Opinion
6:21-cv-00663-MK
11-04-2021
MILES HART and ELIZABETH TANENBAUM, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. J.H. BAXTER & CO., INC. and J.H. BAXTER & CO., A CALIFORNIA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Mustafa T. Kasubhai, United States Magistrate Judge
In this putative class action, Plaintiffs Miles Hart and Elizabeth Tanenbaum (“Hart Plaintiffs”), on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, assert five state law claims against Defendants J.H. Baxter & Co., Inc. and J.H. Baxter & Co. (“Defendants”): (1) trespass, (2) private nuisance, (3) public nuisance, (4) negligence, and (5) gross negligence. Compl. 14-22, ECF No. 1 (Hart Docket). In a separately filed putative class action, Plaintiffs Tiffany Bell-Alanis, Sharon Matthews, Erin Neel, and Sarah Pederson (“Bell Plaintiffs”), on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, assert three state law claims against Defendants as well as Defendant Jeanne Olson: (1) nuisance, (2) trespass, and (3) negligence. Compl. 13-17, ECF No. 1-1 (Bell Docket). Defendants move to consolidate the two cases pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 42. Defs.' Mot. Consolidate (“Defs.' Mot.”), ECF No. 18 (Hart Docket), ECF No. 12 (Bell Docket). Hart Plaintiffs move to appoint their counsel as interim lead class counsel pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. Hart Pls.' Mot. Appoint Interim Lead Counsel, ECF No. 20 (Hart Docket). Bell Plaintiffs move to appoint themselves as interim lead plaintiffs and their counsel as interim lead class counsel pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 23. Bell Pls.' Mot. Appoint Interim Lead Counsel, ECF No. 17 (Bell Docket). For the reasons that follow, Defendants' motion is DENIED and Hart Plaintiffs' motion as well as Bell Plaintiffs' motion are DENIED as moot.
“Hart Docket” refers to the docket in Hart et al. v. J.H. Baxter & Co., Inc. et al., No. 6:21-cv-00663-MK, whereas “Bell Docket” refers to the docket in Bell Alanis et al. v. J.H. Baxter & Co. et al., No. 6:21-cv-00885-MK.
BACKGROUND
Defendants own and operate a wood treatment facility located in Eugene, Oregon (“Treatment Facility”). Defs.' Mot. 2-3, ECF No. 18 (Hart Docket). Hart Plaintiffs and Bell Plaintiffs have both filed putative class actions against Defendants for various claims arising from odors and contaminants allegedly originating from the Treatment Facility. Id.
On April 30, 2021, Hart Plaintiffs commenced a putative class action (“Hart Action”) against Defendants. Hart Plaintiffs allege that “[f]ugitive contaminates and noxious odors” from the Treatment Facility “physically invaded the [Hart] Plaintiffs' and putative Class' groundwater, soil, properties, and persons, thereby causing injury through trespass, private nuisance, public nuisance, and negligence.” Hart Pls.' Resp. 4, ECF No. 19 (Hart Docket). Hart Plaintiffs seek to represent a putative class of owners, occupants, and renters of residential property situated within a one-and-one-half mile radius of the Treatment Facility. Id. at 5.
On May 11, 2021, Bell Plaintiffs commenced a putative class action (“Bell Action”) against Defendants in Lane County Circuit Court and Defendants removed the action to this Court. Defs.' Mot. 4, ECF No. 12 (Bell Docket). Bell Plaintiffs allege that the “release of carcinogenic and poisonous chemicals and noxious odors” from the Treatment Facility “have a significant effect on the wellbeing and health of the surrounding community, have interfered with the ability of residents to use and enjoy their properties, and have diminished the value of those properties in the surrounding community.” Bell Pls.' Compl. 1, ECF No. 1-1 (Bell Docket). Bell Plaintiffs bring state law claims for nuisance, trespass, and negligence. Id. Bell Plaintiffs seek to represent a putative class of persons who resided within a four-mile radius of the Treatment Facility two years before the Bell Complaint was filed to the present. Id. at 8.
