Opinion
Civil Action No. 01-1405, Section "L" (2)
August 9, 2001
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court are two motions: (1) defendants Reily Foods Co. and Steve Himel Motion to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim for Relief and Motion for a More Definite Statement, and (2) defendants Joe Nietzchman, Tyrone White, and Merrick Moore's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim for Relief and Motion for More Definite Statement. For the following reasons, both motions by defendants are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Douglas Hawthorne worked in the processing department of defendant Reily Foods Company's Blue Plate Foods plant for several years. He claims that on or before May 8, 2000, he was subject to various forms of discrimination denying him compensation and benefits. In his pro se in forma pauperis complaint, Hawthorne identifies several causes of action including sex discrimination, retaliation, equal pay violations, defamation, assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and interference with contract. Defendants deny liability and move to dismiss Hawthorne's claims.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a defendant to seek dismissal of a complaint based on the "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a district court should construe the complaint liberally in favor of the plaintiff, assuming all factual allegations to be true. See Leleux v. United States, 178 F.3d 750, 754 (5th Cir. 1999). Rule 12(b)(6) motions are viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted. See id. A complaint may not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. (quoting Lowrey v. Texas A M Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Notice of Title VII Claims
Defendants argue that plaintiff's claims of discrimination under Title VII should be dismissed because he failed to file suit within ninety days of receiving his right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Defendants further explain that there is no basis in equity for tolling the statutory period for filing suit and that plaintiff's claims of discrimination are not appropriately raised against his co-workers, supervisors, and managers. Plaintiff responds that the right-to-sue letter was not sent to his address and that the defendants he names are in fact employers.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that a civil action must be commenced within ninety days after the charging party has received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC or that right to sue will be lost. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Dao v. Auchan Hypermarket, 96 F.3d 787, 789 (5th Cir. 1996). The Fifth Circuit treats this ninety-day limitation requirement as a statute of limitations rather than as a jurisdictional prerequisite. See Espinoza v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 754 F.2d 1247, 1248 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1985). Failure to file the suit timely can be grounds for its dismissal and has been strictly enforced by the Fifth Circuit. See id. at 1249. (affirming the dismissal of Title VII claims filed ninety-two days after the right-to-sue letter was received). The ninety-day period commences on the date that the plaintiff receives notice at the address he designates to the EEOC, unless he failed to receive the right to sue letter through no fault of his own or the statute should be tolled for some other equitable reason until he actually receives notice. See id. at 1250.
Hawthorne satisfies the strict standard for equitable tolling in this case because substantial doubt exists as to whether he timely received the right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. See Mitchell v. Champs Sports, 42 F. Supp.2d 642, 646 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (finding it highly unlikely that plaintiff received EEOC letter on the same day it was mailed). On October 26, 2000, the EEOC responded to Hawthorne's June 28, 2000 Charge of Discrimination by issuing a Dismissal and Notice of Rights. See Defs.' Exs. 1, 2. Although Hawthorne indicated that his street address as "7123 Bunkerhill Road," the EEOC sent the right-to-sue letter to "123 Bunkerhill Road." See id. Plaintiff also explains in his response brief that he is entitled to equitable tolling because the EEOC letter was sent to an address other than his own. Considering the plain language of the right-to-sue letter and construing the facts in favor of the plaintiff, the Court finds dismissal of plaintiff's Title VII claims inappropriate on the basis of his failure to file suit within ninety days of October 26, 2000.
B. Title VII Claims Against Co-Workers and Supervisors
Defendants argue that plaintiff's Title VII discrimination claims against Joe Nietzchman, Tyrone White, Merrick Moore, Steve Himmel, and other employees of Reily Foods should be dismissed because co-workers, supervisors, and managers cannot be sued as "employers" pursuant to Title VII. Plaintiff responds that these defendants serve in an employment capacity.
The Fifth Circuit has clearly held that "a party may not maintain a suit against both an employer and its agent under Title VII." Indest v. Freeman Decorating, Inc., 164 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1999). In Indest, the Fifth Circuit explained that "[w]hile Title VII defines the term employer to include 'any agent' of an employer . . ., this circuit does not interpret the statute as imposing individual liability for such a claim." Id. Accordingly, Hawthorne cannot maintain his Title VII claims against Reily Foods employees.
