Summary
In Hawley, the court went so far as to call a similar opinion "irrelevant" when it "report[ed] limitations that had been in effect since at least 1996 and thus indicate[ed] no change in Hawley's status after 1999," the date of the prior decision.
Summary of this case from Erb v. ColvinOpinion
Case No. 01-74196
February 3, 2003
I. Introduction
This is a Social Security case. Marty Hawley (Hawley) appeals from the final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) that he was not disabled at the time of his application and therefore was not entitled to social security benefits (benefits). Hawley applied for benefits on February 28, 2000, claiming that he was disabled due to a combination of medical problems stemming from multiple injuries: 1) an injured left ankle, headaches, and hemi-paresis of the diaphragm, all attributed to a motorcycle accident in June, 1991; 2) a right-shoulder injury from a fall in September, 1996, and 3) carpal tunnel syndrome in the right wrist. His application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. An administrative law judge (ALJ) conducted a hearing and determined he was not entitled to benefits. The Appeals Council found no basis to grant a review of the ALJ's decision.
Hawley instituted this action for judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The matter was referred to a magistrate judge, before whom Hawley and the Commissioner filed motions for summary judgment. The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation (MJRR) that the ALJ's decision be upheld. The magistrate judge found that substantial evidence in the record supported the ALJ's findings that Hawley had the residual functional capacity to perform a significant range of sedentary work.
Hawley filed objections to the MJRR with the Court. The Commissioner filed a response to Hawley's objections.
For the reasons that follow, the Court adopts the MJRR, will grant the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment, and will deny Hawley's motion for summary judgment.
II. Standard of Review
Judicial review of a Social Security disability benefits application is limited to determining whether "the Commissioner has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record." Walters v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). The substantiality of the evidence must be based upon the record taken as a whole. Futernick v. Richardson, 484 F.2d 647, 649 (6th Cir. 1973). The portion of the MJRR that the claimant finds objectionable are reviewed de novo. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), Herriman v. Apfel, 66 Soc. Sec. Reptr. Serv. 588, 2000 WL 246598, *1 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
III. Facts and Procedural Background
The following facts are gleaned from the parties' papers.
Hawley has a high school education. His previous work was unskilled with exertion levels ranging from light to medium. He has been treated for several conditions: 1) pain in his right arm and both shoulders caused by a tear of the anterior labrum at the base and mild acromioclavicular joint degeneration, 2) shortness of breath and chest pain caused by paralysis of the right hemidiaphragm, and 3) pain in his left ankle caused by a fracture. He has not engaged in substantial gainful employment since 1991.
Hawley filed for benefits on four previous occasions, alleging the same disability onset date of June 5, 1991 each time. His fourth application was filed June 13, 1997. After a hearing before an ALJ, his 1997 application was denied on April 28, 1999, and that decision was upheld by the Appeals Council. A vocational expert, testified at the hearing.
Dr. Thomas R. Wilson (Dr. Wilson), Hawley's treating physician, wrote a "Medical Source Statement" (Statement) on September 4, 2001. The Statement listed a number of restrictions on Hawley's ability to work, which were inconsistent with his June, 1998 statement concluding that Hawley could perform part-time sedentary work. Dr. Wilson relied on the same evidence for both statements.
Hawley filed for benefits in the instant case on February 28, 2000. After a hearing on September 18, 2001, an ALJ ruled that Hawley was not eligible for benefits. A vocational expert testified at the hearing but was not asked a hypothetical based on the limitations in the Statement. The ALJ found that res judicata barred consideration of Hawley's disability status before the 1999 hearing and that there was no new and material evidence that warranted reopening the 1999 decision. The ALJ therefore only considered whether Hawley was disabled after the 1999 hearing and found that this, too, was determined by res judicata, as Hawley submitted no evidence of a worsening of his condition and he was adjudicated able to do sedentary work in 1999.
IV. Discussion
" Res judicata bars the relitigation of the same claim or cause of action [and] collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of the same issue." Drummond v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 126 F.3d 837, 840 (6th Cir. 1997). Res judicata applies to final decisions of administrative agencies. United States v. Utah Const. Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966). "A claimant's request for a hearing before an ALJ can be dismissed on the basis of res judicata." Drummond, 126 F.3d at 841 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(c)(1)). "The doctrine of res judicata has been commonly applied in social security cases with the exception of cases that present `a colorable constitutional issue.'" Id. (citation omitted).
Here, Hawley's claim in this case is the same claim he made in his 1997 application, which was denied in 1999. He alleges the same disability caused by the same injuries, with the same onset date.
The ALJ and the magistrate judge both properly found that the ALJ was not bound to consider Dr. Wilson's Statement, since Hawley's claim was barred by res judicata. In general, medical opinions of treating physicians are accorded substantial deference and an ALJ must provide a reason for rejecting those opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2) Howard v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 240 (6th Cir. 2002);Shelman v. Heckler, 821 F.2d 316, 321 (6th Cir. 1987). Here, however, the issue that Hawley sought to establish with the Statement was that he was unable to work since 1996, and that issue had already been decided against him in the 1999 hearing. There is no exception to res judicata when the party that lost the original decision uncovers new evidence.
The only way Hawley could use new evidence would be to reopen the 1999 decision (not attack it collaterally) or to establish that circumstances have changed since that hearing and that he has become unable to work in the interim. Hawley was not represented by counsel at the hearing, and the ALJ did not offer to reopen the 1999 decision. The Court cannot review the reopening of the 1999 decision. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107-08 (1997) (no jurisidiction to review refusal to reopen absent a constitutional claim). Hawley may now petition the Commissioner to reopen the 1999 decision based on new evidence. Given his lack of representation at that hearing and the fact that he was unable to present this evidence at that time, the Commissioner may well grant such a petition.
Hawley has presented no evidence of changed circumstances or of a worsening of his condition. The Statement reports limitations that had been in effect since at least 1996 and thus indicates no change in Hawley's status after 1999. The Statement therefore is irrelevant to his current case, and the ALJ properly ignored it. See Drummond, 126 F.3d at 842 (previous decision is binding "absent changed circumstances"); see also Stanley v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 39 F.3d 115, 118 (6th Cir. 1994) ("the ALJ did not err in declining to refer to [the treating physician's] opinion because [the treating physician] originally opined that claimant could perform sedentary work and did not provide any objective medical evidence to support his change of heart" citations omitted).
Hawley's claim that the ALJ erred by failing to ensure that the vocational expert was asked a hypothetical reflecting the limitations contained in the Statement fails for the same reason. The 1999 decision established that Hawley was able to work from 1991 to 1999. Hawley submitted no evidence that his condition worsened after 1999, so any testimony the vocational expert could give in this case would on a matter precluded by the 1999 hearing.
V. Conclusion
The findings and conclusions of the magistrate judge are adopted by the Court. The ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. Hawley's motion for summary judgment is DENIED and the Commissioner's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.