Opinion
No. 00 Civ 3419 (GBD).
January 10, 2001.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiff brought an employment discrimination action against her former employer AIG Technical Services, Inc. ("AIG"), as well as the individual defendants Assistant Vice President Eugene Boylan, Senior Vice President William Babicz, and Director of Human Resources Esther Kornblau, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"). The individual defendants move to dismiss the claims filed against them personally as supervisory employees of AIG.
Plaintiff alleges in her complaint that following her promotion to Complex Claims Director, her immediate supervisor, "commenced to treat [the plaintiff] objectively different than [her] younger co-workers. He was openly critical, hostile and physically threatening on occasion." Plaintiff alleges that the "harassing treatment" escalated until she took leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") to take care of her dying husband. Upon her return, plaintiff alleges that she was prevented from resuming her position as Complex Claims Director or from transferring to another department. Additionally, she alleges that she was blamed for a major financial loss to AIG while she was out on leave, even though decisions affecting the loss were made in her absence.
In this Circuit, "individual defendants with supervisory control over a plaintiff may not be held personally liable under Title VII." Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated on other grounds by, Burlington Industries. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998). The Second Circuit looked to the definition of `employer' under Title VII to ascertain who should be held liable in a claim under this act. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the intention of the legislators in drafting this provision was to "limit liability to employer-entities with fifteen or more employees." Id. While the Second Circuit has not specifically commented on individual liability under the ADA and ADEA, the similarity between the definition of employer under those statutes and Title VII indicates that Congress did not intend to allow for personal liability under either of those acts. See Seres v. Liberty Chevrolet. Inc., 1999 WL 11779, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 1999); See also, Wray v. Edward Blank Assoc. Inc., 924 F. Supp. 498, 502-3 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) states in pertinent part "[t]he term `employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such a person. . ."
Both 42 U.S.C. § 12111 and 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) state in pertinent part" [t]he term `employer' means a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year and any agent of such person."
Moreover, it has been widely held among other Circuits that individuals are not personally liable under the ADA or the ADEA See e.g., Birbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507, 510 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that the ADEA limits civil liability to the employer, not the employee); Stults v. Conoco. Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the ADEA provides no basis for individual liability for supervisory employees);Hiler v. Brown, 177 F.3d 542, 546 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding that "numerous courts, including this one, have held that supervisors, sued in their individual capacities, are not included within the statutory definition of `employer' under Title VII and its sister civil rights statutes [the ADA, ADEA and Rehabilitation Act], and accordingly cannot be held personally liable for discrimination"); Silk v. City of Chicago 194 F.3d 788, 797 n. 5 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that "our case law is clear that a supervisor cannot be held liable in his individual capacity under the ADA or under Title VII"); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583; 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that "[t]he liability schemes under Title VII and the ADEA are essentially the same . . . they both limit civil liability to the employer"); Butler v. City of Prairie Village, Kansas, 172 F.3d 736, 744 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the ADA precludes "personal capacity suits against individuals who do not otherwise qualify as employers under the statutory definition"); Mason v. Stallings. et al., 82 F.3d 1007, 1009 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that the ADA does not provide for individual liability, only employer liability). Therefore, this Court also finds that the plaintiff cannot proceed against these individual defendants under Title VII, the ADEA or the ADA because Congress did not intend to allow plaintiffs to bring an action against supervisory or managerial employees in their individual capacities. Plaintiff, however, may proceed with her claims against the employer, AIG, as defendant.
Defendants Boylan, Babicz and Kornblau's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is therefore GRANTED.
SO ORDERED: