Where a plaintiff cannot show such a longstanding custom, a plaintiff may still establish a custom of excessive force using a ratification theory. When relying on a ratification theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate the municipality's " 'persistent failure to take disciplinary action against officers' who use excessive force, which 'can give rise to the inference that the municipality has ratified the conduct[.]' " Hawk v. Klaetsch, 522 F. App'x 733, 736 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1443 (11th Cir. 1985)). Regardless of the selected method, demonstrating a custom requires a plaintiff to show "a persistent and widespread practice" of similar constitutional violations.

At best, these lawsuits evidence isolated occurrences. See Clark v. Evans, 840 F.2d 876, 884-86 (11th Cir. 1988) (at Rule 12(b)(6) stage, holding four incidents where a department of corrections employee failed to process commitment orders in five years would not have been sufficient to put supervisory official on notice of need for improved training or supervision); Hawk v. Klaetsch, 522 Fed.Appx. 733, 735-36 (11th Cir. 2013) (at summary judgment stage, holding three incidents where an officer used excessive force over span of nearly five years did not constitute frequent, widespread, or rampant abuse).

Despite Johnson's sparse use of the terms “tacit approval” and “ratified” within her Second Amended Complaint, distilled to their essence, Johnson's allegations are better understood as attempting to allege that Tony's persistent failure to take disciplinary action against officers who use excessive force effectively condoned their conduct, thereby establishing a “custom” within the meaning of Monell. See Fundiller v. City of Cooper City, 777 F.2d 1436, 1443 (11th Cir. 1985); Hawk v. Klaetsch, 522 Fed.Appx. 733, 736 (11th Cir. 2013). Understanding Johnson's allegations in this light, instead of interpreting Johnson's assertions in the way Gattis, Praprotnik, and Garvie use the phrase “ratify”

(“[I]t is clear that four cases in four years would have been insufficient to put Evans on notice, especially since.. .such matters.. .would not have come to the attention of Evans.”); see also Hawk v. Klaetsch, 522 Fed.Appx. 733, 735 (11th Cir. 2013) (“We fail to see how three incidents over the span of nearly five years can constitute frequent, widespread, or rampant abuse.”); see also Garner v. Jamerson, No. 23-10130, 2023 WL 4927250, at *3 (11th Cir. Aug. 2, 2023) (finding widespread abuse where the inmate suicide rate was double the national average and the supervisors failed to correct the abuse); see also Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976) (“We have also indicated...that a complaint alleging that a police supervisor has notice of past culpable conduct of his subordinates and has failed to prevent a recurrence of such misconduct states a [§] 1983 claim.”)

Finally, in Hawk v. Klaetsch, the Eleventh Circuit found three incidents, occurring over five years, showing the use of excessive force by a police officer were insufficient to "constitute frequent, widespread, or rampant abuse." 522 F. App'x 733, 735 (11th Cir. 2013).

Regardless, this small number of reported incidents is insufficient to prove obvious, flagrant, and rampant abuse. See Hawk v. Klaetsch, 522 F. App'x 733, 735 (11th Cir. 2013) ("We fail to see how three incidents over the span of nearly five years can constitute frequent, widespread, or rampant abuse."). DeSimone also references an investigation into a relationship between an officer and an inmate that began in January 2017, but this occurred when Quintieri was no longer Director of the Jail.

The County Defendants argue that Hill's § 1983 claims under Monell against the County should be dismissed because she fails to identify any instances, other than the Kimbell case, of widespread abuse. (Br. in Supp. of Cnty. Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, at 9-10 (citing Hawk v. Klaetsch, 522 Fed.Appx. 733, 735 (11th Cir. 2013), Braddy v. Fla. Dep't of Lab. & Emp. Sec., 133 F.3d 797, 802 (11th Cir. 1998), and Depew v. City of St. Marys, Ga., 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986))).

See West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321, 1329 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences.” (quoting Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999))); Hawk v. Klaetsch, 522 Fed.Appx. 733, 735 (11th Cir. 2013) (“fail[ing] to see how three incidents over the span of nearly five years can constitute frequent, widespread, or rampant abuse” which was necessary to hold police chief liable); Temple v. McIntosh Cnty., No. 2:18-CV-91, 2019 WL 287482, at *6 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 22, 2019) (“The Eleventh Circuit has explained that a ‘custom is an unwritten practice that is applied consistently enough to have the same effect as a policy with the force of law' and ‘[d]emonstrating a policy or custom requires show[ing] a persistent and wide-spread practice.'” (quoting Goebert v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1332 (11th Cir. 2007))); Campbell v. Humphries, 353 Fed.Appx. 334, 336 (11th Cir. 2009) (granting motion to dismiss supervisory liability claim because “one incident . . . is not enough to meet the rigorous standard for supervisory liability in this circuit”). The Court notes that the complaint does not contain a c

The Court finds that one incident involving the use of force, which occurred prior to her employment at the City of Port Wentworth Police Department, does not rise to the level of "widespread abuse" that would put Defendant Libby on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation so as to establish a causal connection between Defendant Libby's supervisory role and the alleged constitutional deprivations committed by Defendant Etzel. See Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cty., Fla., 604 F.3d 1248, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010) (finding two complaints of sexual harassment prior to the plaintiff's sexual assault did not rise to conduct that was "obvious, flagrant, rampant, and of continued duration"); Hawk v. Klaetsch, 522 F. App'x 733, 735 (11th Cir. 2013) ("We fail to see how three incidents [of excessive force] over the span of nearly five years can constitute frequent, widespread, or rampant abuse."). Moreover, even if the one prior instance was enough to place Defendant Libby on notice that he needed to correct the alleged deprivation, the supervisor must have also "fail[ed] to do so."

Even assuming that jail staff were deliberately indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical need in 2006 and 2008, the court cannot conclude that two events that were six and four years before McBride's respectively are enough to establish a policy or custom of deliberate indifference by the City of Dothan. See Hawk v. Klaetsch, 522 Fed. App'x 733, 735 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that three incidents over five years was not enough to establish rampant abuse for supervisory liability); see also Ott v. City of Mobile, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1311 (S.D. Ala. 2001) (Butler, C.J.) (four meritorious excessive-force cases over five years, including only two in the previous four years, were not enough to show custom or policy). Because McBride has not shown a policy or custom of deliberate indifference, her § 1983 claim against the City of Dothan fails.