Opinion
Case No. 1:15-cv-55
08-25-2016
Elizabeth HAWTHORNE, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE HEALTH SCIENCE CENTER, Defendant.
Douglas S. Hamill, Burnette, Dobson & Pinchak, Chattanooga, TN, for Plaintiff. Brian A. Lapps, Jr., Michael D. Fitzgerald, Thomas C. Doolan, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, for Defendant.
Douglas S. Hamill, Burnette, Dobson & Pinchak, Chattanooga, TN, for Plaintiff.
Brian A. Lapps, Jr., Michael D. Fitzgerald, Thomas C. Doolan, University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
TRAVIS R. McDONOUGH, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 18.) Plaintiff responded (Doc. 19), and Defendant replied (Doc. 20). For the reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT the motion as to Plaintiff's hostile work environment claim, and DENY the motion with respect to Plaintiff's discrimination and retaliation claims.
While the Court acknowledges that many of these facts are disputed, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party as it must do on summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
Defendant's BLUES Project researched the potential impact of health care, psychosocial support, and community outreach on high-risk expectant mothers from the onset of prenatal care until two years after birth. Since January 2012, Dr. Linda Moses has been the principal investigator. Teresa Franklin was the project manager and was responsible for overseeing the staff. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant as a Community Outreach Coordinator for the project. Both Franklin and Moses are African American; Plaintiff is Caucasian. For the majority of Plaintiff's employment, she was the only Caucasian in the Chattanooga office.
Moses and Franklin interviewed 20 applicants for the Community Outreach Coordinator position before hiring Plaintiff. While Franklin initially wanted to hire an African American named Quetta Pipkin, Plaintiff was selected because she was the only applicant who could speak Spanish. Plaintiff was never accepted by her coworkers. She was ostracized and ignored. Her three coworkers shared an office, while Plaintiff was located in a separate office.
On July 22, 2013, Plaintiff and her coworkers, including Tamala McDuffie, were in a meeting to discuss potential sites to host a health fair. During the meeting someone mentioned Eastgate Mall, at which point McDuffie exclaimed "That's the ghetto mall!" The ensuing laughter was interrupted by McDuffie turning to Plaintiff—the only Caucasian in the meeting—and pointedly asking "What do you know about the ghetto, Betsy?" (Doc. 19-6, at 16–18.) Both Moses and Franklin were present at the meeting. When Plaintiff later complained about McDuffie's remark, Franklin told her "that's just Tamala. You'll have to get used to her." (Id. at 18–19.)
At Plaintiff's six-month review on November 19, 2013, Moses and Franklin met with Plaintiff to discuss management's concerns about the lack of communication in the Chattanooga office. Though Franklin and Moses acknowledged that the problems stemmed from Plaintiff's coworkers, Plaintiff was nonetheless placed on a Performance Improvement Plan ("PIP"), and her probationary period was extended by three months. The PIP lists three areas of concern: (1) communication; (2) adherence to work schedule; and (3) ability to perform tasks without direct oversight. (Doc. 19-7.) Soon after this meeting, Franklin and Moses met with the entire staff of the Chattanooga office regarding the communication problems.
During this time, the Chattanooga office was short on staff and had two vacant positions. These positions were filled in early February 2014, making the Chattanooga office fully staffed by the middle of the month. On February 18, 2014, Franklin and Moses visited the Chattanooga office to train two new hires. They also involved the current employees in the training. In one role-playing exercise, Plaintiff was selected to be the staff member and Moses played the role of a loud, boisterous, African-American potential participant, who had a low level of education. The goal of the exercise was for Plaintiff to explain the project to Moses-as-potential-participant sufficiently to gain her informed consent to participate in the project. Throughout the exercise, Moses engaged in disruptive behavior designed to simulate challenges real potential participants might present. At one point, for example, Dr. Moses began stealing snacks and stuffing them down her pants and shirt.
Later that day, Moses met with Plaintiff to give feedback on Plaintiff's performance. During that meeting, Moses told Plaintiff "I don't think you're ghetto enough to work with our particular population." (Doc. 19-6, at 56.) The next day, Plaintiff sent an email to human resources regarding Moses's comment, which she perceived as evidence that race was a factor in the treatment she was receiving. (Doc. 19-9.) On February 21, 2014, Plaintiff complained about the incident to her immediate supervisor in the Chattanooga office, one of the new hires, Erricka Hill. Hill immediately relayed her comments to Franklin, who stated that she already knew about the complaint from human resources. On February 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed an official complaint of race discrimination with the relevant University office. (Doc. 19-12.) Also on February 24, 2014, Franklin and Moses recommended that Plaintiff be terminated. After being informed that human resources required supporting documentation before Plaintiff could be fired, Moses and Franklin provided that documentation on February 26, 2014. (Doc. 19-14.) Plaintiff appeared for a pre-termination hearing on February 28, 2014, and was fired on March 4, 2014. The reasons listed in Plaintiff's termination letter were poor work performance and inability to perform the job without direct supervision. (Doc. 19-15.)
Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant alleging three claims: (1) termination due to race discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 ; (2) being subjected to a racially hostile work environment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 ; and (3) termination in retaliation for protected activity in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3. (Doc. 13.) Defendant moved for summary judgment on all three claims and those claims are now ripe for review.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper when "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and makes all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp ., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc ., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir.2001).
The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Leary v. Daeschner , 349 F.3d 888, 897 (6th Cir.2003). The moving party may meet this burden either by affirmatively producing evidence establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact or by pointing out the absence of support in the record for the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. , 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once the movant has discharged this burden, the nonmoving party can no longer rest upon the allegations in the pleadings; rather, it must point to specific facts supported by evidence in the record demonstrating that there is a genuine issue for trial. Chao v. Hall Holding Co., Inc ., 285 F.3d 415, 424 (6th Cir.2002).
At summary judgment, the Court may not weigh the evidence; its role is limited to determining whether the record contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-movant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248–49, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough; the Court must determine whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-movant based on the record. Id. at 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy , 39 F.3d 1339, 1347 (6th Cir.1994). If not, the Court must grant summary judgment. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
III. ANALYSIS
a. Discrimination
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides "it shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to ... discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a). A circumstantial discrimination claim is evaluated using the familiar burden-shifting approach established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). To establish a prima facie claim of discrimination, a plaintiff must show (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified for the job; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) she was treated differently than similarly situated employees outside of her protected class. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp. , 533 F.3d 381, 391 (6th Cir.2008). In reverse discrimination claims, the plaintiff must establish the first prong by showing that there are "background circumstances" indicating that the defendant employer is the "unusual employer who discriminates against the majority." Sutherland v. Mich. Dep't of Treas. , 344 F.3d 603, 614 (6th Cir.2003) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Moses' comment that Plaintiff was "not ghetto enough" constitutes direct evidence of discrimination. "Direct evidence is evidence that proves the existence of a fact without requiring any inferences." Rowan v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., 360 F.3d 544, 548 (6th Cir.2004). While Plaintiff's argument is logically compelling, the Sixth Circuit has specifically ruled similar "ghetto" references do not qualify as direct evidence. Heike v. Guevara, 519 Fed.Appx. 911, 919 (6th Cir.2013) (applying the employment discrimination framework to an equal protection claim based on the denial of a basketball scholarship and holding that the coach's stated preference for "ghetto" players did not constitute direct evidence of race discrimination).
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for its actions. Seay v. Tenn. Valley Auth. , 339 F.3d 454, 463 (6th Cir.2003). If the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate the employer's explanation is pretext. McDonnell Douglas , 411 U.S. at 802–04, 807, 93 S.Ct. 1817. To establish pretext, a plaintiff may show "(1) that the proffered reasons had no basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate the employer's action, or (3) that they were insufficient to motivate the employer's action." Romans v. Mich. Dep't of Human Servs. , 668 F.3d 826, 839 (6th Cir.2012) (quoting Chen v. Dow Chemical Co. , 580 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir.2009) ).
Defendant contests only the fourth element of the prima facie case—that Plaintiff was treated differently than similarly situated employees. However, as Plaintiff points out, she does not have to make this showing if she was replaced by someone outside her protected class. Myers v. Cuyahoga Cty., Ohio , 182 Fed.Appx. 510, 517 (6th Cir.2006). Here, Plaintiff was replaced by Quetta Pipkin, an African American. (Doc. 19-1, at 57.)
Defendant also contests Plaintiff's evidence of pretext. The reasons given for Plaintiff's termination were poor work performance and an inability to perform the job without direct supervision. (Doc. 19-15.) As the basis for these reasons, the termination letter references deficiencies in Plaintiff's communication and information provided in the role playing exercise, problems with Plaintiff making errors in data-entry protocols, and general problems with Plaintiff's ability to communicate to potential clients and staff. (Id. ) However, Plaintiff points to several facts that cast doubt on Defendant's proffered reason. First, Plaintiff achieved a passing score on the test that assessed her knowledge of Defendant's protocols. (Doc. 19-17.) She also seeks to discredit Moses's assessment of her performance during the role-play. She filed an affidavit from Valerie Schultz—a coworker who was present during Moses's feedback session with Plaintiff—which states:
Defendant argues that it is entitled to the same-actor inference, which creates a presumption that race did not motivate a termination if the decision-maker also hired the employee. Garrett v. Sw. Med. Clinic, 631 Fed.Appx. 351, 357 (6th Cir.2015). However, the same actor inference is only accorded "modest weight," see id. and that modest weight is even further weakened by the fact that Franklin admitted that she initially preferred an African American applicant for Plaintiff's position, (Doc. 19-1, at 16).
Defendant attempts to rely on the "honest belief" rule, which provides that if "employer has an honest belief in its proffered nondiscriminatory reason for discharging an employee, the employee cannot establish that the reason was pretextual simply because it is ultimately shown to be incorrect." Majewski v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 274 F.3d 1106, 1117 (6th Cir.2001). However, the honest belief rule does not apply to situations where the decisionmaker relied on her own personal observations in making the decision rather than receiving information secondhand. See Bagi v. AT & T Mobility Servs. LLC, No. 1:12–CV–214, 2013 WL 1682987, at *6 (W.D.Mich. Apr. 17, 2013). Furthermore, the honest belief rule only applies when a plaintiff is proceeding solely on the basis that the proffered reason has no basis in fact. If, as here, a plaintiff argues that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate the termination or was insufficient to motivate the termination, the honest belief rule has no application. See Vaden v. Dekalb Tel. Co-op., Inc., 21 F.Supp.3d 901, 913–14 (M.D.Tenn.2014) (citing Joostberns v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 166 Fed.Appx. 783, 795 n. 5 (6th Cir.2006) ).
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At the conclusion of the role-playing exercise, Dr. Moses provided some constructive criticism. Based on what Dr. Moses said, I got the impression that Ms. Hawthorne made some errors that needed correction, but Ms. Hawthorne
was also told parts of the role-play she did well. Ms. Hawthorne's performance in the role-play was neither extremely poor nor extremely outstanding.
(Doc. 19-18, at 2–3.) Moses's assessment is further undercut by the fact that she had neither conducted an informed consent nor witnessed staff conducting an informed consent prior to this exercise. (Doc. 19-3, at 8–9.) Plaintiff has also produced evidence that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate her termination—Moses's statement that Plaintiff was not "ghetto enough to work with our particular client population." (Doc. 19-6, at 56.) Finally, Plaintiff has presented evidence that the proffered reasons were insufficient to motivate her termination. For example, she points to statements made by Franklin and Moses that the intra-staff communication problems were attributable to Plaintiff's coworkers. (Doc. 19-6, at 25–26.) While data-entry errors were commonplace, as evidenced by several emails directed at particular staff members regarding such errors, (Doc. 19-21), no other employee was ever reprimanded for such errors, (Doc. 19-8). Taken together, these facts could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Defendant's proffered reason was pretextual. Accordingly, the Court will DENY Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to this claim.
b. Retaliation
Title VII forbids an employer from retaliating against an employee for opposing an unlawful unemployment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a). A Title VII retaliation claim can be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. Laster v. City of Kalamazoo , 746 F.3d 714, 730 (6th Cir.2014). Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding on a circumstantial-evidence theory, the Court analyzes the claim under the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show: "(1) [she] engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) [her] exercise of such protected activity was known by the defendant; (3) thereafter, the defendant took an action that was ‘materially adverse’ to the plaintiff; and (4) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the materially adverse action." Jones v. Johanns , 264 Fed.Appx. 463, 466 (6th Cir.2007). Close temporal proximity is some evidence of a causal connection but is usually not sufficient standing alone. Donald v. Sybra, Inc. , 667 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir.2012).
Defendant argues only that Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendant's proffered basis for Plaintiff's termination was pretextual. In addition to the evidence above calling Defendant's proffered reasons into doubt, Plaintiff also points to Franklin and Moses's shifting stories regarding the timing of the termination decision as evidence that her termination was motivated by retaliation.
