Opinion
CV176079938S
10-26-2018
Peter Hasiuk v. Colt Defense, LLC
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Scholl, Jane S., J.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#118)
Jane S. Scholl, J.
Introduction
This an action by the plaintiff, Peter Hasiuk, pursuant to the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § § 46a-60 et seq., against his former employer, Colt Defense, LLC. The plaintiff claims that he was discriminated against in the terms and conditions of his employment on the basis of his Polish nationality and ancestry and subjected to a constant barrage of discriminatory comments and inappropriate remarks directed at his Polish nationality and ancestry creating a hostile work environment. He also claims that he was wrongfully terminated and retaliated against in violation of the Act.
The defendant has moved for summary judgment on the plaintiff’s claims because the plaintiff has no facts to support his claim in Count One that he was subjected to a hostile work environment based on his Polish national origin and he cannot establish his claim on Count Two, alleging discriminatory termination based on national origin, because he voluntarily resigned. Finally, the defendant claims that the plaintiff’s retaliation claim in Count Three fails because the plaintiff has no evidence of any adverse employment action or of a link between such action and any protected activity. In support of its position, the defendant submitted a memorandum of law as well as portions of the plaintiff’s deposition; portions of the deposition of Deneen Silvers, the defendant’s HR Labor Relations Manager; the defendant’s letter offering employment to the plaintiff; and various e-mails of the parties. The plaintiff submitted a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment as well as portions of his deposition; portions of the deposition of Deneen Silvers; and various e-mails of the parties.
The court heard oral argument on the motion on August 13, 2018.
Discussion
"Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ... In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Squeo v. Norwalk Hosp. Association, 316 Conn. 558, 593 (2015).
It is undisputed that the plaintiff commenced employment with the defendant in or about March of 2016 in the position of second shift production supervisor. On or about August 10, 2016, the plaintiff contacted defendant’s Human Resources representative, Silvers, along with his manager, John Sgueglia, to notify them that he was quitting. Shortly thereafter he attempted to rescind his resignation. Silvers denied his request to do so.
General Statutes § 46a-60 provides: " a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section:(1) For an employer, by the employer or the employer’s agent, except in the case of a bona fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual’s race, color, religious creed, age, sex, gender identity or expression, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past history of mental disability, intellectual disability, learning disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness ... (4) For any person, employer, labor organization or employment agency to discharge, expel or otherwise discriminate against any person because such person has opposed any discriminatory employment practice or because such person has filed a complaint or testified or assisted in any proceeding under section 46a-82, 46a-83 or 46a-84 ..."
The defendant claims that the plaintiff cannot prove that he was subjected to a legally actionable hostile work environment as alleged in Count One of his revised complaint. The defendant argues that the plaintiff relies on a few minor isolated comments and simple teasing which fall short of proving his hostile work environment claim. "[T]o support a hostile work environment claim, the workplace [must be] permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment ... By definition, therefore, a hostile work environment is one that is so severe that it affects the terms and conditions of the workplace." Patino v. Birken Manufacturing Company, 304 Conn. 679, 691 (2012). Contrary to the defendant’s claim, the plaintiff testified at his deposition that he was harassed on a daily basis in the form of derogatory remarks and jokes related to his nationality. "[T]he existence of racial harassment in a hostile work environment involves an application of facts (the specific discriminatory conditions alleged by the plaintiff) to law (the standards governing the existence of racial harassment and hostile work environment discrimination) ... The question may thus be characterized as a mixed question of law and fact because it involves the application of a legal standard to a particular set of facts ... Such mixed questions are especially well-suited for jury determination and summary judgment may be granted only when reasonable minds could not differ on the issue ... Although such questions may be ripe for summary adjudication where the underlying facts are undisputed, that the facts are undisputed does not automatically mandate summary judgment; rather, summary judgment is appropriate only where application of the law to those undisputed facts will reasonably support only one ultimate conclusion." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Richardson v. New York State Department of Correctional Service, 180 F.3d 426, 437-38 (2d Cir. 1999). Here the factual claims underlying the plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim are disputed. Therefore, summary judgment on Count One is not appropriate.
