Opinion
No. 44/434.
02-23-1922
HEGGAN v. HEGGAN.
Patrick H. Harding, of Camden, for petitioner. Wilfred B. Wolcott, of Camden, for defendant.
Petition by Mannolia P. Heggan against John Heggan. On motion for order for compromise settlement of alimony. Order made.
Patrick H. Harding, of Camden, for petitioner.
Wilfred B. Wolcott, of Camden, for defendant.
LEAMING, V. C. I have great hesitancy in making an order for a sum in gross in alimony matters, where the application is under the section of the statute providing for support in the event of abandonment and failure to support. I have entertained the view that the language of the statute contemplates only orders for periodical payments, and that, I think, is in conformity with a prior decision to that effect. Where the application is under the general section of the statute touching divorce and giving jurisdiction in alimony matters both before and after decree, the view that is entertained by the Chancellor is, I think, that an order in gross is justified. I am not sure but the Chancellor may entertain the same view with reference to the other section.
I feel inclined, therefore, to make an order for alimony in gross in this case, which, I understand, is under the general divorce act, but I think there should be great care exercised to make certain that the parties thoroughly understand the situation, and are thoroughly apprised of what it means, and some care should be taken, if possible, to guard against the funds being wasted and the wife again becoming destitute. An order fixing a sum in gross, which provided for the investment of the funds, would be absolutely unobjectionable, because there would be periodical payments of the income earned, but where the sum in gross is fixed upon as an amount to completely discharge the defendant and is paid in cash, there is always great danger of it being expended and the party receiving it subsequently becoming in want by reason of bad investments. I never have been able to formally reach the conclusion that in that unfortunate event there might not still be a liability upon the husband, even though the order should make the payment of the gross amount a complete discharge of future liability by its terms; however, I am not considering that at this time.
I think you had better call the parties and examine them to see whether they thoroughly understand the situation, and whether they favor it.
(The petitioner was thereupon sworn, examined, and cross-examined, and it appeared that petitioner thoroughly understood the situation and favored it, and intended to use the money to enlarge her home, to the end that she could take boarders and in that way make money.)
I will make the order.