Plaintiff initially complained of race discrimination on February 19, 2014. On February 21, 2014, Plaintiff complained about the incident to Hill. Soon after, Hill relayed her comments to Franklin, who stated that she already knew about the complaint from human resources. (Doc. 19-5, at 13–14.) On Monday, February 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed an official complaint with Defendant's Office of Equity and Diversity. (Doc. 18-11, at 1.)
At her deposition, Franklin testified that she thought that the conversation in which she and Moses decided to terminate Plaintiff took place on February 24, 2014. (Doc. 19-1, at 48.) However, in a later filed declaration, she claims the conversation took place as she and Moses were driving back to Memphis on February 18, 201. (Doc. 18-5, at ¶ 27.) Moses made similarly inconsistent statements regarding the timing of the decision. (Compare Doc. 19-3, at 22 (stating that the conversation with Franklin about terminating Plaintiff's employment took place on Monday, February 24, 2014) with id. at 24 (stating on cross-examination by defense counsel that the conversation took place six days earlier, on Tuesday, February 18, 2014).) Franklin also claimed that she was never aware that Plaintiff's complaints related to race discrimination before Plaintiff was terminated (Doc. 19-1, at 56), despite the fact that she was sent an email detailing Plaintiff's claims of race discrimination on Friday, February 21, 2014, (Doc. 19-11). Evidence that tends to show that decisionmakers lied about material facts regarding a plaintiff's protected activity and subsequent adverse employment action can serve as evidence of pretext. See Youssef v. Holder , 19 F.Supp.3d 167, 185 (D.D.C.2014) (noting that evidence that decision-makers lied about their knowledge of protected activity could constitute evidence of retaliatory intent).
Here, Defendant's shifting stories coupled with Plaintiff's other evidence undermining Defendant's proffered justification is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff was terminated in retaliation for her protected activity. Accordingly, the Court will DENY Defendant's motion for summary judgment on this claim.
c. Hostile Work Environment
To establish a racially hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show that "(1) the employee is a member of a protected class, (2) the employee was subject to unwelcomed retaliatory harassment, (3) the harassment was based on the employee's protected activity, (4) the harassment created a hostile work environment, and (5) the employer failed to take reasonable care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior." Willey v. Slater , 20 Fed.Appx. 404, 406 (6th Cir.2001). A workplace is hostile if it is "permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. , 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The conduct must be objectively hostile or abusive, and the victim must subjectively perceive it as such. Id. A hostile work environment by its nature involves repeated conduct and thus "cannot be said to occur on any particular day[;]" rather "[i]t occurs over a series of days or perhaps years." Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan , 536 U.S. 101, 115, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002)superseded in non-relevant part by statute , Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, Pub.L. No. 111–2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009). The Court examines the totality of the circumstances to determine whether an environment is hostile or abusive. Factors include the "frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Harris , 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367.
As support for her hostile work environment claim, Plaintiff points to the general ostracism and isolation Plaintiff experienced from her coworkers and the two "ghetto" comments. (Doc. 19, at 19–23.) Even assuming that Plaintiff can demonstrate a causal connection between race and this treatment, it falls far short of what constitutes a hostile work environment for purposes of Title VII. See e.g. , Mensah v. Michigan Dep't of Corr. , 621 Fed.Appx. 332, 334 (6th Cir.2015) (holding that plaintiff failed to establish a hostile work environment claim when he was denied leave, he had to notify his supervisor when he came and went, his supervisor used coworkers to surveil him while at work, he had to filter any instructions he had for an employee under his supervision through his own supervisor, and he was given poor performance evaluations and written reprimands); Lundy v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 101 Fed.Appx. 68, 73 (6th Cir.2004) (holding that the plaintiff's claims that his toolbox was stolen, that he was the subject of derogatory comments and false accusations, and that he was denied overtime and requests to transfer did not show a hostile work environment).
Plaintiff relies on Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co. , 726 F.3d 802 (6th Cir.2013), for the proposition that ostracism and isolation can constitute a hostile work environment for purposes of Title VII. However, in Waldo , evidence of ostracism was accompanied by extensive evidence of far more abusive behavior than is present in this case. As just a few examples, Waldo was called a "bitch," a "wench," and a "dike," told that "If [she] want[ed] to work in a man's world and ... work a man's job, [she] got to pee like a man," and locked inside a porta-potty. Id. at 816. No equivalent evidence is present in this case. Accordingly, the Court will GRANT Defendant's motion for summary judgment as to the hostile work environment claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the motion as to Plaintiff's Hostile Work Environment claim, and DENIES the motion with respect to Plaintiff's Discrimination and retaliation claims.