Opinion
24A-CR-592
12-20-2024
Marcus Deion Lee Hatcher, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Sean P. Hilgendorf South Bend, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana James T. Whitehead Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the St. Joseph Superior Court The Honorable Stephanie E. Steele, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 71D01-2304-MR-6
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Sean P. Hilgendorf South Bend, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana James T. Whitehead Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Foley, Judge.
[¶ 1] Marcus Deion Lee Hatcher ("Hatcher") was convicted after a jury trial of reckless homicide, a Level 5 felony, and the jury found that Hatcher used a firearm in the commission of the offense. The trial court sentenced Hatcher to three years for reckless homicide, enhanced by twelve years for the use of a firearm, for an aggregate sentence of fifteen years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction ("the DOC"). Hatcher appeals and raises the following issues:
I. C. § 35-50-2-11.
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Hatcher; and
II. Whether Hatcher's sentence is inappropriate given the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.
[¶ 2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶ 3] On the evening of April 8, 2023, brothers Vuon'Tre Tyler ("Vuon'Tre") and TreVuon Tyler ("TreVuon") celebrated their birthdays at an Irish sports bar in South Bend, Indiana with their brother Eddie Tyler ("Eddie") and friend, Robert Ike ("Robert"). In the early morning hours of April 9, 2023, at approximately 1:45 a.m., Hatcher arrived at the bar. His cousins, Kerynn Boatright ("Kerynn") and Taylor Glenn ("Taylor"), and the mother of his child, Gabrielle Patton ("Gabby"), were playing beer pong with Vuon'Tre and Eddie. At last call, the patrons of the bar began exiting into the parking lot.
[¶ 4] As patrons were exiting the bar and heading towards the parking lot, Hatcher walked with Gabby and Taylor to his vehicle. As Gabby and Taylor got into Hatcher's vehicle, Hatcher noticed that another friend, Kahtlyn Gleen ("Kahtlyn"), was sleeping in Kerynn's Jeep, parked near Hatcher's vehicle. Hatcher approached Kerynn's Jeep to speak with Kahtlyn. Meanwhile, Vuon'Tre was leaning into Hatcher's vehicle and attempting to speak with Gabby and Taylor. Hatcher told Vuon'Tre to step away and to "get the F away from his car." Tr. Vol. 3 pp. 170-71. Vuon'Tre explained that he "wasn't from there" and that he "didn't know it was [Hatcher's] vehicle, neither did [he] know [Hatcher]." Id. at 171. Hatcher told Vuon'Tre he was not "cool" with Vuon'Tre speaking with Gabby and Taylor. Id. at 172. A heated argument between Vuon'Tre and Hatcher ensued and Vuon'Tre, who felt disrespected, stated, "if you're going to fight me, then fight me." Id. at 68. Hatcher responded and said, "I don't want to fight you. I just wanted you to get away from my car." Id. Hatcher then walked to the rear of his vehicle and retrieved a rifle from the trunk.
[¶ 5] Vuon'Tre then left to find "his people," but continued to argue with Hatcher as he walked away. Id. at 45. When Vuon'Tre reached his friends' vehicle, he retrieved a Glock firearm from the vehicle. Meanwhile, Hatcher and his party got into their vehicles and drove toward the exit of the parking lot, but when they got to the exit, Vuon'Tre's vehicle was blocking the path. After hearing a gunshot, Vuon'Tre fired his weapon one time into the air. After firing his weapon, Vuon'Tre got back into his vehicle, and the driver put the car into reverse, heading away from the parking lot. At that time, Hatcher stopped his vehicle, got out of his vehicle, and fired upon Vuon'Tre's vehicle. In total, Hatcher fired approximately twenty-one rounds. After Hatcher stopped firing his weapon, Vuon'Tre got out of his vehicle, and in an attempt to protect himself and the other occupants in his vehicle, he then returned fire in the direction where he believed the volley of shots had come from, shooting approximately seven times.
[¶ 6] After getting back into his vehicle, Vuon'Tre learned that Eddie, his backseat passenger, had been shot. Robert and Vuon'Tre rushed Eddie to the hospital, but despite life-saving measures, Eddie was pronounced dead at the hospital. An autopsy revealed that Eddie's cause of death was a gunshot wound to the back.