The defendant also claims that the plaintiff cannot establish a claim of wrongful termination as alleged by the plaintiff in Count Two of his revised complaint because the plaintiff voluntarily resigned his employment. In response, the plaintiff argues that he was constructively discharged because he was unable to tolerate the working conditions he was subjected to. "Normally, an employee who resigns is not regarded as having been discharged, and thus would have no right of action for abusive discharge ... Through the use of constructive discharge, the law recognizes that an employee’s ‘voluntary’ resignation may be, in reality, a dismissal by an employer ... Constructive discharge of an employee occurs when an employer, rather than directly discharging an individual, intentionally creates an intolerable work atmosphere that forces an employee to quit involuntarily ... Working conditions are intolerable if they are so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee’s shoes would have felt compelled to resign ... Accordingly, [a] claim of constructive discharge must be supported by more than the employee’s subjective opinion that the job conditions have become so intolerable that he or she was forced to resign." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Brittell v. Department of Correction, 247 Conn. 148, 178 (1998). The defendant argues that the undisputed fact that the plaintiff sought to rescind his resignation, and return to the workplace he argues was intolerable, defeats his claim of constructive discharge. The court agrees. In Cadet v. Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc., No. 11 CIV. 7964 CM, 2013 WL 3090690, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2013) the court found that "the fact that Plaintiff attempted to rescind his resignation severely undermines any inference that [the defendant’s workplace] had become such a hostile work environment that Plaintiff felt compelled to resign." Also, in Yancy v. Allstate Insurance Company, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 970573357S, 1999 WL 1063270, at *4 (Peck, J., Nov. 2, 1999) the court held that "the fact that [the plaintiff] reapplied for a position with the defendant so soon after his departure knowing that he would be reporting to the same supervisor further undermines his claim of constructive discharge." Therefore, summary judgment is granted as to Count Two.
Lastly, the defendant claims that the plaintiff cannot prove his claim of retaliation alleged in Count Three of his complaint because he cannot establish that he suffered an adverse employment action. "A plaintiff alleging retaliation must initially establish a prima facie case by showing that he was engaged in a protected activity, that his employer was aware of this activity, that he was subject to an adverse employment action, and that there was a causal connection between his protected activity and the adverse action ... To demonstrate that he engaged in a protected activity, Plaintiff must show that he had a good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying employment practice was unlawful ... The causation element can then be proven (1) indirectly, by showing that the protected activity was followed closely by discriminatory treatment, or through other circumstantial evidence such as disparate treatment of fellow employees who engaged in similar conduct; or (2) directly, through evidence of retaliatory animus directed against the plaintiff by the defendant ... Alternatively, causation may be satisfied by showing a sufficiently close temporal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cortez v. State, 606 F.Supp.2d 246, 251 (D.Conn. 2009).
The plaintiff claims that an employer’s decision to reject an employee’s rescission of his resignation should be construed as an involuntary discharge and thus an adverse employment action. The plaintiff cites Benedict v. New Canaan Board of Education, Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. FSTCV 084013437S, 2008 WL 4853607, at *5 (Nadeau, J., Oct. 22, 2008) which quotes "Britt v. Graphic Center, Inc ., Board Case No. 559-BR-87, July 7, 1987, [in which] the Board of Review wrote: We have repeatedly held that a claimant who quits in haste under the influence of strong emotions and who, upon reflection, immediately attempts to reclaim his job, has not voluntarily left his job at least where the employer has not already replaced the claimant at the time the claimant rescinds his resignation." This principle, however, involves claims pursuant to the Unemployment Compensation Act. Claims under that act are clearly distinguishable from those made, as here, pursuant to the Fair Employment Practices Act, in that "the [Unemployment Compensation] act is remedial and, consequently, should be liberally construed in favor of its beneficiaries ... Indeed, the legislature underscored its intent by expressly mandating that the act shall be construed, interpreted and administered in such manner as to presume coverage, eligibility and nondisqualification in doubtful cases. General Statutes § 31-274(c)." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mattatuck Museum-Mattatuck Historical Society v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 238 Conn. 273, 278 (1996). In the context of employment discrimination cases, however, as the defendant argues, the refusal to allow an employee to rescind a resignation is not considered an adverse employment action. "Federal courts across the country have held that the refusal to allow rescission of a voluntary resignation does not constitute an adverse action ... The reason for this is simple: employers are not usually obligated to allow their employees to rescind their resignations ... Thus, in the absence of a duty to permit an employee to rescind his resignation, it is not an adverse employment action for the purposes of a discrimination claim or a retaliation claim- for an employer to take the employee at his word that he wants out and not reinstate him if he changes his mind ... Nothing in the case law suggests that an employee is entitled to some kind of grace period during which he is free to reconsider his resignation or that an employer is obligated to allow him to rescind if he does so within a brief period of time ..." Cadet v. Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc., No. 11 CIV. 7964 CM, 2013 WL 3090690, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2013). See also, Henderson v Mercy Catholic Medical Center, 2018 U.S. Dist. Lexis 113191 (E.D.PA, July 9, 2018). Therefore, summary judgment is granted as to Count Three.
Conclusion
The motion for summary judgment is denied as to Count One and granted as to Counts Two and Three.