Opinion
No. X07-CV02 0084286S
August 24, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The defendants, the Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., Bishop Daniel P. Reilly, and the Our Lady of Lourdes Corp., move for summary judgment as to all counts of the second amended complaint filed by the plaintiff, Michael Hayes. The operative complaint asserts that when the plaintiff was fifteen years old, during July and August 1985, the late Raymond Jean, a priest serving at Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Gales Ferry, sexually assaulted him, and that Reilly was at that time the bishop in charge of the Norwich diocese which comprised Gales Ferry. The first count alleges liability for negligence; the second count for reckless or wanton misconduct; the third count, under the doctrine of respondeat superior; and the fourth count for civil conspiracy. The basis for this motion is a lack of evidentiary support for these allegations.
Summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings and documentary proof submitted demonstrate that no genuine dispute as to material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Practice Book § 17-49.
I
An examination of the documents submitted discloses that a genuine factual dispute exists as to whether the defendants knew or should have known of Raymond Jean's sexual proclivity. Therefore summary judgment cannot be granted as to the first count.
II
The second count avers that the defendants acted recklessly, wantonly, or wilfully in allowing Jean to serve as a priest at Our Lady of Lourdes parish and have contact with minors.
It is unnecessary to prove that the defendants actually intended to harm the plaintiff in order to prove reckless or wanton misconduct. Berry v. Loiseau, 223 Conn. 786, 811 (1992). However, there is a wide difference between reckless behavior and mere negligence and merely labeling acts as "reckless" or "wanton" is insufficient to establish the facts of recklessness or wantonness. Brock v. Waldron, 127 Conn. 79, 81 (1940). Thoughtlessness and inadvertence are not recklessness. Id., 83. Reckless or wanton behavior implies a conscious disregard of a high risk, such as embarking upon a particularly dangerous course of action after actual warning. Id., 83-84. Recklessness entails ignoring a perceived risk. Sheiman v. LaFayette Bank and Trust Co., 4 Conn.App. 39, 45 (1985); or egregious conduct which involves an extreme departure from ordinary care and where danger is apparent. Dubay v. Irish, 207 Conn. 518, 588 (1988). A reckless actor is one who recognizes a substantial risk of harm to others and consciously chooses to act despite such knowledge. Mooney v. Wabrek, 129 Conn. 302, 308 (1942).
Bishop Reilly and Monsignor Paul J. St. Onge, who was the chief assistant to the bishop for the Norwich diocese, provided affidavits indicating that neither had received complaints or comments suggesting Jean's pedophilia. These denials of actual knowledge regarding the risk Jean posed for minors is uncontradicted by any other admissible evidence.
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the court must view all admissible evidence and draw all reasonable and logical inferences most favorably to the party opposing the motion. Lind-Larsen v. Fleet National Bank of Connecticut, 84 Conn.App. 1, 8 (2004). However, only evidence admissible at trial may be considered. Wooten v. Heisher, 82 Conn.App. 815, 819 (2004). Once the defendants have submitted evidence to show no actual knowledge regarding Jean's danger to minors it becomes incumbent upon the plaintiff to offer some admissible evidence which tends to disprove that lack of actual knowledge of the substantial risk Jean posed.
As noted above constructive knowledge is insufficient to establish reckless or wanton conduct. That is not to say that such subjective perception cannot be proven circumstantially, but such circumstantial evidence must be probative of actual belief rather than the "should have known" standard applicable to ordinary negligence.
The evidence proffered by the plaintiff in this regard amounts to no more than inadmissible hearsay, the suspicions of third parties who never communicated such opinions to either Reilly or St. Onge, and mere innuendo. Evidence of the indifferent attitude toward, or efforts to suppress disclosure of priests' sexual abuse of minors by the Roman Catholic Church, generally is irrelevant to establish that Reilly and/or St. Onge were actually aware of Jean's sexually predatory nature and chose to ignore that risk in having him serve as a priest at Our Lady of Lourdes parish.
