“Although plaintiff has named the MPD as a defendant, it is well settled that the MPD is non sui juris and, therefore, cannot sue or be sued.” Heenan v. Leo, 525 F.Supp.2d 110, 112 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing McRae v. Olive, 368 F.Supp.2d 91, 94 (D.D.C. 2005)). Thus, the claims against MPD must be dismissed for his reason alone.
MPD must be dismissed as a defendant because as a District of Columbia agency, the MPD is non sui juris and cannot sue or be sued as a separate entity. Nutt v. Dist. of Columbia Gov't , No. 19-cv-3220, 2020 WL 4597100 at *1 n. 4 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2020) (citing Heenan v. Leo , 525 F. Supp. 2d 110, 112 (D.D.C. 2007) ); see alsoFre v. Monk , No. 15-2192, 2017 WL 627371 at *2 (D.D.C. Feb. 15, 2017) (granting dismissal of MPD as party defendant). Plaintiffs do not contest dismissal.
As an initial matter, the complaint will be dismissed against defendant the "District of Columbia Police Department," because as a District of Columbia agency, the Metropolitan Police Department cannot be sued as a separate entity. See Heenan v. Leo, 525 F. Supp. 2d 110, 112 (D.D.C. 2007) ("it is well settled that the MPD is non sui juris and, therefore, cannot be sue or be sued"). BACKGROUND
Compl. Caption. The District of Columbia is the real party in interest because (1) "it is well settled that the MPD is non sui juris and, therefore, cannot sue or be sued," Heenan v. Leo, 525 F.Supp.2d 110, 112 (D.D.C.2007) (citations omitted), and (2) official-capacity claims "are equivalent to a suit against the municipality itself," Atchinson v. District of Columbia, 73 F.3d 418, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1996). I. BACKGROUND
The MPD is such an entity. See, e.g., Heenan v. Leo, 525 F. Supp. 2d 110, 112 (D.D.C. 2007); Robinson v. District of Columbia, No. 03-CV-1455, 2005 WL 491467, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2005). Defendants move to dismiss the MPD as a party defendant, see Mem. of P. & A. in Support of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss (Defs.' Mem.) at 3, and the motion will be granted, see, e.g., Argote v. D.C. Metro.
Francis v. District of Columbia , 731 F.Supp.2d 56, 67 (D.D.C.2010) (quoting Braxton v. Nat'l Capital Housing Auth ., 396 A.2d 215, 216 (D.C.1978) ). "[I]t is well settled that the MPD is non sui juris and, therefore, cannot sue or be sued." Heenan v. Leo , 525 F.Supp.2d 110, 112 (D.D.C.2007) (citations omitted). The Court is not convinced that the D.C. Public Library is non sui juris , as the defendants contend.
In addition, "it is well settled that the MPD is non sui juris and, therefore, cannot sue or be sued." Heenan v.Leo, 525 F. Supp. 2d 110, 112 (D.D.C. 2007) (citations omitted). A separate Order of dismissal accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
DISCUSSION At the outset, the Court will grant defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint against MPD because it is “well settled” that MPD is an entity within the District of Columbia that “cannot sue or be sued” in its own name. Heenan v. Leo, 525 F.Supp.2d 110, 112 (D.D.C.2007) (citing cases). In addition, the Court will dismiss any claims plaintiff purports to bring on behalf of his grandmother and uncle because a lay person cannot represent another individual in federal court. See28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel”); Georgiades v. Martin–Trigona, 729 F.2d 831, 834 (D.C.Cir.1984) (individual “not a member of the bar of any court ... may appear pro se but is not qualified to appear in [federal] court as counsel for others”) (citation and footnote omitted); U.S. ex rel. Rockefeller v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 274 F.Supp.2d 10, 15–18 (D.D.C.2003) (discussing general prohibition against lay person representation).
Defendants argue correctly that the complaint against MPD should be dismissed because MPD cannot be sued separately from the District of Columbia. See Heenan v. Leo, 525 F.Supp.2d 110, 112 (D.D.C.2007) (“[I]t is well settled that the MPD is non sui juris and, therefore, cannot sue or be sued.”) (citations omitted). Hence, the complaint against MPD is dismissed.
The District argues that Metropolitan Police Department is non sui juris and cannot be sued. See Hunt v. District of Columbia, 2002 WL 1997987, at *1 (D.C.Cir. Aug. 29, 2002) (per curiam); Heenan v. Leo, 525 F.Supp.2d 110, 112 (D.D.C.2007). Second, the District asks the court to dismiss any claims brought against the “John Doe” defendants, because claims against fictitious defendants must be dismissed after the close of discovery.