Opinion
A23-0612
10-02-2023
Mohammed F. Hayat, Appellant, v. Minnesota Commissioner of Human Rights, Respondent.
Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-CV-22-4695
Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Segal, Chief Judge; and Wheelock, Judge.
ORDER OPINION
Michelle A. Larkin, Judge.
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. On March 15, 2022, appellant Mohammed F. Hayat arrived for a dental appointment at a HealthPartners clinic and was told that he needed to take an antibacterial pill prior to an examination and that he therefore needed to reschedule his appointment. Hayat alleges that (1) a HealthPartners supervisor told him that HealthPartners would not treat him and that he needed to find another clinic; (2) the same supervisor told him that HealthPartners had a policy that any patient that has not been an active member since 2014 cannot be seen; (3) a HealthPartners office manager subsequently told him that HealthPartners indeed had such a policy and could not accommodate his future dental work; and (4) despite his requests, he was not given specifics regarding the policy.
2. Hayat complained to HealthPartners. HealthPartners responded with letters to Hayat stating that "the dentist and staff followed protocols and procedures as they relate to patients who have not taken a prescribed pre-medication prior to their dental visit." The letters also stated that HealthPartners was unable to reschedule Hayat's appointment during his requested timeframe due to "full schedules," but noted that HealthPartners was "happy to schedule an appointment" and wished to continue providing care for Hayat.
3. Based on those circumstances, Hayat filed an online discrimination-incident report (discrimination report) with respondent Minnesota Department of Human Rights and its commissioner (collectively, the commissioner). Hayat also provided the commissioner with the letters from HealthPartners. The commissioner informed Hayat that the department would not be "filing a charge" or "opening an investigation into [his] concerns" because there was "no evidence to tie [his] experiences" to his "protected classes." The commissioner explained that Hayat's allegation that he was denied services was "directly refuted" by HealthPartners's letters indicating that HealthPartners would be "happy to schedule an appointment" for him.
The commissioner's email response to Hayat's discrimination report states: "Filling out this form does not mean you filed a charge of discrimination." Nonetheless, the parties, by their legal arguments to this court, have characterized Hayat's discrimination claim as a "charge." See Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 6 (2022) (discussing the processing of a discrimination "charge"). We therefore analyze Hayat's discrimination claim as a "charge." Regardless, the discretion afforded to the commissioner to pursue charges, as discussed below, would seemingly apply with equal weight to a discrimination report.
4. In August 2022, Hayat petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus directing the commissioner to "file a charge" and complete an "investigation" of his alleged civil-rights violation. He asserted that the commissioner was required to take these actions under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (the Act), Minn. Stat. §§ 363A.01-.50 (2022).
5. In January 2023, the district court held a hearing on Hayat's petition for a writ of mandamus. Hayat asserted that the commissioner failed to fulfill a statutory duty to investigate his discrimination report. Specifically, he argued that Minn. Stat. § 363A.06, subd. 1(8), "clearly, implicitly, and unequivocally" requires the commissioner to receive and investigate charges alleging unfair discriminatory practices. The district court asked Hayat to clarify what he was asking the court to order the commissioner to do, and Hayat responded, "File the charges . . . and complete the investigation. That's it." The district court denied Hayat's petition, reasoning that it "cannot use a writ of mandamus to compel an act which the agency does not have a duty to perform, and where [Hayat] has an adequate alternative available remedy."
6. Hayat contends that the district court erred by denying his petition for a writ of mandamus. "Mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy." Mendota Golf, LLP v. City of Mendota Heights, 708 N.W.2d 162, 171 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted). "The authority to issue a writ of mandamus is statutory." State v. Wilson, 632 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Minn. 2001); see Minn. Stat. §§ 586.01-.12 (2022). Mandamus is available to "compel the performance of an official duty clearly imposed by law or to compel the exercise of discretion when that exercise is required by law." Spann v. Minneapolis City Council, 979 N.W.2d 66, 77 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted); see also Minn. Stat. § 586.01. To obtain a writ of mandamus, a petitioner must show that three conditions are present: (1) the respondent has "failed to perform an official duty that is clearly imposed by law"; (2) the failure to perform the official duty has caused injury to the petitioner; and (3) there is "no other adequate legal remedy." Breza v. City of Minnetrista, 725 N.W.2d 106, 109-10 (Minn. 2006) (quotation omitted).
7. We review a district court's denial of a mandamus petition de novo if the denial was based solely on a question of law. Id. at 110. The issue presented in this case involves statutory interpretation, which is a question of law that we also review de novo. Sumner v. Jim Lupient Infiniti, 865 N.W.2d 706, 708 (Minn. 2015). When the language of a statute is clear and free from ambiguities, we apply it as written. Id.
