Opinion
No. 2-246 / 01-1146
Filed October 16, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, D.J. Stovall, Judge.
The employer appeals the district court's decision remanding the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for reconsideration of the denial of benefits to an employee in this review-reopening action. REVERSED.
Jean Dickson Feeney of Betty, Neuman McMahon, L.L.P., Davenport, for appellant.
Harry W. Dahl, Des Moines, for appellee.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Miller, JJ.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
On August 24, 1994, Hawkins was awarded temporary total disability benefits from September 13, 1991 (the date Hawkins sustained a head injury while working for Amana) to July 20, 1992. The commissioner rejected Hawkins's claims for a running award of temporary total benefits. In reaching this decision, the commissioner expressly concluded the evidence supporting Hawkins's claims of permanent disability was inconclusive. The commissioner's decision awarding Hawkins temporary total benefits instead of the requested running award of temporary total disability benefits was affirmed on judicial review.
On May 23, 1995, Hawkins filed a petition for review-reopening of the commissioner's April 1994 decision requesting an award of permanent partial disability benefits. Hawkins's claim for increased benefits was based on a subsequent diagnosis that she sustained a brain injury on September 13, 1991, precluding her from returning to work.
The commissioner's review-reopening decision states:
Claimant has not undergone any vocational rehabilitation and/or retraining so that she could reenter the workforce in a sedentary job. Several physicians have offered opinions that she is unable to work due to a variety of reasons, but the testing on her cognitive skills are essentially normal.
Claimant's condition has not changed; the diagnosis has changed, but addresses the same symptoms claimant complained of at the original arbitration hearing. Claimant is not entitled to try her case twice.
The original decisions, based on the medical evidence, indicated claimant could return to sedentary work. She has not attempted to return to sedentary work, so a finding of permanency due to an inability to work in sedentary occupations cannot be made.
As a result, claimant has failed to prove that she has sustained a change in her condition which was not contemplated at the time of the original award.
Hawkins's claim for additional benefits was accordingly denied.
On judicial review, Hawkins challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the commissioner's decision that her condition had not changed since the April 1994 decision awarding her temporary total benefits. She argued that the preponderance of the evidence demonstrates that she sustained a closed head injury that was not properly diagnosed until August 9, 1995. Hawkins also cited evidence that she experienced increased headaches and blackouts since that time.
After considering the record, the district court remanded Hawkins's case to the commissioner citing the commissioner's failure to determine whether Hawkins's spine and closed head injuries failed to improve to the extent anticipated. The court also cited the commissioner's failure to explain why Hawkins's increased headaches and blackouts did not constitute a change in her condition. The court's remand instructions to the commissioner were to resolve these issues as well as any reevaluation in light thereof deemed necessary by the commissioner.
II. Scope of Review.
An appeal of a district court's ruling on judicial review of an agency's decision is limited to determining whether the district court correctly applied the law in exercising its judicial review function under Iowa Code section 17A.19(8) (1999). Herrera v. IBP, Inc., 633 N.W.2d 284, 287 (Iowa 2001). The district court, as well as this court, is bound by the commissioner's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record. IBP, Inc. v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 2001).
III. Remand.
We initially reject the district court's conclusion that the commissioner's legal analysis was flawed in the manner specified. Contrary to the district court's conclusion, the commissioner, citing Meyer v. Holiday Inn, 272 N.W.2d 24, 26 (Iowa Ct.App. 1978), expressly noted that a failure of an employee's injury to improve to the extent anticipated may constitute a change of condition justifying additional benefits. The foregoing findings indicate that the commissioner applied this legal standard by comparing Hawkins's condition in 1994 with her condition at the time of the review-reopening proceedings. There was therefore no reason to remand this issue to the commissioner.
This case holds that workers' compensation benefits may be increased when an increase in industrial disability results from a failure of a diagnosed physical condition to improve to the extent anticipated. Meyers, 272 N.W.2d at 26; see also Simonson v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 588 N.W.2d 430, 435 (Iowa 1999); Blacksmith v. All-American, Inc., 290 N.W.2d 348, 350 (Iowa 1980).
The commissioner also clearly found Hawkins's claims of increased headaches and blackouts were not credible. We are bound under our standard of review to defer to these findings. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d at 420. As a result, there was nothing remaining for the commissioner to consider on remand.
IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Evidence is substantial when a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach the commissioner's conclusions. Murillo v. Blackhawk Foundry, 571 N.W.2d 16, 17 (Iowa 1997). Evidence may be substantial even if it would support contrary findings. Myers v. F.C.A. Servs., Inc., 592 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Iowa 1999).
The record indicates that Dr. Sue Barcellos found Hawkins's condition had been static for several years. Dr. Matthew Rizzo found Hawkins did not have a traumatic brain injury. Dr. Daniel Tranel gave Hawkins a neuropsychological examination and determined she did not have a closed head injury. Dr. Tranel concluded Hawkins had a chronic pattern of dysfunction caused by her personality style; major psychological distress, particularly depression; and former improper diagnoses, with consequent improper treatment. We determine there is substantial evidence in the record to support the commissioner's conclusion Hawkins failed to prove a change in condition since the earlier workers' compensation decision.
We reverse the decision of the district court and reinstate the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner.