Opinion
23-3352
07-01-2024
JOHN A. HAWKINS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. FRANK VANIHEL, Respondent-Appellee.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. APP. P. 32.1
Submitted June 25, 2024.[*]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division No. 1:22-cv-02331-SEB-CSW Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.
Before CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
ORDER
John Hawkins (who also goes by Hawkins-El), an Indiana prisoner, appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking relief from a prison disciplinary sanction. Because the disciplinary proceeding did not violate Hawkins-El's right to due process, we affirm.
After an argument, Hawkins-El punched a correctional officer, Sergeant D. Betzner, in the face. As he attempted to strike Sergeant Betzner again, Officer T. Conley interceded. (Neither officer's first name is in the record.) The scuffle took Hawkins-El and Officer Conley into an open cell nearby. Officer Conley emerged with bruises on her face or scalp and a cut lip; she was later treated at the hospital.
A correctional officer tasked with investigating the incident later prepared a conduct report charging Hawkins-El with offense number A-117, "Battery Against a Staff Person," for the incident with Officer Conley. (Sergeant Betzner wrote a separate conduct report based on his encounter with Hawkins-El.) The investigator's report summarized a video that captured portions of the event: After Hawkins-El struck Sergeant Betzner, Officer Conley responded and all three went off screen. Later, the three re-entered the frame. Sergeant Betzner appeared to use pepper spray on Hawkins-El, who covered his eyes, and Officer Conley walked forward, bending over at the waist as though she could not breathe. The report also summarized an interview with Officer Conley. She stated that Hawkins-El had turned and pushed her into a cell, where she landed on her back on the bottom bunk, and Hawkins-El landed on top of her and then placed his hand over her mouth and nose to close her airway.
Hawkins-El pleaded not guilty to the charged violation. In his view, Officer Conley had used an illegal chokehold to hold him back, and they fell on the bed as he struggled to get free from her. He requested that a witness, "Inmate Reed," answer the question, "Did I touch that lady?" and that the investigator answer the question, "Who told you to write this up?" Reed's statement said: "I never seen Hawkins touch/nor assault Conley during any part of the incident." The investigator responded that he had issued the conduct report based on the evidence, including statements from Sergeant Betzner, Officer Conley, and Hawkins-El himself.
Hawkins-El had separate disciplinary hearings pertaining to Officer Conley and Sergeant Betzner. Procedural errors led to re-hearings in both cases, and Hawkins-El asked that the disciplinary hearing officer, Officer N. Angle, and Hawkins-El's lay advocate, B. Myers, recuse themselves from the re-hearings. From his experience with Officer Angle and lay advocate Myers in the original hearings, Hawkins-El believed they would not be impartial in a second round. (According to his appellate brief, Hawkins-El's concern with Myers was that she "work[ed] closely with Mr. Angle, and just signed off two medical expenses restitution fees.") They each declined to recuse. Officer Angle cited a staffing shortage and said he decided the case based solely on the evidence, and the record does not contain Myers's reasoning.
After the short re-hearing, which took place through the door to Hawkins-El's cell, Officer Angle found him guilty. Officer Angle wrote on the hearing report that Hawkins-El had stated in his defense: "I did not touch that woman," and "it's stacking." (The second statement ostensibly refers to his belief that he shouldn't have had two disciplinary hearings based on the same evidence.) Officer Angle explained that he found Hawkins-El guilty based on the conduct report and "witness statements." He sanctioned Hawkins-El with the loss of 365 days of good time credit, 365 days in restrictive housing, up to $1000 in restitution for medical expenses, and a demotion of two credit classes. The warden denied his appeal but reduced the sanction from 365 to 180 days' loss of good time and 180 days in restrictive housing. (Separately, the State of Indiana criminally prosecuted Hawkins-El, and he pleaded guilty to battery of a public official, see Indiana Code § 35-42-2-1(c).)
Hawkins-El petitioned the district court for habeas relief, alleging that the duration of his sentence had been increased based on disciplinary proceedings that did not afford him due process. Four of the due-process violations he asserted are relevant on appeal: (1) there was no proof that Officer Conley suffered a serious bodily injury; (2) insufficient evidence supported the guilty finding; (3) Officer Angle cut off the hearing before Hawkins-El could present his best defense; and (4) the hearing was not impartial. Hawkins-El later elaborated in a reply brief that he had wanted to submit exculpatory evidence that Officer Conley used an illegal chokehold and had a history of using such techniques, as well as to argue that there was insufficient documentation of medical expenses justifying restitution. The district court denied his petition.
Hawkins-El appeals and now renews his arguments from the district court. We review the denial of a petition for habeas corpus de novo. Love v. Vanihel, 73 F.4th 439, 445 (7th Cir. 2023). Indiana prisoners have a liberty interest in good-time credits and are entitled to due process before losing them. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974); Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007). In this case, Hawkins-El received the process to which he was entitled.
