In addition, “the traveling expenses of witnesses may be taxed as costs, MCL 600.2405(1); MCL 600.2552(1); MCL 600.2552(5) [.]” Hartland Twp. v. Kucykowicz, 189 Mich.App. 591, 599, 474 N.W.2d 306 (1991).Id., quoting Detroit v. Lufran Co., 159 Mich.App. 62, 67, 406 N.W.2d 235 (1987).

Hartland Twp v Kucykowicz, 189 Mich.App. 591, 595; 474 N.W.2d 306 (1991). Therefore, "[w]e review for an abuse of discretion a trial court's exercise of its power to control the interrogation of witnesses" with the imposition of time limits.

[Citations, internal quotation marks, and alteration brackets omitted.] Van Elslander is controlling, although we note that, as to the preceding passage, the panel relied on this Court's opinions in Hartland Twp v Kucykowicz, 189 Mich App 591; 474 NW2d 306 (1991), and Detroit v Lufran Co, 159 Mich App 62; 406 NW2d 235 (1987). Van Elslander, 297 Mich App at 218 nn 28-30.

See also Hartland Twp v Kucykowicz, 189 Mich.App. 591, 599; 474 N.W.2d 306 (1991) ("Experts are properly compensated for court time and the time required to prepare for their testimony").

"MRE 611 grants a trial court broad power to control the manner in which a trial is conducted, including the examination of witnesses." Hartland Twp v Kucykowicz, 189 Mich.App. 591, 595; 474 N.W.2d 306 (1991). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the scope of the cross-examination at the evidentiary hearing to the relevant factors outlined in Smith, 481 Mich. at 528-533.

This Court then explained: Hartland v Kucykowicz, 189 Mich App 591; 474 NW2d 306 (1991). Id. at 599, quoting Detroit v Lufran Co, 159 Mich App 62, 67; 406 NW2d 235 (1987).

A trial court has broad power to control the manner in which a proceeding is conducted. Hartland Twpv Kucykowicz, 189 Mich App 591, 595; 474 NW2d 306 (1991). Because the cases had the same parties and related issues, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to hold the hearings together.

Respondent has also failed to establish error with respect to the trial court's decision not to entertain further proofs after hearing respondent's testimony at the evidentiary hearing. A trial court has broad power in controlling the manner in which a court proceeding is conducted. Hartland Twp v Kucykowicz, 189 Mich App 591; 595; 474 NW2d 306 (1991); see also MRE 611(a). The material issue before the court was whether respondent engaged in a course of conduct that constituted stalking as defined in MCL 750.411h(d), during the one-week period between the expiration of the first PPO on July 29, 2011, and the entry of the second PPO on August 4, 2011.

Pursuant to MRE 611(a), "[t]he court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment." In Hartland Twp v Kucykowicz, 189 Mich App 591, 595; 474 NW2d 306 (1991), this Court emphasized that "[t]he mode and order of admitting proofs and interrogating witnesses rests within the discretion of the trial court." The trial court in Hartland Twp, on the fifth day of a trial, limited witness examinations to one hour each for direct and cross-examinations, but later amended its ruling to permit defense counsel more time with one expert witness.

Pursuant to MRE 611(a), "[t]he court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment." In Hartland Twp v Kucykowicz, 189 Mich App 591, 595; 474 NW2d 306 (1991), this Court emphasized that "[t]he mode and order of admitting proofs and interrogating witnesses rests within the discretion of the trial court." The trial court in Hartland, on the fifth day of a trial, limited witness examinations to one hour each for direct and cross-examination, but later amended its ruling to permit defense counsel more time with one expert witness.