Opinion
3:18-cv-01837
06-07-2021
JOHN CRAIG HAYNES, Plaintiff, v. JOHN WETZEL, et al., Defendants.
Mannion, Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Susan E. Schwab, United States Magistrate Judge
I. Introduction.
During his incarceration in Pennsylvania, the plaintiff, John Craig Haynes (“Haynes”), was transferred to a prison in New Jersey. While in New Jersey, he injured his knee during a basketball game. In this lawsuit, Haynes brings claims against several defendants alleging that the defendants provided inadequate medical care for his knee both while he was in New Jersey, and then when he was subsequently transferred back to Pennsylvania. Because Haynes has failed to file a second amended complaint and has not otherwise been in contact with the court, it appears that he has abandoned this action. Accordingly, after analyzing the applicable factors, we recommend that the case be dismissed.
II. Background and Procedural History.
Haynes, proceeding pro se, began this action on July 20, 2018, by filing a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County. Doc. 1 at 1; doc. 10 at 1. On September 18, 2018, five of the defendants named in the original complaint, all of whom resided in New Jersey (“the New Jersey Defendants”), removed this case from the Court of Common Pleas to this court. Doc. 1 at 1. Shortly after removing the case, the New Jersey Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction along with a supporting brief. Docs. 2, 4. Another defendant, Dr. Scott Prince (“Prince”), also moved to dismiss the claims against him on December 13, 2018, arguing that Haynes had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Doc. 16.
We addressed these motions to dismiss in two reports and recommendations on May 6, 2019. Docs. 20-21. We recommended that the claims against the New Jersey Defendants be severed from the case and transferred to the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Doc. 20 at 19. We also recommended that the claims against Prince be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and that Haynes be given leave to amend his complaint as to his claims against Prince. Doc. 21 at 18.
Judge Mannion adopted both of our reports and recommendations in late June of 2019. Docs. 28-29. The court accordingly severed the claims against the New Jersey Defendants and transferred them to the District of New Jersey and dismissed the claims against Prince, giving Haynes leave to amend his complaint on or before July 29, 2019. Doc. 28 at 3; doc. 29 at 3. Judge Mannion remanded the case to us for further proceedings. Doc. 29 at 3.
We conducted a screening of the complaint and concluded that Haynes failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against Wetzel, Martin, and the three John Doe defendants. Doc. 31. We ordered Haynes to file an amended complaint against Wetzel, Haynes, and the three John Doe defendants on or before August 9, 2019. Id. Haynes filed an amended complaint on October 1, 2019. Doc. 34.
On December 10, 2019, defendants Wetzel and Martin filed a motion to dismiss Haynes's amended complaint for failure to state a claim. Doc. 40. We found that Haynes's amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted against the defendants. Docs. 51, 53. Accordingly, we recommended that Haynes's claims be dismissed with leave to file a second amended complaint on or before October 20, 2020. Doc. 53 at 4. Haynes has failed to file a second amended complaint, and the time to do so has long since passed.
III. Discussion.
By failing to file a second amended complaint, it appears that Haynes has abandoned this action. Thus, we recommend that the court dismiss this action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).
The court may dismiss an action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) if the plaintiff fails to prosecute a case or to comply with court rules or court orders. Even though dismissal is an available sanction, it is a drastic sanction that “should be reserved for those cases where there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.” Donnelly v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir. 1982). In other words, “cases should be decided on the merits barring substantial circumstances in support of the contrary outcome.” Hildebrand v. Allegheny Cnty., 923 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2019).
Decisions regarding dismissal of actions for failure to prosecute rest in the sound discretion of the court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002). But that discretion, while broad, is governed by the following factors, commonly referred to as the Poulis factors, which the court must balance in deciding whether to dismiss a case:
(1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney
was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984). No. single factor is dispositive, Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 (3d Cir. 2008), and each factor need n ot be satisfied for the court to dismiss an action, Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2003). In this case, an assessment of the Poulis factors weighs in favor of dismissing this action.
The first Poulis factor is the extent of the party's personal responsibility. A pro se litigant is personally responsible for failure to comply with the court's rules and orders and to pay the filing fee. In this case, because Haynes is proceeding pro se, he is responsible for his failure to file a second amended complaint.
The second Poulis factor is prejudice to the adversary. Examples of prejudice are “the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.” Scarborough v. Eubanks, 747 F.2d 871, 876 (3d Cir. 1984). Prejudice for purposes of the Poulis analysis, however, does not mean irremediable harm. Ware, 322 F.3d at 222. “[T]he burden imposed by impeding a party's ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy is sufficiently prejudicial.” Id. In this case, Haynes's failure to file a second amended complaint frustrates and delays resolution of this action. Going forward, such failure to litigate would prejudice the defendant, who without timely responses by Haynes could not seek a timely resolution of the case.
The third Poulis factor is a history of dilatoriness. While “conduct that occurs one or two times is insufficient to demonstrate a ‘history of dilatoriness, '” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 261, “[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response to interrogatories, or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Adams v. Trs. of N.J. Brewery Emps.' Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 874 (3d Cir. 1994). A “party's problematic acts must be evaluated in light of [his] behavior over the life of the case.” Id. at 875. In this case, Haynes has failed to file a second amended complaint, and the time to do so has long passed. Thus, Haynes has a history of dilatoriness.
The fourth Poulis factor is whether the conduct was willful or in bad faith. “Willfulness involves intentional or self-serving behavior.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. Here, Haynes's failure to respond to our order to file a second amended complaint leads to an inference that he has willfully abandoned this case.
The fifth Poulis factor is the effectiveness of alternate sanctions. Dismissal is a sanction of last resort, and it is incumbent upon a court to explore the effectiveness of lesser sanctions before ordering dismissal. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868. Haynes is proceeding pro se and, given his refusal or inability to file a second amended complaint, there is no evidence to suggest that paying monetary sanctions will remedy Haynes's deficiencies. Therefore, monetary sanctions would not be effective in this case. Moreover, Haynes's failure to file a second amended complaint leads to an inference that further orders to him would not be effective. In this case, no sanction short of dismissal would be effective.
The sixth and final Poulis factor is the meritoriousness of the claim. In this inquiry, a claim will be deemed meritorious when the allegations of the complaint, if established at trial, would support recovery. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 870. Here, assuming for the sake of argument that Haynes' claim has merit, consideration of this factor cannot save his case, sin ce he is now wholly noncompliant with his obligations as a litigant.
In su m, the Poulis fact ors weigh h eavily in favor of dism issal. Hayn es h a s abandoned this case. Thus, we will recommend that the court dismiss the case.
IV. Recommendations.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we RECOMMEND that the Court DISMISS this action in accordance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party
shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.