Summary
dismissing Monell and conspiracy claims where plaintiff failed to prove deprivation of constitutional right
Summary of this case from Clemons v. City of MinneapolisOpinion
Civil No. 04-3974 (DWF/JSM).
September 1, 2006
Albert T. Goins, Sr., Esq., and Joanna L. Woolman, Esq., Goins Wood, PC, counsel for Plaintiff.
C. Lynne Fundingsland, Esq., Minneapolis City Attorney's Office, counsel for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Introduction
This matter is before the Court pursuant to a Motion for Summary Judgment brought by Defendants City of Minneapolis (the "City"); James R. Jensen, Michael McCarthy, Hein Dinh, Justin Merten, Vicki Karnik, Joel Kimmerle, all personally, individually, and in their capacities as Minneapolis Police Officers (the "officers"); Richard Roe and Jane Doe, unknown and unnamed Minneapolis Police Officers, personally, individually, and in their capacities as Minneapolis Police Officers; Chiefs of Police William McManus and Robert K. Olson, personally, individually, and in their official capacities (collectively, the "Defendants"). By the Complaint (the "Complaint"), Plaintiff Shukri Hassan, as the trustee of decedent Abu Kassim Jeilani's Estate, alleges wrongful death, violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and conspiracy to deprive of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion is granted.
Plaintiff filed a Declaration in Support of Request to File a Supplemental Expert Affidavit Under Rule 56(f) Regarding Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment. In that Declaration, Plaintiff asserts that her expert, Louis Reiter, had not completed his review of Defendants' second set of depositions regarding Crisis Intervention Team ("CIT") training. Therefore, Plaintiff requests an opportunity to submit a final expert affidavit in opposition to summary judgment. The Court denies Plaintiff's request because, on the record before the Court, a final expert affidavit would not affect the outcome of this case.
Background
This case arises from the tragic shooting death of Abu Kassim Jeilani by Minneapolis police officers. On March 10, 2002, at approximately 2:19 p.m., Sergeant Gross, an on-duty Minneapolis police officer, observed a black male walking down the middle of the street carrying a machete and a crowbar. The man, later identified as Jeilani and determined to be of Somalian descent, was at or near the intersection of Franklin Avenue South and Chicago Avenue South in Minneapolis. There were pedestrians in the area, and Gross determined that Jeilani was a threat. Gross requested assistance from available officers, specifically CIT members possessing tasers.Officer Joel Kimmerle was the first officer to respond to Gross's request for assistance. When Kimmerle arrived at the scene, he observed Jeilani walking down the middle of the street and Gross following him in a squad car heading westbound on Franklin Avenue. Kimmerle began following Jeilani in his squad. Using the Public Address ("P.A.") system on his squad, Kimmerle told Jeilani to stop and drop his weapons. Kimmerle also told the pedestrians to leave. Jeilani ignored Kimmerle's commands.
Officers and partners Hien Dinh and Justin Merten also responded to Gross's call. These officers were assigned to Squad 314. When Dinh and Merten arrived at the scene and drove by Jeilani, he pointed the machete at them. Gross told Dinh and Merten to block off the eastbound traffic, but the officers observed a squad already in that area. Instead, the officers went to the intersection of 11th and Franklin and blocked traffic there. Dinh and Merten instructed the pedestrians to stay off Franklin.
Shortly thereafter, Officer James Jensen arrived at the scene. Jensen specifically responded to Gross's call because he had received CIT training and was armed with a taser. Jensen testified that CIT training involves a week-long course that includes training on abnormal psychology and the mentally ill. Jensen also testified that, as part of his CIT training, he learned how to deploy a taser. Around this time, Officer Michael McCarthy and his partner, Linda Chaplin, also responded to Gross's call. Gross directed McCarthy and Chaplin to block traffic at 10th and Franklin.
After Jensen arrived at the scene, he told Gross that he was going to speak with Jeilani, and if that failed, he would deploy his taser in an attempt to disarm Jeilani. Jensen testified that Jeilani was waiving the machete in a chopping manner as he walked down the middle of the street. Jensen pulled up alongside Jeilani and asked him "what [the officers] could do to resolve his problem [that day]." (Aff. of C. Lynne Fundingsland in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. ("Fundingsland Aff."), ¶ 6, Ex. D, Dep. of Sergeant James Jensen ("Jensen Dep.") at 42.) Jeilani turned around, waived the machete in Jensen's direction and said something in a language other than English. But Jensen testified that he believed that Jeilani understood English because when Jensen first spoke to Jeilani, he turned around to face Jensen.
