Opinion
No. 01-02-00624-CV.
Opinion issued October 9, 2003.
Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 1, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 773096.
For Appellant: Mary Frances Masterson, 11811 North Freeway, Suite 500, Houston, TX 77060.
For Appellee: Mary Heafner, 11767 Katy Freeway, Suite 740, Houston, TX 77079.
Panel consists of Justices HEDGES, NUCHIA, and HIGLEY.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Fred Heafner, appeals a judgment of eviction from real property at 1621 Kipling in Houston, Texas. He and appellee, Mary Heafner, each inherited an undivided one-half interest in the property from their mother. Fred, who had lived on the property with his mother until her death, continued to live on the property. In August 2000, appellee sued Fred in the 333rd District Court of Harris County, seeking a forced sale of the property for Fred's failure to pay his share of the taxes, the award of Fred's interest in the property to appellee as reimbursement for taxes that she had paid and as damages for various causes of action, and an award of a deficiency judgment for any damages awarded in excess of the value of Fred's interest in the property.
Mary prevailed in her suit. An interlocutory summary judgment, signed on September 27, 2001 (the September judgment), divested Fred of his interest in the property, awarded Mary the property in fee simple, and awarded a deficiency judgment for fraud in the amount of $124,000. A final judgment disposing of all parties and all issues was signed on April 23, 2002. Mary then filed a petition for eviction in justice court. The justice of the peace issued an eviction order, and Fred appealed to the county court at law. The county court conducted a de novo bench trial and signed a judgment of eviction that included a judgment for rent in the amount of $15,000. Fred has appealed that judgment. We reverse the trial court's judgment and render judgment that Mary take nothing by her suit.
DISCUSSION
In his first issue, Fred contends that the final judgment in this case is void because the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Fred argues that the trial court, in ruling that the September judgment created a tenancy at sufferance, determined the issue of title to the property — an issue that was not within the jurisdiction of a county court at law. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 26.043 (Vernon 1988); Falcon v. Ensignia, 976 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.). He further argues that, because the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, the judgment is void.
Mary relied on the September judgment to establish that she was the sole owner of the property. We find nothing in the record to show that Fred objected to the September judgment as interlocutory. Furthermore, the final judgment rendered in the district court case awarded the same relief to Mary as did the September judgment. The trial court in this case did not make a determination of title to the property; it merely followed the ruling of the judgment in the district court case. Accordingly, the judgment in this case is not void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
We overrule Fred's first issue.
2. Landlord-Tenant Relationship
In his second issue, Fred contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to show that the parties had a landlord-tenant relationship. Fred points out that the final judgment in the district court case was not introduced into evidence in this case and that the judgment on which Mary relied was the September judgment. He argues that, even if, as argued by Mary, the September judgment was final, it was void because it improperly divested Fred of his interest in the judgment and awarded it to Mary, thus bypassing the rules of civil procedure relating to the execution of judgments.
Mary contends that the September judgment was a final judgment. She argues that the trial court made a finding that the judgment was final and that it divested Fred of his interest in the property on September 27, 2001. She also asserts that the entire record from the 333rd district court case is not before this Court in this case and, therefore, we must presume that the evidence omitted from the record supports the September judgment. Mary is mistaken on these arguments.
The September judgment, on its face, is not final. Not only is it titled as a partial summary judgment; it recites that it is a judgment against "the Defendant FRED WAYNE HEAFNER" and omits any reference to the other named defendant. Therefore, it does not dispose of all parties or all issues. It did not divest Fred of his interest in the property on September 27, 2001 because it was not a final judgment. It became final on April 23, 2002, when the trial court signed an amended final judgment disposing of all parties and all issues in the district court case. The district court case was appealed to this Court in cause number 01-02-00429-CV, Heafner v. Heafner, and we take judicial notice of the entire record in that cause number. We also take judicial notice of our opinion in that case, issued on this date, in which we concluded that the trial court erred in divesting Fred of his interest in the property and in which we reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the cause to the trial court.
A forcible detainer action is dependent on proof of a landlord-tenant relationship. Haith v. Drake, 596 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The trial court concluded that Fred became a "tenant at sufferance" on the date of the September judgment. This conclusion of law was evidently based on the assumption that the September judgment was a final judgment. However, a final judgment was not rendered until April 23, 2002. Furthermore, the final judgment did not create a landlord-tenant relationship because it improperly divested Fred of his interest in the property.
Mary asserted a claim for a forced sale under chapter 29 of the Texas Property Code. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. §§ 29.001-.007 (Vernon 2000 Supp. 2003). However, she neither adequately pleaded nor proved her claim in that action. She also pleaded for a partition of the property, but she abandoned that request in an amended petition. Fred cannot be divested of his interest in the property under any of the causes of action brought by Mary. Until the property is partitioned by sale or is sold under chapter 29, Mary and Fred remain joint owners and cannot have a landlord-tenant relationship.
Mary recognizes in her brief that, as joint owners, she and Fred each had an equal right to possession of the property. Because joint owners have an equal right to possession, a landlord-tenant relationship is inconsistent with joint ownership. See Levesque v. Wilkens, 57 S.W.3d 499, 504 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) ("A lease grants a tenant exclusive possession of the premises as against the owner.").
We hold that there was legally insufficient evidence to establish that the parties had a landlord-tenant relationship. We sustain Fred's second issue.
C. Attorney's Fees
In his third issue, Fred contends that the trial court erred in not awarding attorney's fees to him as the prevailing party. Fred asserts that section 24.006 of the Texas Property Code provides for the recovery of attorney's fees by the prevailing party in a forcible detainer action. Fred misreads section 24.006. That section provides as follows:
If the landlord provides the tenant notice under Subsection (a) or if a written lease entitles the landlord or the tenant to recover attorney's fees, the prevailing tenant is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees from the landlord. A prevailing tenant is not required to give notice in order to recover attorney's fees under this subsection.
Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.006(c) (Vernon 2000). Because Mary and Fred did not have a landlord-tenant relationship, section 24.006 does not apply to this case.
We overrule Fred's third issue.
CONCLUSION
Because there was legally insufficient evidence to establish a landlord-tenant relationship between Mary and Fred, the trial court erred in rendering a judgment of eviction. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and render judgment that Mary take nothing by her suit.