Opinion
NO. 2014-CA-001281-MR
03-25-2016
JEFFREY A. HAYNES APPELLANT v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Jeffrey A. Haynes, pro se LaGrange, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway Attorney General of Kentucky Tami Allen Stetler Assistant Attorney General Frankfort, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. GRISE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 10-CR-00397 & 10-CR-00638 OPINION
AFFIRMING BEFORE: DIXON, NICKELL, AND VANMETER, JUDGES. DIXON, JUDGE: Jeffrey A. Haynes, pro se, appeals a Warren Circuit Court order that denied his motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 11.42. Finding no error, we affirm.
In May 2010, a Warren County grand jury indicted Haynes on charges of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), possession of drug paraphernalia, and first-degree persistent felony offender (PFO). Shortly thereafter, the grand jury returned a second indictment charging Haynes with bail jumping (first-degree) and first-degree PFO.
The Commonwealth submitted a written offer on plea of guilty to the charges of possession of a controlled substance and bail jumping, recommending an aggregate ten-year sentence. The offer provided for dismissal of the remaining charges, as well as the dismissal of a third indictment for manufacturing methamphetamine. Haynes accepted the offer and signed a motion to enter guilty plea. Following a lengthy colloquy, the court accepted Haynes's guilty plea and sentenced him to ten-years' imprisonment.
In January 2013, Haynes moved the circuit court to vacate his conviction due to alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Haynes asserted counsel abandoned a pending suppression motion and coerced Haynes to plead guilty without advising him of potential defenses. Haynes specifically argued he had a viable defense to the bail jumping charge because he suffered a seizure and did not intentionally miss his court date. The trial court rendered a written order denying the RCr 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing. The court stated, in relevant part:
It is apparent that the defendant was aware of his rights and the defenses that he was waiving before entering the plea agreement. Contrary to his contention, the record shows that he was, in fact, aware of the intentional element in Bail Jumping. During the plea colloquy, the Court specifically stated the elements of Bail Jumping, including the element of intent. The Court also inquired about his possible defenses to the charge of Bail Jumping, including potential medical defenses. In
response, the defendant explicitly confirmed that the potential defenses had been considered and that he still desired to enter a guilty plea. The circumstances show that the defendant entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea of guilty for Bail Jumping and cannot now claim relief pursuant to RCr11.42.
. . .
The defendant alleges that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to contest the introduction of evidence or re-notice the previous Motion to Suppress. Trial counsel filed a Motion to Suppress for Fourth Amendment Violations prior to the defendant's plea agreement. . . . During the plea colloquy, the Court specifically inquired about whether potential claims of constitutional violations had been discussed with counsel, including suppression issues. The defendant responded with his intention to enter into a guilty plea nonetheless. The record shows that he entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea agreement.
Haynes now raises the same arguments on appeal, and he contends the trial court improperly denied his RCr 11.42 motion without an evidentiary hearing.
Where, as here, ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged in the context of a guilty plea proceeding, the movant must show, "(1) that counsel made errors so serious that counsel's performance fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance; and (2) that the deficient performance so seriously affected the outcome of the plea process that, but for the errors of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial." Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726, 727-28 (Ky. App. 1986), citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370, 80 L. Ed. 2d 203 (1985). Furthermore, a trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing only "if there is a material issue of fact that cannot be conclusively resolved, i.e., conclusively proved or disproved, by an examination of the record." Fraser v. Commonwealth, 59 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Ky. 2001).
In the case at bar, the record clearly refutes Haynes's allegations of ineffective assistance; consequently, the court was not required to hold an evidentiary hearing. Id. During the plea colloquy, counsel explained that he and Haynes reviewed the discovery and decided not to pursue the suppression issue. Further, the court expressly inquired about Haynes's potential medical defense to the charge of bail jumping, and Haynes acknowledged that he wanted to plead guilty rather than risk going to trial. The court also asked Haynes if he was completely satisfied with the services of his attorney, and Haynes responded affirmatively. Haynes ultimately advised the Court that he believed pleading guilty was in his best interest. After careful review, we conclude the trial court properly denied Haynes's motion for post-conviction relief.
For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the order of the Warren Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: Jeffrey A. Haynes, pro se
LaGrange, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Jack Conway
Attorney General of Kentucky Tami Allen Stetler
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky