Opinion
23A-XP-2857
07-18-2024
Timothy N. Hatton, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
APPELLANT PRO SE Timothy N. Hatton ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana J.T. Whitehead Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Marshall Superior Court The Honorable Robert O. Bowen, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 50D01-2309-XP-50
APPELLANT PRO SE
Timothy N. Hatton
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. Whitehead Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
BRADFORD, JUDGE
Case Summary
[¶1] Over a decade ago, Timothy Hatton pled guilty to Class B felony child molesting, in exchange for which the State agreed to dismiss his other criminal charges. In 2023, Hatton petitioned the trial court to expunge the dismissed charges. The trial court denied Hatton's petition, after which he moved the trial court to reconsider. Again, the trial court denied Hatton's petition. Hatton contends that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his petition. We disagree and affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2] In 2012, Hatton pled guilty to Class B felony child molesting in exchange for the State's dismissing five other criminal charges. See Hatton v. State, No. 19A-CR-191, 2019 WL 3720738, at *1 (Ind.Ct.App. Aug. 8, 2019). In September of 2023, Hatton petitioned the trial court to expunge the five dismissed charges. In his petition, Hatton alleged that, on October 24, 2012, all charges had either not been filed or had been dismissed by the State before trial. The trial court denied Hatton's petition because the same cause number had resulted in at least one conviction, namely Class B felony child molesting by plea agreement. Hatton moved the trial court to reconsider, stating that he had sought only to expunge the five dismissed charges but not the conviction. The State did not file a response and, after granting Hatton's request that it reconsider his petition, the trial court again denied Hatton's petition in November of 2023.
Discussion and Decision
[¶3] Hatton argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his expungement petition because he had met all the statutory requirements for expungement and the State had never responded or objected to his petition. After reviewing the expungement statute in effect at the time of his arrest, we disagree. When interpreting a statute, our standard of review is de novo. A.L. v. State, 993 N.E.2d 1159, 1160 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013). "Our goal in statutory construction is to determine, give effect to, and implement the intent of the legislature." Id. If the statute's language is unambiguous, we apply the plain meaning of its text. Allen v. State, 159 N.E.3d 580, 583 (Ind. 2020).
[¶4] The expungement statute in effect between 2011 and 2013 permitted a person to petition for expungement when "all criminal charges filed against [the] individual are dropped[.]" Ind. Code section 35-38-5-1 (2011) (emphasis added). The State dismissed five charges against Hutton; however, the same cause number resulted in a conviction for Class B felony child molesting by way of his guilty plea, rendering him ineligible to expunge the records relating to the dismissed charges. Hatton, 2019 WL 3720738 at *1. Moreover, Indiana Code section 35-38-9-1, the statute through which Hatton sought expungement, indicates by its title that it applies "to persons whose arrest did not result in conviction[.]" Further, Indiana Code section 35-38-9-4(b)(6) prohibits persons, like Hatton, from obtaining an expungement if they have been convicted of an offense described in Indiana Code chapter 35-42-4, which includes sex crimes such as child molestation. Because Hatton was convicted of a crime-and because that crime was a sex crime described in Indiana Code chapter 35-42-4-he cannot expunge the records relating to the dismissed charges in the same cause number.
[¶5] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.