Opinion
No. 4:00CV24-P-D
July 24, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [3-1]. The Court, having considered the motion and the briefs submitted by both parties, is prepared to rule. The facts of this case are as follows:
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On August 27, 1990, the Plaintiff, Brent Hazzard, was approved for a Chase Manhattan Visa card. Hazzard claims that he used this card only once, on November 6, 1990. On November 24, 1990, the Visa was apparently stolen from the Y.M.C.A. in Greenville, Mississippi. Hazzard then contacted Chase Manhattan and reported the card stolen. In addition, he sent Chase Manhattan an official police record reporting the card as stolen. His account was closed, and a new account was opened. On November 27, 1990, Hazzard was sent a bill from Chase Manhattan, claiming that he had a balance of $55.36 on his old account. Then, on December 14, 1990, he was sent another bill, which stated that he owed $674.97 on his new account. Hazzard and his mother repeatedly complained to Chase Manhattan representatives, and on each occasion, they were told that the matter would be investigated and rectified. Despite Chase's assertions, nothing was done to correct his account. In May of 1991, Chase corrected the bulk of the account balance; however, his account still contained a balance of $84.67. Hazzard continued to complain to Chase about the mix-up, but in September of 1991, his account was referred to a collection agency in an attempt to collect the "past due" balance. On December 13, 1991, Hazzard received a statement from Chase, claiming that he had purchased an item in the amount of $49.00 from Autovantage. According to Hazzard, he did not authorize such a purchase.
The balance, in the amount of $6.36, was paid in November or December of 1990.
During the next few years, Chase continued to seek the unpaid balance from Hazzard, and Hazzard continued to object to the amount of any balance on the account. His account was referred to several different collection agencies, but finally, on October 15, 1999, Hazzard was informed by Chase that the company had corrected the mistake. Thus, the matter was over.
Hazzard still felt as though he had been wronged by the company, so, when Chase would not respond to his requests for a settlement and several attorneys told Hazzard that he did not "have a case" against Chase because he had no actual damages, he decided to file this suit against Chase pro se.
In his complaint, he seeks
$200,000 in compensatory damages for the approximate worth of a house in Oxford, Mississippi;
Hazzard attempted to buy a house in Oxford while he was attending the University of Mississippi in 1992, but, because of his credit history, he was told that he would be "wasting his time." Complaint at ¶ 55.
"the ability to use credit for eight years;"
a four thousand dollar bar loan;
After graduating from the University of Mississippi School of Law in May of 1999, Hazzard applied for a loan from the Access Group in the amount of $4000 to use in studying for the bar exam. However, because of his credit history, he was denied the loan.
punitive damages in the amount of $220,000,000;
an injunction preventing Chase from using the slogan "The Right Relationship is Everything;" and
attorney's fees.
Chase has filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that Mississippi's three-year statute of limitations applies; thus, this action is time-barred, since the last alleged act of negligence on the part of Chase occurred on December 13, 1991, when Hazzard was charged $49.00 on his credit card for a product from Autovantage. Hazzard, on the other hand, insists that the last act of negligence which he has pleaded occurred on January 7, 1997, when Performance Capital Management sent a letter informing Hazzard that Chase sold his account to them. Thus, he is within the three-year statute, since his suit was filed on January 6, 2000.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
In determining whether to grant a motion to dismiss, this Court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Cinel v. Connick, 13 F.3d 1338, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994). The motion should be granted "only if it appears that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Jackson v. City of Beaumont Police Dep't, 958 F.2d 616, 619 (5th Cir. 1992). The review of such a motion is limited to the plaintiff's complaint. Id.
In the case presently before this Court, Hazzard alleges negligent actions by Chase that are not specifically provided for under the Mississippi Code. Therefore, the three-year negligence "catch-all" of the Mississippi Code applies to this action. Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-49. After reviewing the complaint, this Court is not convinced that Hazzard has asserted any acts of negligence by Chase after December 13, 1991, when $49.00 was erroneously charged to Hazzard's account. Hazzard attempts to persuade the Court in his reply to the motion that Chase continuously engaged in negligent activity from 1990 until 1999 because the company referred his account to collection agencies and repeatedly attempted to collect the unpaid balance from Hazzard. Additionally, he claims that when he received notice from Performance Capital Management on January 7, 1997, that this was his "first knowledge that Chase was continuing their negligent actions toward him." Plaintiff's Reply at ¶ 4.
Unfortunately for Hazzard, the notice he received on January 7, 1997, cannot be attributed to Chase. The letter merely informed him that his account was purchased by Performance Capital Management. This is not an act of negligence by Chase. Because the claims in Hazzard's complaint are outside the time limits of the applicable statute of limitations, the action is time-barred and must be dismissed.
An order will issue accordingly.