Jensen noticed that there were pedestrians located about a half a block away in the direction Jeilani was headed. Because Jensen determined that there were not enough resources to sequester the pedestrians, Jensen deployed his taser at Jeilani. Jensen deployed his taser from about 15 feet away, which is within the taser range of 21 feet. Jensen saw both prongs of his taser strike Jeilani. Jeilani fell to the ground, dropping his weapons. Kimmerle and McCarthy took a step or two toward Jeilani, intending to handcuff him. Dinh was also ready to get out of his squad and handcuff Jeilani. But Jeilani immediately got up and picked up his weapons. Kimmerle heard Jeilani say, "that ain't enough." (Fundingsland Aff., ¶ 8, Ex. F, Dep. of Officer Joel Kimmerle ("Kimmerle Dep.") at 67.) Jensen observed that the prongs and wires of the taser were still attached to Jeilani when he stood. Jeilani came within 10 to 20 feet of pedestrians, who began running away.
After Jeilani got up, he ran toward McCarthy with the machete over his head. McCarthy pointed his gun at Jeilani and back-pedaled. McCarthy repeatedly told Jeilani to "stop." Jeilani swung his machete at McCarthy, getting within 6 to 10 feet of McCarthy. McCarthy testified that the only reason he did not shoot Jeilani was because he did not know who was in the background. Jeilani then suddenly focused his attention on Chaplin, and ran toward her. Chaplin retreated to her squad car. Jeilani then ran toward the corner of Chicago and Franklin. Jensen reloaded his taser and deployed it a second time from about 10 feet away as he followed Jeilani in his squad. Jensen saw one prong of the taser engage Jeilani, but the taser had no apparent effect. Jeilani continued to run and pull free of the taser.
Jeilani stopped in the parking lot of the Chicago Crossings strip mall. Several officers followed Jeilani to the parking lot. Jeilani paced around the parking lot swinging the machete at shoulder height. Several officers had their guns pointed at Jeilani and repeatedly ordered him to drop his weapons. Kimmerle observed a person exit one of the stores abutting the parking lot and ordered that person to leave. Jensen then exited his vehicle and tased Jeilani from approximately 15 feet away with his third and last taser. Jensen observed both taser prongs strike Jeilani, but observed no reaction from Jeilani.
By that time, Officer Vicki Karnik, another CIT member, had arrived and was also armed with a taser. Gross ordered Karnik to deploy her taser. As Karnik deployed her taser, Jensen drew his service revolver to cover Karnik. Both taser prongs hit Jeilani, but they appeared to have no effect. Kimmerle testified that he again heard Jeilani say, "it ain't working." (Kimmerle Dep. at 85.) Additionally, Karnik testified that Jeilani said, "it's not working." (Fundingsland Aff., ¶ 7, Ex. E, Dep. of Officer Vicki Karnik ("Karnik Dep.") at 45-46.) Jeilani then walked toward Karnik, who ran backwards while exchanging taser cartridges. Karnik then deployed a second taser. The prongs attached to Jeilani, but he tore the wires and probes out of his body. Dinh testified that during this round of tasing, he heard Jeilani say something like, "that does nothing to me." (Fundingsland Aff., ¶ 5, Ex. C, Dep. of Officer Hein Dinh ("Dinh Dep.") at 28.) After the tasing, McCarthy heard Jeilani say, "I don't care." (Fundingsland Aff., ¶ 9, Ex. G, Dep. of Michael McCarthy ("McCarthy Dep.") at 64.)
Although Jeilani appeared to have no reaction to the taser, Karnik testified that she believed her taser was working properly because she heard the electricity going through Jeilani's body and because she had tested the taser the day before. Karnik, who is trained as a hostage negotiator, testified that she is trained to create negotiation rapport before deploying her taser. Karnik, however, believed that there was no time to establish negotiation rapport before deploying her taser in this case. Karnik testified that Jeilani was so agitated that she thought he would start running or attack the officers if she did not tase him immediately.
Jeilani then hit a light pole with the machete. Jensen asked Jeilani something like, "What do we got to do to get you to put your weapons down." (Jensen Dep. at 105.) In response, Jeilani moved toward the front of Squad 314, which was parked in the lot. Jeilani walked to the passenger side of Squad 314, where Dinh was standing outside of the car. Dinh covered himself with the passenger door and repeatedly ordered Jeilani to drop his weapon. Jeilani moved toward Dinh and Dinh got in the squad and shut the door.
Jeilani then walked toward the rear of the squad, took a deep sighing breath, and struck the rear of Squad 314 with the machete. Dinh exited the squad and came around by Jensen, who was standing near the trunk of Squad 314. After Jeilani struck the trunk of the squad, he took another deep sighing breath and moved toward the officers, making slashing motions with the machete at ear level. At this point there was nothing between Jeilani and Jensen, Dinh, and Kimmerle. The officers pointed their guns at Jeilani and ordered him to drop his weapons. But Jeilani did not drop his weapons. All six officers then simultaneously fired their guns at Jeilani. The officers fired approximately 16 shots, 12 of which hit Jeilani.
Jensen, Dinh, and Kimmerle testified that when Jeilani moved toward them with the machete raised, they believed that their lives and the other officers' lives were in danger. Dinh testified that even if he had backed up, Jeilani could have chopped off his head. McCarthy, Karnik, and Merten, who were covering the other officers, also fired at Jeilani, fearing for their lives and the other officers' lives. Karnik testified that as part of her training as a negotiator and CIT member, she learned that when people want to commit suicide, they take a deep breath. When Karnik observed Jeilani take the second deep breath and move toward the officers, she believed Jeilani wanted to die. Karnik testified that she was unable to use her training as a hostage negotiator with Jeilani because the situation was moving too fast and Jeilani was not listening to anybody or focusing on any one officer.
The entire altercation with Jeilani lasted about 11 minutes. The officers testified that Gross was in charge at the scene. The Court notes that the officers were in uniform and their squads were marked.
In response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff submits the expert report of Reiter, a private police consultant. In his report, Reiter concludes that the officers' actions "were contrary to generally accepted police practices for this type of encounter" and created the need to use deadly force. (Aff. of Albert Turner Goins, Sr. in Opp'n to Summ. J., ¶ 5, Ex. H, Pl.'s Prelim. Expert Report of Lou Reiter at ¶ 12.)
Discussion
I. Standard of ReviewSummary judgment is proper if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Court must view the evidence and the inferences, which may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Enterprise Bank v. Magna Bank of Missouri, 92 F.3d 743, 747 (8th Cir. 1996). However, as the Supreme Court has stated, "[s]ummary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed 'to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enterprise Bank, 92 F.3d at 747. The nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record, which create a genuine issue for trial. Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986). II. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 prohibits a person acting under color of state law from depriving another person of his or her "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff asserts that the officers' use of deadly force violated Jeilani's constitutional rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In particular, Plaintiff contends that the officers' actions violated Jeilani's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, and Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection. Further, Plaintiff asserts that the officers, in each permitting the other officers to employ deadly force against Jeilani, failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the other officers from violating Jeilani's constitutional rights. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that the City has an unconstitutional policy regarding crisis intervention and is deliberately indifferent to the inadequate training of its officers. The Court will address Plaintiff's § 1983 claim as it applies to the officers and the City.
In her opposition brief, Plaintiff does not address Defendants' argument that she has failed to establish a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the chief of police. Because Plaintiff has not addressed this claim, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has abandoned it. See Thomsen v. Ross, 368 F. Supp. 2d 961, 974 n. 9 (D. Minn. 2005) (concluding that plaintiff had abandoned claims not addressed in his response in opposition to summary judgment).
A. Officers Jensen, McCarthy, Dinh, Merten, Karnik, and Kimmerle
The officers contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claim. Qualified immunity shields government officials as well as private individuals from civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999). A defendant is shielded from civil liability if it is shown that his or her "conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court employs a three-part test to determine whether qualified immunity exists. Goff v. Bise, 173 F.3d 1068, 1072 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Habiger v. City of Fargo, 80 F.3d 289, 295 (8th Cir. 1996)).
First, the plaintiff must assert a violation of a constitutional right. Id. Second, the alleged right must be clearly established. Id. Third, taking the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, there must be no genuine issues of material fact as to whether a reasonable official would have known that the alleged action violated the plaintiff's clearly established rights. Id. "Qualified immunity is available 'to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.'" Avalos v. City of Glenwood, 382 F.3d 792, 798 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
In determining whether Plaintiff has satisfied the first prong, the Court will examine Plaintiff's assertion that the officers violated Jeilani's Fourth Amendment rights. The Court evaluates excessive force claims, including the use of deadly force, under an objective-reasonableness test. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. In determining whether the use of force is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment, a court must balance "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests" against the government interests at stake. Id. at 396 (citation omitted). The reasonableness of the use of force must be judged from the "perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." See id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968)).
Plaintiff's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process claims are analyzed under the same analysis. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
The reasonableness determination also must make allowances for the fact that police officers make split-second judgments in oftentimes tense situations. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. Therefore, the United States Supreme Court has set out the reasonableness inquiry as one that requires courts to determine "whether the officers' actions are 'objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation." Id. at 397 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-39 (1978)). It is reasonable for an officer to use deadly force if he or she has probable cause to believe the individual "poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others." Hernandez v. Jarman, 340 F.3d 617, 622 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985)).
The heart of Plaintiff's argument is that the officers created the need to use deadly force. Plaintiff alleges that Jeilani did not understand English and was mentally ill. Further, Plaintiff alleges that the officers knew Jeilani was mentally ill. In her brief, Plaintiff states, "the police were confronting an individual whom they knew to be mentally ill or retarded, even though the Officers may not have known the full extent of the mental illness." (Pl.'s Mem. in Opp'n to Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Opp'n Mem.") at 35.) Therefore, according to Plaintiff, the officers should have summoned a Somali-language interpreter. Plaintiff contends that "despite having the availability of language resources and psychological resources, [the CIT officers] never utilized these resources." ( Id. at 5.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that members of the Somali community offered to serve as interpreters.
Plaintiff also contends that the officers were incompetent. In particular, Plaintiff contends that the officers should have known that Jeilani did not present an immediate threat of serious physical injury or death. Additionally, Plaintiff contends that the officers failed to properly warn Jeilani, maintain cover, and secure the perimeter. Plaintiff also alleges that the CIT officers failed to properly use their tasers and that the tasers malfunctioned. Further, Plaintiff contends that the CIT officers failed to coordinate a strategy for dealing with Jeilani and failed to take command of the situation. Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the fact that the officers used deadly force within 11 minutes of first confronting Jeilani reflects inappropriate training and lack of skills.
The Court finds no merit in Plaintiff's arguments. The Court's Fourth Amendment analysis of a police officer's decision to use deadly force is analyzed at the time the decision to use deadly force was made, regardless of whether the seizure involves a mentally-ill person. See Schneider v. City of Minneapolis, No. 03-CV-03510, 2006 WL 1851128, *6 (D. Minn. June 30, 2006) (citing Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 471 (8th Cir. 1995)). Thus, the officers correctly assert that the events leading up to the decision to use deadly force are irrelevant to a Fourth Amendment seizure analysis. After analyzing the information the officers possessed when they chose to use deadly force, the Court concludes that the officers' use of deadly force was reasonable as a matter of law.
Here, it is undisputed that Jeilani was carrying a crow bar and brandishing a two-foot-long machete at the officers. The officers decided to use deadly force when Jeilani charged at Jensen, Kimmerle, and Dinh with the machete raised. By the time the officers decided to use deadly force, Jeilani had already charged at McCarthy with the machete and hit a lightpole and Squad 314 with the machete. Furthermore, although there is no evidence in the record that Jeilani suffered from a mental illness, the officers were aware that Jeilani was disturbed. Indeed, Gross specifically requested assistance from CIT members armed with tasers. These officers testified that there was no time to use negotiation skills with Jeilani because he was agitated and would not listen. Instead, these officers made several attempts to subdue Jeilani with the tasers.
Furthermore, the Court notes that many of Plaintiff's unsupported allegations are contradicted by the record. For example, the evidence contradicts Plaintiff's assertion that Jeilani did not speak English. Rather, several officers testified that Jeilani spoke to them in English. Likewise, there is no evidence to support Plaintiff's allegation that the tasers malfunctioned. Instead, the officers testified that the tasing appeared to have no effect on Jeilani. Further, Karnik testified that she believed her taser was working properly because she heard the electricity in Jeilani and had just tested her taser the day before.
The Court notes, however, that even if Jeilani did not understand English and the officers were aware of this fact, the Court's analysis does not change. Likewise, even if the tasers had malfunctioned, the analysis is the same. Therefore, on this record, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the officers' conduct violated Jeilani's Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the Officers are entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim that the officers' use of deadly force was unreasonable.