In the absence of any admissible evidence contradicting the affidavits of Reilly and St. Onge that they had no knowledge that Jean posed a risk of sexually assaulting minors, the court must conclude that there is no genuine dispute as to this fact and that the defendants are entitled to judgment on the second count alleging reckless or wanton misconduct.
III
The third count attempts to impose vicarious liability on the defendants for the sexual assaults committed by Jean under the theory of respondeat superior. The movants contend that this legal doctrine is inapplicable because such assaults fall outside of the scope of Jean's employment as a Roman Catholic priest within the Norwich diocese. The court concurs that respondeat superior is inapplicable as a matter of law.
An employer is liable for the torts of an employee only when that misconduct is activated, at least in part, by a purpose of serving the employer. A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farms, Inc., 216 Conn. 200, 210 (1990). "Service of an employer" is not synonymous with "during the period covered by employment." Id., 209-10.
Our Appellate Court has held, as a matter of law, that the Department of Mental Retardation incurred no vicarious liability under respondeat superior when a person who was assigned to counsel mentally retarded clients regarding life skills sexually assaulted a client. Gutierrez v. Thorne, 13 Conn.App. 493, 499 (1988). In Mullen v. Horton, 46 Conn.App. 759 (1997), the Appellate Court observed, in dictum, that cases where a priest sexually molests a minor "clearly represent a situation in which the priest wholly disregarded his pastoral duties." Id., 770. The Court further commented that the scenario of a priest assaulting a child is such a "digression from duty . . . so clear cut that the disposition of the case is a matter of law." Id., 770-71. Many trial court decisions have granted motions to strike and for summary judgment when considering identical claims under respondeat superior.
In the present case, the defendants presented evidence that it is entirely contrary to the teachings and tenets of the Roman Catholic Church for priests to engage in sexual liaisons of any kind and for anyone, clergy or lay persons, to engage in homosexual activity. This evidence is unrefuted. Clearly, Jean's sexual assaults upon the plaintiff were repugnant to his employer's business and in utter contravention of the employer's aims and rules. Unlike a situation where a servant performs the master's work poorly or misunderstands what the master wants done, the molestation of children is a total abdication of the master's work so that the pedophile priest can satisfy personal lust. Consequently, the defendants are entitled to judgment on the third count as a matter of law.
IV
The fourth count is entitled "Conspiracy" and alleges that the members of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, of which Bishop Reilly was one during the pertinent time period, conspired to conceal the existence and extent of the sexual molestation of children by priests because if such information became publicly available it would tarnish the reputation of the Roman Catholic Church and decrease affiliation with and financial contributions to the Church.
Civil conspiracy is not an independent cause of action under Connecticut law. Litchfield Asset Management Corp. v. Howell, 70 Conn.App. 133, 140 (2002). Instead, civil conspiracy is but a means by which cognizable tortious conduct is committed, and liability is imposed for the underlying tort which was the goal of the conspiracy, such as fraud or battery. Id. No damages are awarded for civil conspiracy, but instead are assessed as a result of the underlying tort which harmed the plaintiff. Id.
In order to incur liability for the underlying tort based on civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant combined with one or more persons; (2) to do a criminal or an unlawful act or a lawful act by criminal or unlawful means; (3) an act was done by a coconspirator pursuant to the scheme and in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy; and (4) that act resulted in harm to the plaintiff. Id., 139-40.
The complaint is devoid of any allegation that Reilly or any other member of the conference combined to facilitate Jean's sexual assault of the plaintiff or anyone else. The purported purpose of the conspiracy was to conceal from public awareness past instances of sexual abuse at the hands of priests to eliminate or minimize the scandalous impact of such information. That alleged objective is a far cry from a conspiracy to facilitate molestation of children by Raymond Jean or priests generally. The defendants are entitled to judgment on this count, also.
Summary judgment is denied as to the first count and granted as to the remaining counts.
Sferrazza, J.