Hawkins-El's contention that he could not be found guilty of battery of a staff person without documentary proof of serious bodily injury (or bodily injury in general) is incorrect. The offense in A-117 is defined as "committing battery against a staff person," and elsewhere "battery" is defined, in relevant part, as "knowingly or intentionally touching another person in a rude, insolent or angry manner." Ind. Dep't of Corr., Disciplinary Code for Adult Offenders No. 02-04-101, § 3(F); App'x (2020). The offense does not contain an element of bodily injury to the victim. True, the guide to sanctions suggests that for an enhanced punishment, "photographs or other documentation of the bodily injury should be included." Id. § IX(E)(3)(e) n.1. Hawkins-El, however, did not receive any enhancement in this proceeding (although he did in the one involving Sergeant Betzner). In any case, a hearing officer's failure to comply with procedures in the state's disciplinary manual is not a ground for habeas relief because such a deviation alone does not violate the federal Constitution. See Caffey v. Butler, 802 F.3d 884, 894 (7th Cir. 2015).
As to Hawkins-El's more general challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the record supported the finding that Hawkins-El committed battery against Officer Conley. Due process requires only "some evidence" to support a finding of guilt in a prison disciplinary proceeding. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985). Leaving aside that Hawkins-El would later admit to battery in a criminal prosecution, there was sufficient evidence of the disciplinary violation at the time of the hearing. A conduct report alone provides "some evidence" for a decision if it contains sufficient detail. McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1999); see Ellison v. Zatecky, 820 F.3d 271, 274 (7th Cir. 2016). Here, the conduct report included a statement by Officer Conley that Hawkins-El pushed her onto the bed and covered her mouth and nose with his hand, and that she suffered bruises and cuts. That description provided a sufficient basis for the officer's finding.
And although Hawkins-El protests that Officer Angle wrongly ended the hearing before he could present his best defense (and exculpatory evidence), the hearing officer did not have to entertain his theory of self-defense. A disciplinary hearing officer may not "arbitrarily refuse to consider" evidence that is potentially exculpatory, Piggie v. McBride, 277 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 2002), but Hawkins-El does not point to any such evidence. He tells us now that he had wanted to explain that he was struggling against an illegal chokehold and to submit evidence that Officer Conley has a history of unethical de-escalation techniques. That argument fails for several reasons.
First, Hawkins-El did not raise this argument until a reply brief in the district court, and the court was "entitled to treat an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief as waived." O'Neal v. Reilly, 961 F.3d 973, 974 (7th Cir. 2020); see also Thompson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 614, 616 (7th Cir. 2006) (habeas petition must "specify all the grounds for relief available to [the petitioner]."). Further, we have recently reaffirmed that the due-process rights of prisoners in disciplinary proceedings do not include "the right to present mitigating arguments prior to a discretionary decision on good time credit revocation." Love, 73 F.4th at 451-52; see Scruggs, 485 F.3d at 938-39 (addressing selfdefense). And the disciplinary code does not make exceptions for self-defense, so Hawkins-El's assertions about Officer Conley would not have been exculpatory in any event.
Finally, Hawkins-El does not show that he was deprived of an impartial decisionmaker. Disciplinary review officers are given a "presumption of honesty and integrity." Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2003). But a hearing officer who was "directly or substantially involved" in the events underlying the charge or in the investigation is not considered impartial. Id. at 667. Hawkins-El argues that Officer Angle had such involvement because he did not fairly review the evidence, was previously attacked by a prisoner, and refused to recuse himself, but none of these circumstances establishes the kind of involvement that violates due process. See id. Moreover, they are unsupported by the record. Officer Angle wrote in his hearing report (and in an affidavit submitted in response to the habeas petition) that he considered all the witness statements, including Reed's. He also attested that his previous experience with prison violence "played no part" in the hearing and that a staffing shortage would have prevented his recusal in any event. Beyond the unsupported assertions of partiality, Hawkins-El's argument seems to be based on the guilty finding, but an adverse decision-one that was based on some evidence as required-is not evidence of bias.
Hawkins-El's remaining contentions lack merit or are waived. He argues that his lay advocate was also biased against him because she worked closely with Officer Angle and had some involvement with the restitution sanction imposed at his first hearing. But Hawkins-El had a right to an impartial "decisionmaker," which was Officer Angle. See Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570. He further argues that he was denied access to the surveillance footage of the incident at his hearing and that the imposed restitution was not supported by medical expenses, but he did not raise those arguments in his habeas petition, so they are waived. See O'Neal, 961 F.3d at 974; Thompson, 458 F.3d at 616.
We have considered Hawkins-El's remaining arguments, but none merits further discussion. AFFIRMED.
[*] We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. p. 34(a)(2)(C).