The Court next turns to Plaintiff's contention that she has satisfied the first prong by asserting a violation of Jeilani's Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights. This claim also fails as a matter of law because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the officers treated similarly-situated persons differently and that the officers failed to provide a rational basis for this differing treatment. See Moreland v. United States, 968 F.2d 655, 660 (8th Cir. 1992). Here, Plaintiff has failed to even allege that Jeilani was treated differently from anyone similarly situated. Thus, again, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the officers violated Jeilani's constitutional rights. Because Plaintiff has not satisfied the first prong of the test, the Court need not address the additional prongs. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity and summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim that the officers violated Jeilani's right to equal protection.
Finally, the officers are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim that each officer failed to prevent a constitutional violation. A claim against an officer under § 1983 for failure to intervene necessarily assumes that another officer violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Brown v. City of Bloomington, 280 F. Supp. 2d 889, 894 (D. Minn. 2003) (citing Putman v. Gerloff, 639 F.2d 415, 423-24 (8th Cir. 1981)). Because the Court has determined that the officers did not violate Jeilani's constitutional rights, Plaintiff's claim fails as a matter of law. Therefore, the officers are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for failure to prevent a constitutional violation.
B. City of Minneapolis
The Eighth Circuit has succinctly set out the standard for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as follows:
Municipalities are "liable under Section 1983 only if a municipal custom or policy caused the deprivation of the right protected by the constitution or federal laws," Angarita v. St. Louis County, 981 F.2d 1537, 1546 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)), or the "municipal policy or custom was the 'moving force [behind] the constitutional violation,'" Mettler v. Whitledge, 165 F.3d 1197, 1204 (8th Cir. 1999) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S. Ct. 2018). For there to be section 1983 liability, "there must first be a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights." Shrum ex rel. Kelly v. Kluck, 249 F.3d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). "[A] municipality may be held liable for the unconstitutional acts of its officials or employees when those acts implement or execute an unconstitutional municipal policy or custom." Mettler, 165 F.3d at 1204. Under this standard, there must be an unconstitutional act by the municipal employee before the municipality is liable.Avalos v. City of Glenwood, 382 F.3d 792, 802 (8th Cir. 2004).
The Court has found that the officers did not violate Jeilani's constitutional rights and thus, that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity. Absent a viable claim that the officers deprived Jeilani of his constitutional rights, there is no claim that the City utilized an unconstitutional policy, custom, or practice. See id. Thus, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against the City.
III. 42 U.S.C. § 1985
Plaintiff asserts that the officers conspired to deprive Jeilani of his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) when the officers used deadly force against Jeilani. To prove the existence of a civil rights conspiracy under § 1985(3), the plaintiff must prove: (1) that the defendants did conspire; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws, or equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) that one or more of the conspirators did, or caused to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy; and (4) that another person was injured in his or her person or property or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3); Larson by Larson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1454 (8th Cir. 1996). Thus, the plaintiff must prove a deprivation of a constitutional right or privilege in order to prevail on a § 1983 civil conspiracy claim. Askew v. Millerd, 191 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1999).
Here, as discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to establish a violation of Jeilani's constitutional rights. Thus, without proving an actual deprivation of a constitutional right, Plaintiff's conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 fails as a matter of law. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted as to Plaintiff's § 1985 civil conspiracy claim.
IV. State Law Claims
Plaintiff asserts a claim of wrongful death against the Defendant officers. Plaintiff also asserts that the officers' actions were negligent, intentional, malicious, or reckless. Further, Plaintiff asserts a claim against the City for negligent and improper training, supervision, hiring, and retention of the officers.
A. Officers Jensen, McCarthy, Dinh, Merten, Karnik, and Kimmerle
The officers assert that they are entitled to official immunity on all state law claims. Under Minnesota law, public officials are automatically entitled to official immunity from state law claims when their duties require the exercise of discretion, so long as the officer is not guilty of a willful or malicious wrong. See Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 41-42 (Minn. 1990); Elwood v. County of Rice, 423 N.W.2d 671, 677 (Minn. 1988). Under Minnesota law, the decision to use deadly force is a discretionary function entitling a police officer to official immunity, absent a willful or malicious wrong. Maras v. City of Brainerd, 502 N.W.2d 69, 77 (Minn.Ct.App. 1993).
