding it from Heintzlemann at the time of their arrest.
The jury was not required to believe Cole's testimony. On weight-of-evidence determinations, juries trump appellate judges. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 164 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326 (1979)). The jury, as the factfinder, is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); see Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319. The jury may choose to believe all, some, or none of the witnesses at trial. Chambers, 805 S.W.2d at 461; Walker, 2016 WL 2942398, at *5. If the record reflects conflicting inferences, we presume that the jury resolved any conflict in favor of the verdict, even if the resolution is not explicitly within the record. Nowlin, 473 S.W.3d at 317; Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Here, the jury had the opportunity to hear Cole's testimony, but was not required to believe his claims that the contraband and paraphernalia belonged to him. In light of the evidence presented a trial, including the type of bags in which the contraband and paraphernalia were found, the location of the bags under or near Heintzlemann, and the items that surrounded the contraband and paraphernalia, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the bags belonged to Heintzlemann. See Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (jury may infer knowledge from acts, words, or conduct by defendant); Gant v. State, 278 S.W.3d 836, 839 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) ("A jury can infer knowledge from all the circumstances, including the acts, conduct, and remarks of the accused and the surrounding circumstances.").
Additionally, Heintzlemann points out the remaining links that are not supported by the record. But the absence of some links does not constitute evidence of innocence that must be weighed against the links that are present. Walker v. State, No. 03-14-00473-CR, 2016 WL 2942398, at *4 (Tex. App.—Austin May 10, 2016, no pet. h.) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Santiesteban-Pileta v. State, 421 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. App.—Waco 2013, pet. ref'd); Satchell v. State, 321 S.W.3d 127, 134 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref'd). Thus, we do not have to consider the absent links in our analysis. --------
When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence is sufficient to support the judgment of conviction, and we overrule Heintzlemann's sole issue on appeal.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment of conviction.
/s/_________
Scott K. Field, Justice Before Justices Puryear, Goodwin, and Field Affirmed Filed: August 4, 2016 Do Not Publish