Opinion
C. A. 3:20-3039-JMC-SVH
09-02-2020
Demetric Hayes and Carla Marshall, Plaintiffs, v. Joe Earle Berry, Jr.; Phillip K. Stephens; Lucas Stephens; Gary Finklea; William H. Edwards; Albert J. Dooley, Jr.; Mary M. Caskey; James Y. Becker; Scott D. Whittle; Stephens Remodeling, LLC; Haynesworth Sinkler Boyd, P.A.; Finklea Law Firm; Moore Taylor Law Firm; JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.; County of Lexington; and Lexington County Sheriff's Department, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHIVA V. HODGES, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Demetric Hayes and Carla Marshall (“Plaintiffs”), proceeding pro se, filed this action against the above-named defendants (“Defendants”), asserting claims related to their ejectment from property located at 232 Edinfield Court, Gaston, South Carolina (“Property”). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends the district judge dismiss the complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiffs allege the court has jurisdiction pursuant to diversity and federal question jurisdiction. [ECF No. 1 at 3]. Plaintiffs list the following statutes as the basis for federal question jurisdiction: 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and 42 U.S.C. § 14141. Id.
Plaintiffs' claims date to 2010 when Chase Home Finance, LLC, first filed foreclosure proceedings against them related to the Property. This court is familiar with the case, as Plaintiff Hayes removed several state court actions to this court, all of which were remanded for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., C. A. Nos. 3:13-731-JFA; 3:13-1884-JFA; 3:17-1568-JFA; and 3:17-2575-JFA.Most of defendants are law firms, lawyers, judges, or parties involved in various state court lawsuits beginning in 2010 and continuing to the present. [ECF No. 1 at 14, 21, citing to case #2017-cp-3203043]. The most significant event deriving from all the litigation was the ejectment of Plaintiffs from the Property on August 22, 2017,which they allege was carried out by the Lexington County Sheriff's Department.
A district court may take judicial notice of materials in the court's own files from prior proceedings. See United States v. Parker, 956 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1992) (the district court had the right to take judicial notice of a prior related proceeding); see also Fletcher v. Bryan, 175 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1949).
The undersigned notes that it does not appear claims in the instant case, filed August 24, 2020, related to the August 22, 2017 ejectment would survive a challenge under the statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs seek $15,000,000 in monetary damages and for this court to “sanction and discipline all parties involved.” Id. at 5, 21.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Merriweather v. Reynolds, 586 F.Supp.2d 548, 554 (D.S.C. 2008). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” Id. at 352; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Although the absence of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the case, determining jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is the most efficient procedure. Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999).
There is no presumption that a federal court has jurisdiction over a case, Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, MD., 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999), and a plaintiff must allege facts essential to show jurisdiction in her pleadings. McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); see also Dracos v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 762 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[P]laintiffs must affirmatively plead the jurisdiction of the federal court.”). To this end, Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1) requires the complaint provide “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction[.]” When a complaint fails to include “an affirmative pleading of a jurisdictional basis[,] a federal court may find that it has jurisdiction if the facts supporting jurisdiction have been clearly pleaded.” Pinkley, 191 F.3d at 399 (citations omitted). However, if the court, viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to a plaintiff, finds insufficient allegations in the pleadings, the court will lack subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
The two most commonly recognized and utilized bases for federal court jurisdiction are (1) diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332; and (2) federal question pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The allegations contained in the instant complaint do not fall within the scope of either form of this court's limited jurisdiction.
First, the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), requires complete diversity of parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000. Complete diversity of parties in a case means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-74 nn.13-16 (1978). The court does not have diversity jurisdiction over this case, as Plaintiffs' complaint fails to demonstrate complete diversity of citizenship satisfying the requirement of § 1332(a). In fact, it appears from the complaint that all defendants except for JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A, are citizens of South Carolina, as are Plaintiffs. [ECF No. 1 at 4, 16-18].
Second, the essential allegations contained in the complaint are insufficient to show that the case is one “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Although Plaintiffs list alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, these are criminal statutes that do not provide for civil cause of action between private parties. See Casey v. Orman, C. A. No. 5:08-1373, 2009 WL 2971770, at *5 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 10, 2009) (holding 18 U.S.C. § 242 does not provide for a private cause of action and collecting cases). Plaintiffs also list 42 U.S.C. § 14141, which by its own terms allows only for a civil cause of action by the Attorney General of the United States.
To state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an aggrieved party must sufficiently allege that he was injured by “the deprivation of any [of his or her] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution and laws” by a “person” acting “under color of state law.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; see generally 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1230 (3d ed. 2014). All defendants except for Lexington County and the Lexington County Sheriff's Department are private persons or corporate entities and therefore do not act under the color of state law. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 940 (1982) (finding purely private conduct is not actionable under § 1983).
Section 1983 is the procedural mechanism through which Congress provided a private civil cause of action based on allegations of federal constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state actors from using badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally-guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.
Only “persons” may act under color of state law; therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” For example, inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds are not “persons” and cannot act under color of state law. See Preval v. Reno, 57 F.Supp.2d 307, 310 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“[T]he Piedmont Regional Jail is not a ‘person,' and therefore not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D. N.C. 1989) (“Claims under § 1983 are directed at ‘persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to suit.”). Lexington County and Lexington County Sheriff's Department are not persons subject to suit under § 1983.
Because Plaintiffs have not shown that the court has either diversity or federal question jurisdiction over their claims, the complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the court dismiss the complaint without prejudice.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”