Opinion
Case No. 2:20-cv-01056-MGL-MGB
10-27-2020
Jerene Hayward, #314451, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of Corrections, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jerene Hayward, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks relief pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, alleging that the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC" or "Defendant") was negligent in failing to protect him from a series of violent attacks while housed at several SCDC facilities. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and submit findings and a recommendation to the assigned district judge. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned finds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Complaint and therefore recommends that this action be remanded to state court.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Plaintiff's pro se Complaint. Specifically, the undersigned has evaluated Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), including 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, as well as the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978). Of particular relevance here, § 1915A requires that this Court dismiss a pro se prisoner's complaint seeking redress from a governmental entity, like that filed by Plaintiff, where the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
This Court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1151. Even under this less stringent standard, however, the Court cannot ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for "all civil actions").
DISCUSSION
The instant case involves a series of physical attacks against Plaintiff occurring at several of SCDC's facilities over the course of a year. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that on or around November 23, 2017, he was stabbed several times in the upper chest while housed at Broad River Correctional Institution. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) Plaintiff claims that upon returning from the hospital, he was placed in the same unit and cell, "despite his pleas for protection." (Id.)
Plaintiff was later transferred to Lee Correctional Institution where he "was [the] victim of a left jaw-line injury" that required emergency surgery on March 30, 2018. (Id. at 6-7.) On April 11, 2018, Plaintiff was taken to Kirkland Correctional Institution's infirmary to recover from this procedure; despite his physical condition, however, he was transferred to Broad River Correctional Institution shortly thereafter and assigned to a highly violent unit called "Monticello." (Id. at 7-9.) Plaintiff requested that he be placed in the facility's medical unit until he fully recovered from his surgery, but "SCDC refused to honor his concerns regarding his well-being." (Id. at 9.)
Upon arriving at the Monticello unit, Plaintiff was "rushed" by several prisoners and sustained multiple stab wounds to his upper and lower back, resulting in yet another hospital visit. (Id.) The puncture wounds resulted in a serious infection, such that Plaintiff then had to stay in Kirkland Correctional Institution's infirmary for two weeks. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that as a result of these physical assaults, he continues to suffer extreme pain and experiences paranoia and post-traumatic stress. (Id. at 10.)
Plaintiff filed a civil complaint with this Court on March 6, 2019, against SCDC and several wardens, seeking redress for his injuries under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Case No. 2:19-cv-00654-MGL-MGB.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent in failing to protect him from the aforementioned attacks and sought $2.1 million in damages. (Case No. -654, Dkt. No. 1.) The undersigned sent Plaintiff a proper form order on March 11, 2019, outlining various pleading deficiencies in his Complaint—for example, the defendants' "mere negligent failure to protect an inmate" does not, in and of itself, establish a constitutional violation under § 1983—and allowing Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his claims. (See Case No. -654, Dkt. No. 6.)
See Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record"); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that 'the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'").
Upon reviewing Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint, the undersigned issued a second proper form order, once again identifying deficiencies in Plaintiff's pleading and providing him an opportunity to amend. (Case No. -654, Dkt. No. 17.) Among other things, the undersigned explained that SCDC was not amenable to suit under § 1983 because only a "person" may be held liable under that statute. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff failed to file a second amended complaint and the Court dismissed his action for failure to prosecute and comply with the Court's order. (Case No. -654, Dkt. No. 23.)
Plaintiff then filed the instant action on March 16, 2020, this time naming only SCDC as a defendant and raising his claims under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act ("SCTCA"). Plaintiff claims that SCDC owed him a duty of care and failed to protect him despite knowing there was a substantial risk to his health and well-being. Plaintiff further contends that SCDC was grossly negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of his injuries. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2-5.) Plaintiff's Complaint makes no mention of § 1983 or any federal statutes whatsoever.
Generally, a federal court exercises only limited jurisdiction and is constrained to "the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute." In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Thus, a district court must ensure that all cases before it are properly subject to such jurisdiction and may dismiss and/or remand claims sua sponte when they are not. Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999) (explaining that it is most efficient to determine jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation). The two most commonly recognized bases for federal jurisdiction are: diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Because there is no diversity of citizenship in the instant case, Plaintiff's Complaint must demonstrate federal question jurisdiction to remain in federal court.
The diversity statute requires complete diversity between the parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000.00. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). "Complete" diversity of the parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 (1978). Here, SCDC is a South Carolina entity, and Plaintiff is likewise a South Carolina citizen. Thus, there is no diversity jurisdiction in the instant case. See Elliott v. Am. States Ins. Co., 883 F.3d 384, 394 (4th Cir. 2018); Phillips v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 0:19-cv-03433-JMC, 2020 WL 3167640, at *2 (D.S.C. June 15, 2020).
In order to establish federal question jurisdiction, the plaintiff must set forth a claim arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also King v. Marriott Int'l Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2003) ("[O]rdinarily courts look no further than the plaintiff's complaint in determining whether a lawsuit raises issues of federal law capable of creating federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). If the plaintiff establishes subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 1331, the district court may then exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all other related claims that form part of the same case or controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Upon review of the instant case, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's Complaint fails to allege any claims arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. To the contrary, he consistently and repeatedly references the SCTCA as the basis for his allegations, methodically outlining the relevant state case law and statutes in support thereof. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 2-5.) Moreover, he explicitly echoes this Court's established precedent that "governmental entities" like SCDC are not shielded from liability resulting from its employees' gross negligence under the SCTCA. (Id. at 3.) See, e.g., Green v. SCDC, No. 9:11-cv-3407-DNC-BM, 2012 WL 360144, at *1, n.1 (D.S.C. Jan. 13, 2012), adopted, 2012 WL 360105 (D.S.C. Feb. 2, 2012) (noting that SCDC "is amenable to suit in state court for tort pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, but is not amenable to suit in federal court for damages based on an alleged violation of a prisoner's constitutional rights"). Thus, it appears that Plaintiff now seeks to recover for his injuries under state law.
To the extent there is any further doubt regarding proper jurisdiction in this case, the caption of Plaintiff's Complaint confirms that he intended to file this action with the Court of Common Pleas. Indeed, while Plaintiff may have sent his pleading to the district court, his Complaint is expressly directed to the "State of South Carolina, County of Richland." (See Dkt. No. 1 at 1.) This makes sense, given that "suits brought under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act must be brought in a state court within the boundaries of South Carolina." Rivera v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., No. 8:18-cv-2539-JMC-JDA, 2018 WL 7825496, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 13, 2018), adopted, 2019 WL 642916 (D.S.C. Feb. 15, 2019).
Based on the above, the undersigned finds that this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's SCTCA claims and therefore recommends that this case be remanded to state court as Plaintiff intended. See id. at *2 (remanding pro se plaintiff's claims to state court where he alleged violations of the SCTCA and named only SCDC as a defendant).
CONCLUSION
The undersigned recommends that the Court remand Plaintiff's Complaint for adjudication by the proper state court.
To the extent the assigned district judge adopts the recommendation herein, the undersigned also recommends that Plaintiff's pending motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 3) be denied as moot.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
/s/_________
MARY GORDON BAKER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE October 27, 2020
Charleston, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).