Opinion
NO. 2013-CA-001638-MR
06-05-2015
RACHEL HARTMAN APPELLANT v. DANIEL HARTMAN APPELLEE
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: William G. Knoebel Florence, Kentucky BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Laura A. Oldfield Erlanger, Kentucky
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER J. MEHLING, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 10-CI-01199
OPINION
AFFIRMING
BEFORE: CLAYTON, DIXON AND KRAMER, JUDGES. DIXON, JUDGE: Rachel Hartman appeals from the judgment of the Kenton Family Court. We affirm.
Rachel and Daniel Hartman were divorced in 2011. The terms of the separation agreement provided for joint legal custody of their children, including joint discussion and resolution of major issues. In 2013, the parties decided to obtain counseling for one of their children, and a dispute between the parties arose concerning the division of costs associated with doctors chosen out of network. Both parties filed motions on the matter, which were set to be heard jointly on May 31, 2013.
Prior to the hearing date, the parties began to negotiate a settlement of the matter. At the hearing, the parties testified that they had reached an agreement, and the agreement was read into the record. This agreement included the following provision:
2) That the Petitioner [Daniel] shall be entitled to make the decisions regarding the medical care for the children. Except in cases of emergency, Father shall have the right to select the care providers independent of Mother. Mother shall be provided with notice of all appointments and procedures for the children and shall be entitled to full and complete access to any and all records or information regarding the children. Father currently provides the health insurance for the minor children. He shall continue to do so for as long as insurance is reasonably available from his employer. He agrees that he will be solely responsible for all uncovered medical expenses and shall pay 100% of the insurance premiums.
Because some changes had been made to the agreement during the course of negotiations, the parties were unable to submit a written agreed order for the judge to sign on that date. They did, however, submit a draft of the agreement with some minor changes notated in the margins. Paragraph 2 did not have any notes in the margins of the document submitted to the family court. The judge wrote on the docket sheet that the parties had reached an agreement and that they would submit an order for entry with the appropriate changes.
Thereafter, Rachel refused to sign the proposed agreed order and filed a motion to set aside the agreement. The motion alleged that Daniel canceled some doctor appointments without consulting Rachel based on the language of the agreement. Rachel argued that it was never her intent to waive her rights regarding medical treatment decisions; she claimed that the language was intended to only allow Daniel to choose providers. Rachel claimed that because her interpretation was different from Daniel's, there was ambiguity, indicating that the parties did not have a meeting of the minds. Daniel responded that the provision was a compromise that arose from his agreement to take on the full cost of health insurance premiums. In July, the family court entered the submitted agreed order without Rachel's signature.
In August, the family court entered an amended agreed order. This amended agreed order acknowledged that the parties reached an agreement on May 31, 2013, and stated that the order entered in July was incorrect. The alterations in the corrected order had no impact on the provision from which the parties' disagreement arose. The amended agreed order entered in August accurately reflects the agreement as read into the record on May 31, 2013.
Rachel filed a Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.02 motion, arguing that the family court's decision to enter the agreed order effectively overruled her motion to set aside the agreement and requesting specific findings on that motion. The family court subsequently entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, finding that the parties had reached an agreement and that the agreement had been read into the record. The family court also found that the parties had negotiated the terms of the agreement, including the provision that gave Daniel the authority to make decisions regarding medical care. The family court concluded that Daniel had the authority to make all routine medical decisions for the children, but made distinctions among routine medical decisions, extraordinary medical care, and emergency medical care, giving different decision making powers in each situation. This appeal followed.
We review the decision of the family court de novo. "An agreement to settle legal claims is essentially a contract subject to the rules of contract interpretation." Cantrell Supply, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 94 S.W.3d 381, 384 (Ky. App. 2002). "Since the interpretation of a contract—including a determination of whether it is ambiguous—is a question of law, we review it de novo." Baker v. Coombs, 219 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Ky. App. 2007) (citing Cantrell Supply, 94 S.W.3d at 385).
The rules of contract interpretation "dictate that the parties' intentions be discerned from the four corners of the document itself. Absent ambiguity, extrinsic evidence should not be considered." Id. (citing Cantrell Supply, 94 S.W.3d at 385). "A contract is ambiguous if a reasonable person would find it susceptible to different or inconsistent interpretations. The fact that one party may have intended different results, however, is insufficient to construe a contract at variance with its plain and unambiguous terms." Cantrell Supply, 94 S.W.3d at 385 (citations omitted). In determining ambiguity, we must look to the four corners of the instrument. Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Kincaid, 617 S.W.2d 32, 33 (Ky. 1981).
The provision that Rachel takes issue with is the first sentence of Paragraph 2 of the agreement. This provision stated that Daniel was entitled to make medical decisions regarding the children. It appears from the wording of the agreement that in exchange for paying all insurance premiums and uncovered medical expenses, Daniel was afforded the right to make all decisions regarding medical care for the children. This is consistent with the structure of Paragraph 3 dealing with the cost and decision making for dental and vision care. Paragraph 3 states in relevant part:
Mother and Father shall have joint decision making power on all dental and vision related issues affecting the children. The parties agree that all uncovered expenses of the children for dental or dental related services or vision and vision related services shall be divided according to the percentages on the [child support] worksheet.Under Paragraph 3, the parties have joint decision making power for all dental and vision issues, and the costs of uncovered expenses are to be split according to their respective incomes. That costs are split and that the parties have joint decision making power indicates the parties intended in Paragraph 2 to give Daniel the power to make medical decisions in exchange for paying for all medical expenses.
Upon review of Paragraph 2 of the agreement, and in light of the agreement as a whole, we find that the terms of Paragraph 2 were negotiated by the parties and are clear and unambiguous. Because there is no ambiguity, we need not use extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intentions. Central Bank & Trust Co., 617 S.W.2d at 33.
We are somewhat perplexed by the family court's conclusion that the parties should have "joint decision making for any extraordinary medical care for the children." There is nothing in the agreed order carving out an exception for "extraordinary" medical care. However, as Daniel has not appealed this conclusion we will not disturb the family court's ruling in this regard.
Based on the foregoing, the decision of the family court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR. BRIEF FOR APPELLANT: William G. Knoebel
Florence, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE: Laura A. Oldfield
Erlanger, Kentucky