8. Under Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 1, any person aggrieved by a violation of the Act may file a verified charge with the commissioner setting forth a summary of the details of the complained-of practice. Hayat argues that the commissioner failed to fulfill a statutory duty to "file the charges and complete the investigation" of his discrimination claim against HealthPartners. He argues that the commissioner had a duty to do so under Minn. Stat. § 363A.06, subd. 1(8), which states that the commissioner "shall . . . issue complaints, receive and investigate charges alleging unfair discriminatory practices, and determine whether or not probable cause exists for hearing." See also Minn. Stat. § 363A.06, subd. 1(9) (directing the commissioner to "subpoena witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony, and require the production for examination of any books or papers relative to any matter under investigation").
9. Despite the mandatory language in Minn. Stat. § 363A.06, subd. 1(8), another statute makes clear that the commissioner is not required to process every charge filed with the department. Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 6, regards the processing of charges filed with the commissioner. It sets forth the procedures the commissioner must follow and states that "[t]he commissioner may adopt policies to determine which charges are processed." Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 6(h). The language of Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 6, indicates that investigation is a part of charge processing. See Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 6 (b) (prioritizing the "investigating and processing" of certain charges), (c)-(d) (referring to a determination "after investigation").
10. Because the legislature has granted the commissioner the discretion to determine which charges are processed, and because investigation is part of the process, we conclude that Minn. Stat. § 363A.06, subd. 1(8), does not require the commissioner to investigate every charge filed with the department. Because the commissioner's decision not to file a charge or open an investigation-that is, not to process Hayat's discrimination claim-was discretionary, mandamus was not available.
11. We acknowledge Hayat's frustration with the district court's ruling. In district court, Hayat made it clear that he was not asking the court to order the commissioner to conduct a hearing on his discrimination claim. Yet the district court's reasoning is framed in the context of a request for a hearing, stating, "Generally, in review of which cases to bring to an evidentiary hearing, and which to dismiss without a hearing, [the commissioner] has broad discretionary authority." But we categorically reject Hayat's argument that the district court's reasoning is the result of misconduct by the district court and opposing counsel.
12. "There is the presumption that a judge has discharged his or her judicial duties properly." State v. Mems, 708 N.W.2d 526, 533 (Minn. 2006). The district court may not have addressed the nuances of Hayat's argument, but there is absolutely no evidence of misconduct by the district court or opposing counsel. Indeed, our review of the hearing transcript indicates that the district court treated Hayat with respect, gave Hayat ample opportunity to present his argument, and asked Hayat relevant questions to ensure that the court understood his request. For example, the district court asked if the commissioner's review of the documents that Hayat had submitted with his discrimination claim constituted an investigation. That was a reasonable question given that Hayat had framed the issue for the court as whether the commissioner has "a statutory duty to file the charges and complete the investigation on [Hayat's] discrimination [claim] against HealthPartners."
13. Hayat also contends that the district court violated his due-process rights in four ways: (1) "arbitrarily" changing the caption of his petition to remove the commissioner's name from the caption, (2) "intentionally" changing a material fact by referring to HealthPartners as a "no name 'dental clinic,'" (3) failing to inform the parties that retaliation is against the law after Hayat informed the district court that he was being retaliated against for filing his petition for a writ of mandamus, and (4) "intentionally" trying to "frame" him by asking if the commissioner's reliance on HealthPartners's letters constituted an investigation.
14. Hayat does not provide legal support or argument to support his due-process claim. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (describing the analysis of a procedural due-process claim); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (describing the analysis of a substantive due-process claim in the context of executive action). "An assignment of error based on mere assertion and not supported by any argument or authorities in appellant's brief is waived and will not be considered on appeal unless prejudicial error is obvious on mere inspection." Louden v. Louden, 22 N.W.2d 164, 166 (Minn. 1946). We discern no obvious prejudicial error.
15. Lastly, Hayat asks for special consideration based on his status as a self-represented party. Hayat "believes that this Court has a responsibility and legal duty to protect any and all of [his] constitutional and statutory rights." Courts have a duty to reasonably accommodate self-represented litigants, so long as there is no prejudice to the adverse party. Kasson State Bank v. Haugen, 410 N.W.2d 392, 395 (Minn.App. 1987). But "[a]lthough some accommodations may be made for [self-represented] litigants, this court has repeatedly emphasized that [self-represented] litigants are generally held to the same standards as attorneys and must comply with court rules." Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn.App. 2001). Those standards and rules apply to Hayat, including a party's obligation to articulate and provide legal support for requests for relief.
16. In conclusion, under Minn. Stat. § 363A.28, subd. 6(h), the commissioner has discretion to decide which cases to process and investigate. Thus, the commissioner's discretionary decision not to process and investigate Hayat's discrimination claim does not provide a basis for a writ of mandamus. See Breza, 725 N.W.2d at 109 (stating that a petitioner must show that the respondent "failed to perform an official duty clearly imposed by law" (quotation omitted)). We therefore affirm without reviewing the district court's alternative basis for denying relief. See Minn. Stat. § 586.02 (stating that a writ of mandamus "shall not issue in any case where there is a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law").
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is affirmed.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.