C. Equal Pay Act Claims
Defendants Nietzschaman, White, and Moore move to dismiss plaintiff's Equal Pay Act claims because they are not employers as defined by the statute. Plaintiff responds that defendant White is an employer because he controlled hiring and firing practices. The Equal Pay Act defines the term "employer" as "any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee" and has been construed broadly by the Supreme Court. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d); see Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190 (1973). In determining employer status, courts employ an "economic reality" test that examines the totality of the circumstances and considers questions of fact. Falk, 414 U.S. at 195; Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co., 695 F.2d 190, 194-5 (5th Cir. 1983). Because the Court must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true at this stage of the litigation, dismissal of the Equal Pay Act claim against White is not appropriate. The question of whether White may be individually liable as the plaintiff's employer requires a fact-intensive inquiry ill-suited to resolution under Rule 12. Rather, the issue is properly resolved by summary judgment following the submission of affidavits, depositions, and other evidence allowed under Rule 56(c), or at trial.
D. State Law Claims
Defendants argue that plaintiff's state law claims should be dismissed because they are prescribed. Article 3492 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides a one-year prescriptive period for tort actions including claims of employment discrimination. See La.C.C. art. 3492. The prescriptive period commences on the date the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered his injury. See Rodriguez v. Holmes, 963 F.2d 799, 803 (5th Cir. 1992). In the present case, plaintiff and defendants concur that plaintiff's state law causes of action are based on events occurring on or before May 8, 2000. Therefore, Hawthorne had until May 8, 2001 to file suit on the basis of his state law claims.
Defendants contend that plaintiff's state law claims are prescribed because he filed his complaint on May 10, 2001. Plaintiff responds that he was delayed in filing his complaint because his request to proceed in forma pauperis was pending before the court. It is well settled law in the Fifth Circuit that the submission of a complaint accompanied by a motion to proceed in forma pauperis tolls the statute of limitations until the court approves the plaintiff's petition for in forma pauperis. See Fletcher v. Apfel, 210 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing Ynclan v. Department of Air Force, 943 F.2d 1388, 1392-93 (5th Cir. 1991)); Hernandez v. Aldridge, 902 F.2d 386, 388 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1086 (1991); Martin v. Demma, 831 F.2d 69, 72 (5th Cir. 1987). "[A] delay by the clerk in stamping a complaint 'filed' due to the pendency of a motion to proceed [in forma pauperis] does not jeopardize the timeliness of the plaintiff's commencement of suit." Ynclan, 493 F.2d at 1392.
The record in the present case indicates that the statute of limitations on Hawthorne's state law claims was tolled while he awaited a determination of his pauper status. Although date-stamped on May 10, 2001, Hawthorne's complaint was received on May 8, 2001 according to a clerical note on the complaint. Pl.'s Compl. Hawthorne signed and dated his motion to proceed in forma pauperis on May 8, 2001, and the court granted his motion on May 10, 2001. Accordingly, Hawthorne's state law claims are not prescribed because the statute of limitation was tolled while he awaited approval of his successful motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
E. Motion for More Definite Statement
Defendants further move for a more defendant statement of plaintiff's claims. A Rule 12(e) motion for a more definite statement is proper when the pleading at issue "is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). In the present case, plaintiff states numerous possible causes of action in a sprawling and confusing factual narrative. While Hawthorne's complaint need not outline all elements of a claim, it must provide a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Hawthorne's complaint requires a more definite statement because the defendants "cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). Accordingly, plaintiff shall submit a revised complaint summarizing with specificity his legal claims and the particular facts giving rise to those claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants Reily Foods Co. and Steve Himel's Motion to Dismiss For Failure to State a Claim for Relief and Motion for a More Definite Statement, and (2) defendants Joe Nietzchman, Tyrone White, and Merrick Moore's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim for Relief and Motion for More Definite Statement is GRANTED in part and DENTED in part. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that defendants Reily Foods Co., Steve Himel, Joe Nietzchman, Tyrone White, and Merrick Moore's motion for a more definite statement is GRANTED, and plaintiff Douglas Hawthorne, Sr. file within ten (10) days a revised complaint summarizing with specificity his legal claims and the particular facts giving rise to those claims or the Court will strike the complaint currently filed.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Steve Himel, Joe Nietzchman, Tyrone White, and Merrick Moore's motion to dismiss plaintiff's Title VII discrimination claims is GRANTED, and defendant Reily Foods Co.'s motion to dismiss plaintiff's Title VII discrimination claims is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Joe Nietzchman and Merrick Moore's motion to dismiss plaintiff's Equal Pay Act claims is GRANTED, and defendant Tyrone White's motion to dismiss plaintiff's Equal Pay Act claim is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Reily Foods Co., Steve Himel, Joe Nietzchman, Tyrone White, and Merrick Moore's motion to dismiss plaintiff's state law claims is DENIED.