[¶ 7] After an investigation, the State of Indiana charged Hatcher with murder, and also sought a sentencing enhancement for use of a firearm in the offense. A bifurcated jury trial was held on November 13, to November 17, 2023, with the trial court instructing the jury on the lesser-included offense of Level 5 felony reckless homicide. The jury found Hatcher guilty of the lesser-included offense of Level 5 felony reckless homicide and determined that Hatcher used a firearm in the commission of the offense. On February 14, 2024, the trial court held the sentencing hearing. In pronouncing Hatcher's sentence, the trial court found that "the nature and circumstances of the event [were] an aggravator." Tr. Vol. 5 p. 97. Furthermore, the trial court identified two mitigators, which were Hatcher's "lack of criminal history . . . and the effect of the situation on . . . Hatcher's dependents." Id. at 98. The trial court also referred to the indiscriminate manner in which Hatcher fired, stating: "Hatcher brought out not just any firearm, but an AK-47, which he had to go back to his trunk to get. He fired over 20 times. Some of those bullets hit nearby buildings and cars, . . . [w]hile yelling watch out, watch out." Id. at 98-99. The trial court sentenced Hatcher to three years in the DOC for Level 5 felony reckless homicide, enhanced by an additional term of twelve years in the DOC for the use of the firearm, resulting in an aggregate sentence of fifteen years executed in the DOC. Hatcher now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Abuse of Discretion
[¶ 8] "[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion." Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), (citing Smallwood v. State, 773 N.E.2d 259, 263 (Ind. 2002)), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is "clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom." Id. "A trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to issue a sentencing statement, gives reasons for imposing a sentence that are not supported by the record, omits reasons clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration, or considers reasons that are improper as a matter of law." Higginson v. State, 209 N.E.3d 15, 25 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491). "Because the trial court no longer has any obligation to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence, a trial court cannot now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to properly weigh such factors." Id.
Furthermore, "[a]lthough a sentencing court must consider all evidence of mitigating factors offered by a defendant, the finding of mitigating factors rests within the court's discretion." Guzman v. State, 985 N.E.2d 1125, 1133 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013) (citing Henderson v. State, 769 N.E.2d 172, 179 (Ind. 2002)). Indeed, "[i]f the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, the trial court is not obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist." Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493 (citing Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind. 1993)).
[¶ 9] Hatcher does not challenge his three-year sentence for Level 5 felony reckless homicide, which was the advisory sentence. See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). Rather, Hatcher focuses on the trial court's decision to impose a twelve-year firearm enhancement, claiming the trial court had an issue and bias against the specific type of firearm used by Hatcher, abused its discretion in not finding certain mitigating factors, and improperly weighed aggravators and mitigators.
[¶ 10] When imposing a sentence for a felony, the sentencing court begins with the advisory sentence established by statute. See, e.g., I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b) (establishing an advisory sentence of three years for a Level 5 felony). The trial court may then deviate from the advisory sentence based on aggravating and mitigating circumstances, provided the court explains its reasons for doing so. I.C. § 35-38-1-1.3; Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 490. However, sentence enhancements operate under a fundamentally different framework. The firearm enhancement statute, like other enhancement provisions, contains no advisory term-it simply authorizes "an additional fixed term of imprisonment" within a specified range. I.C. § 35-50-2-11(h); see also I.C. § 35-50-2-8 (habitual offender enhancement).
[¶ 11] While Indiana Code section 35-38-1-3 explicitly requires courts to provide reasons for deviating from an advisory sentence, our enhancement statutes contain no such requirement. Indeed, "[a]side from setting the parameters regarding the length of a habitual offender enhancement, the relevant statutes contain no guidelines or formulas for courts to apply or follow when determining the length of the habitual offender enhancement." Cornelious v. State, 988 N.E.2d 280, 284 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013) (citing Montgomery v. State, 878 N.E.2d 262, 268 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007)); see also Merritt v. State, 663 N.E.2d 1215, 1217 (Ind.Ct.App. 1996) (rejecting the argument that the trial court must explain why it chose a particular enhanced term). Instead, once the factual predicate for an enhancement is established-here, the jury's finding that Hatcher used a firearm-the trial court has discretion to select any term within the statutory range. See Montgomery, 878 N.E.2d at 268.
[¶ 12] In selecting a twelve-year enhancement, the trial court focused on the manner in which Hatcher fired the rifle, noting that he fired over twenty rounds in an indiscriminate manner. Hatcher argues the trial court "clearly had an issue and bias against the specific type of firearm used." Appellant. Br. p. 10. We do not agree. The trial court properly considered the specific nature and circumstances, particularly the type of firearm and how it was fired, in its imposition of the enhancement. The record reflects that Hatcher went to his trunk to retrieve his rifle; he fired over twenty rounds in the direction of Vuon'Tre; he yelled "watch out, watch out," as he shot across the parking lot at Vuon'Tre; and the bullets from Hatcher's rifle struck nearby buildings and cars. Tr. Vol. 5 pp. 98-99. Furthermore, as to Hatcher's argument that the trial court abused its discretion in not finding certain mitigating factors, the mitigating factors Hatcher refers to were not argued to the trial court at sentencing. A trial court does not abuse its discretion when it omits mitigating factors that were not advanced for consideration. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 492 (noting that ". . . our courts have determined in the past, the trial court does not abuse its discretion in failing to consider a mitigating factor that was not raised at sentencing."). Further, to the extent that Hatcher is arguing that that the trial court improperly weighed aggravators and mitigators, this is no longer subject to appellate review. "[A] trial court no longer has any obligation to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence, [so] it cannot now be said to have abused its discretion in failing to properly weigh such factors." Kovats v. State, 982 N.E.2d 409, 415 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013) (citing Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491).
