Opinion
No. 05-09-01089-CR
Opinion Filed July 22, 2010. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
On Appeal from the 422nd Judicial District Court, Kaufman County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 27824-422.
Before Justices MORRIS, MOSELEY, and LANG.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Curtis Eugene Heath pleaded guilty to an indictment for evading arrest/detention with a motor vehicle. He also pleaded true to two enhancement paragraphs for prior felony convictions; however, he contested an allegation that he used his vehicle as a deadly weapon while evading arrest/detention. The jury convicted Heath, found against him on the deadly weapon allegation, and assessed punishment at thirty years' imprisonment. In a single point of error, Heath contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the use of the motor vehicle as a deadly weapon. The background of the case and the evidence adduced at trial are well known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We affirm the trial court's judgment. In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). We review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and assume the trier of fact resolved conflicts in the testimony, weighed the evidence, and drew reasonable inferences in a manner that supports the verdict. See Rollerson v. State, 227 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). In a factual sufficiency review, an appellate court views all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the fact-finder's verdict of guilt was rationally justified. See Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). We will conclude the evidence is factually insufficient if (1) the supporting evidence is "too weak" to support the fact finder's verdict or (2) considering conflicting evidence, the fact finder's verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Unless the record clearly reveals a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact-finder's determination concerning what weight to be given to contradictory testimony. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). To sustain a deadly weapon finding, the evidence must show (1) the object meets the statutory definition of a dangerous weapon, (2) the deadly weapon was used during the event that led to the felony conviction, and (3) other people were put in actual danger. Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). An object may become a deadly weapon based on the manner of its use during the commission of an offense, even if it is not normally considered dangerous. Id. (citing Thomas v. State, 821 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). A motor vehicle is considered a deadly weapon if the manner of its use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. Id. (citing Ex parte McKithan, 838 S.W.2d 560, 561 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). The State does not have to prove specific intent to use a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon. Id. (citing McCain v. State, 22 S.W.3d 497, 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). Use of a motor vehicle will support a deadly weapon finding "on a sufficient showing of actual danger, such as evidence that another motorist was on the highway at the same time and place as the defendant when the defendant drove in a dangerous manner." Id. at 799. There is evidence in the record that Officer McGee stopped Heath's vehicle for driving on the wrong side of the access road. McGee approached the vehicle and found Heath with a large sum of money, covered in blood. McGee asked for Heath's ID and went back to his patrol car. At that time, Heath drove away from McGee, entered the highway, and a chase ensued. Heath passed two cars, which had to get over to the shoulder, he exited the highway, again drove on the wrong side of the access road, ran two stop signs while signaling each turn then re-entered the highway, reached speeds between 100 and 115 mph, and had trouble controlling the vehicle on the wet roads after his tires blew out. Although traffic was light, only a strip of grass divided the highway and there were oncoming cars throughout the chase. Heath contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to show he used his car in a manner capable of causing death or serious injury because he did not try to hit any cars and there was light traffic so no one was in danger. We disagree. Viewing all of the evidence under the proper standards, we conclude it is legally and factually sufficient to support the deadly weapon allegation. See Roberts, 220 S.W.3d at 524; Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 191-92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Porter v. State, 873 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, pet. ref'd). We overrule appellant's point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.