Malice, in the official immunity context, means intentionally committing an act that the official has reason to believe is legally prohibited. State by Beaulieu v. City of Mounds View, 518 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Minn. 1994). In determining whether the official acted with malice, the Court conducts an objective inquiry that examines the legal reasonableness of an official's actions. Id. An officer does not commit a willful and malicious wrong unless the officer relies on information that the officer knows to be false. Johnson v. County of Dakota, 510 N.W.2d 237, 240 (Minn.Ct.App. 1994). To overcome a defense based on official immunity, a plaintiff cannot rely on "bare allegations of malice"; rather, a plaintiff must present specific facts evidencing bad faith. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817.
The officers assert that Plaintiff has set forth no evidence that they acted with malice, ill will, or with the intent to act unlawfully. In response, Plaintiff contends that fact issues remain regarding "the officer's [sic] potentially discriminatory treatment of Mr. Jeilani, including with respect to his mental disability, his race, his national origin and language." (Pl.'s Opp'n Mem. at 31.) Plaintiff contends that the officers precipitated the confrontation with Jeilani. In particular, Plaintiff contends that the officers failed to properly utilize community and mental health resources, including failing to employ a Somali interpreter. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that the CIT officers did not follow department policy on dealing with mentally-ill individuals and that a CIT officer should have been in command.
In light of the information that the officers had at the time they decided to use deadly force, the Court finds that the officers' actions were not malicious, willful, or unreasonable under the circumstances. Nor did the officers rely on information that they knew to be false. Therefore, the Court finds that the officers are entitled to official immunity from Plaintiff's wrongful-death claim.
B. City of Minneapolis
The City asserts that it is entitled to statutory immunity on Plaintiff's claim of negligent training, supervision, hiring, and retention. Under Minnesota law, municipalities are not subject to liability for "any claim based on the performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty, whether or not the discretion is abused." Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6 (2004). Statutory immunity protects the separation of powers by preventing the judicial branch from reviewing executive and legislative branch policy decisions. Nusbaum v. County of Blue Earth, 422 N.W.2d 713, 722 (Minn. 1988). Statutory immunity applies to planning-level decisions that ordinarily involve policy considerations, but not to operational-level decisions. Steinke v. City of Andover, 525 N.W.2d 173, 175 (Minn. 1994). The Minnesota Supreme Court has reasoned that it is not the role of courts to second-guess policy decisions that involve political, economic, and social considerations, "including consideration of safety issues, financial burdens, and possible legal consequences." Watson v. Metropolitan Transit Comm'n, 553 N.W.2d 406, 412 (Minn. 1996).
Thus, a court engages in a two-step process when determining whether statutory immunity applies. Christopherson v. City of Albert Lea, 623 N.W.2d 272, 275 (Minn.Ct.App. 2001). The Court first determines which governmental conduct is challenged, and then, whether that conduct is operational or policy-making. Id. Critical to the second question is "whether the specific governmental conduct at issue involves the balancing of policy objectives." Norton v. County of Le Sueur, 565 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Minn.Ct.App. 1997).
Plaintiff does not specifically address the City's claim that it is entitled to statutory immunity. The City correctly cites Maras v. City of Brainerd, 502 N.W.2d 69, 78 (Minn.Ct.App. 1993), for the proposition that a city's decisions regarding the training of its police officers are policy decisions protected by statutory immunity. The City also correctly cites Fear v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 911, 634 N.W.2d 204, 212 (Minn.Ct.App. 2001), for the proposition that the hiring, supervising, and retaining of municipal employees are policy-level activities protected by statutory immunity. Accordingly, the City has the authority to make decisions regarding how to train officers in general, and specifically with regard to disturbed individuals like Jeilani.
Here, the City provided specialized crisis-intervention training that included dealing with the mentally ill. Thus, the City acknowledged the challenges that officers face when dealing with the mentally ill or those who are otherwise disturbed. Realizing that Jeilani was disturbed, Gross summoned the help of CIT officers. The two responding CIT officers used non-deadly force in an effort to subdue Jeilani. Unfortunately, their efforts failed, and the officers resorted to deadly force when Jeilani charged at them with the machete. Because it is not the Court's role to second-guess the City's policy decisions regarding officer training, the City of Minneapolis is protected by statutory immunity. Thus, the Court grants summary judgment on this claim. Defendant City of Minneapolis alternatively asserts that even if the City is not entitled to statutory immunity, Plaintiff's negligence claims fail for lack of evidentiary support for the requisite elements. Because the Court has found that the City is entitled to statutory immunity, the Court need not address this alternative argument.
Conclusion
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 19) is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff's Declaration in Support of Request to File Supplemental Expert Affidavit Under Rule 56(f) Regarding Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 37) is DENIED.
3. Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. No. 1) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.