[¶ 13] In this case, because the jury found that Hatcher used a firearm in committing reckless homicide, the trial court was statutorily authorized to impose an enhancement within the range of five to twenty years. I.C. § 35-50-2-11(h). The trial court selected a twelve-year enhancement, which was below the midpoint of discretion permitted by the statute. For the reasons discussed, the trial court was not required to identify or balance aggravating and mitigating factors when imposing the firearm enhancement sentence. Rather, the factors relied upon by the trial court were supported by the record, and the trial court did not omit or fail to consider any factors raised by Hatcher at sentencing. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's imposition of twelve years for the firearm enhancement.
[¶ 14] We, therefore, conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Hatcher.
II. Inappropriate Sentence
[¶ 15] Hatcher next argues that the trial court's sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. The Indiana Constitution authorizes appellate review and revision of a trial court's sentencing decision. See Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020). Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), this court may revise a sentence "if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the [c]ourt finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender."
[¶ 16] Our review under Appellate Rule 7(B) "should focus on the forest-the aggregate sentence-rather than the trees-consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count." Wilson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1163, 1181 (Ind. 2020) (citing Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008)). The Indiana Supreme Court has long said that "sentencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference." Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222 (citing Morgan v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1067, 1072 (Ind. 1996)). "Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character)." Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).
[¶ 17] When determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we are mindful that "the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed." Turkette v. State, 151 N.E.3d 782, 787 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (citing Pierce v. State, 949 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Ind. 2011)). Here, Hatcher was convicted of one count of reckless homicide, a Level 5 felony, enhanced by the use of a firearm in the commission of a crime. A conviction for a Level 5 felony carries a sentencing range of between one year and six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b). The sentencing enhancement for using a firearm in the commission of the crime imposes an additional term of imprisonment between five years and twenty years. I.C. § 35-50-2-11. The trial court sentenced Hatcher to the advisory sentence of three years for his reckless homicide conviction, enhanced by twelve years for the use of a firearm. Thus, Hatcher was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of fifteen years, where faced with a potential sentencing range of six to twenty-six years.
[¶ 18] When reviewing the nature of the offense, this court considers "the details and circumstances" of the commission of the offense. Merriweather v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1281, 1286 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (citing Washington v. State, 940 N.E.2d 1220, 1222 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011), trans. denied). Hatcher argues that he was not the true aggressor in this altercation, that the trial court "overreached" in its assessment of Hatcher's culpability, and Hatcher is thereby entitled to a revised sentence. Appellant's Br. pp. 11-12. In seeking appellate revision of his sentence, Hatcher minimizes the nature of the offense, characterizing Vuon'Tre as the true aggressor. Hatcher also argues that he was not the first to fire his weapon and that his vehicle was also struck by a bullet.
[¶ 19] In looking at the nature of Hatcher's offense, the evidence revealed that after a verbal argument in the parking lot of the bar, Hatcher retrieved a rifle from his car prior to Vuon'Tre retrieving his gun or firing a shot. After hearing a gunshot, Hatcher stopped his vehicle, got out of his vehicle, and yelled, "watch out, watch out." Tr. Vol. 5 pp. 98-99. Hatcher then proceeded to fire over twenty rounds in the direction of Vuon'Tre and his occupied vehicle, resulting in the fatal gunshot wound to Eddie. Hatcher's actions were not accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality, see Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122; but rather, demonstrated a disregard for the lives of people in the parking lot and the occupants of Vuon'Tre's vehicle. Hatcher's utter lack of restraint resulted in the death of Eddie, a person who posed no threat, either real or perceived, to Hatcher.
[¶ 20] When reviewing the character of the offender, his character "is found in what we learn of his life and conduct." Merriweather v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1281, 1286 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020) (citing Croy v. State, 953 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011)). Hatcher argues that he: had no criminal history; scored low on the risk assessments in every category other than his financial situation; and has the support of his friends and family. Despite these considerations, Hatcher's conduct highlights his poor character. Rather than walking away from a verbal disagreement, he escalated the situation by retrieving a rifle from the trunk of his vehicle-an act that led to the exchange of gunfire and death of a bystander. Rather than waiting for police to discuss what transpired, Hatcher fled the scene of the crime. Consequently, Hatcher has failed to identify "substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character" to support appellate revision of his sentence. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.
[¶ 21] Hatcher has failed to demonstrate that his fifteen-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.
Conclusion
[¶ 22] We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its sentencing of Hatcher and that his sentence is not inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.
[¶ 23] Affirmed
Bailey, J. and Bradford, J., concur.