Defendants now move to consolidate the two actions and request that the Court designate the Hart Action as the lead case. Defs.' Mot. 2, ECF No. 18 (Hart Docket). Bell Plaintiffs do not oppose consolidation for discovery and case management purposes but do oppose consolidation of the two actions for trial. Id.; see also Bell Pls.' Resp., ECF No. 16 (Bell Docket). Hart Plaintiffs, however, oppose consolidation of the two actions. Hart Pls.' Resp. 2, ECF No. 19 (Hart Docket).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Rule 42, the court may consolidate actions that involve “a common question of law or fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a). “The purpose of Rule 42(a) is to improve trial court efficiency by avoiding unnecessary duplication of evidence and procedures and to avoid the risk of inconsistent adjudications.” Wilson v. HGC, Inc., No. 3:16-cv-64-SI, 2016 WL 4432690, at *1 (D. Or. Aug. 18, 2016). The court may consolidate for hearing or trial any and all matters at issue, including the entire case. Fed.R.Civ.P. 42(a). “In making this determination, the court must weigh ‘the interest in judicial convenience against the potential delay, confusion and prejudice caused by consolidation.'” Evraz Inc., N.A. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 3:11-cv-00233-AC, 2013 WL 6241984, at *1 (D. Or. Dec. 3, 2013) (quoting Paxonet Commc'ns, Inc. v. TranSwitch Corp., 303 F.Supp.2d 1027, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2003)). “It is not enough that the actions involve a common defendant, if the issues of law or fact are otherwise unrelated.” Wilson, 2016 WL 4432690, at *1. In addition, “[c]onsolidation is inappropriate if it would lead to inefficiency, inconvenience, or unfair prejudice to any party.” Id. The district court has broad discretion to decide whether to consolidate cases. In re Adams Apple, Inc., 829 F.2d 1484, 1487 (9th Cir. 1987).
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue consolidation is appropriate because: (1) both cases involve common questions of law and fact, and (2) the interest of judicial convenience and avoidance of the risk of inconsistent adjudications “weigh strongly in favor of consolidation.” Defs.' Mot. 5-6, ECF No. 18 (Hart Docket). In opposing consolidation, Hart Plaintiffs argue: (1) the actions are premised on different questions of fact because Hart Plaintiffs' claims are premised solely upon property damage whereas Bell Plaintiffs' claims involve personal injuries; (2) as a result of the different questions of fact, there will only be minimal common issues of law at the class certification stage of each action; and (3) consolidation of these actions would result in inefficiency, inconvenience, and unfair prejudice to Hart Plaintiffs. Hart Pls.' Resp. 2-4, ECF No. 19 (Hart Docket).
Here, the Court cannot say that the Hart Action and the Bell Action both involve common questions of law and fact. While Hart Plaintiffs' claims are premised solely upon property damage resulting from Defendants' alleged release of noxious odors and contaminants, Bell Plaintiffs' claims also involve claims of personal injuries from Defendants' alleged release of carcinogenic and poisonous chemicals. See Hart Pls.' Resp. 10, ECF No. 19 (Hart Docket); see also Bell Pls.' Compl. 1, ECF No. 1-1 (Bell Docket). These differences will require the Court to apply different legal standards to each action. For instance, Bell Plaintiffs' claims involving personal injury will implicate a medical causation standard. See, e.g., Abuan v. General Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329, 334 (9th Cir. 1993) (“In cases claiming personal injury from exposure to toxic substances, it is essential that the plaintiff demonstrate that she was, in fact, exposed to harmful levels of such substances.” (citation omitted)). As Hart Plaintiffs correctly note, the only common question of fact between the actions at this time seems to be whether Defendants' Treatment Facility actually emits the odors and chemicals as alleged in each complaint. Hart Pls.' Resp. 10, ECF No. 19 (Hart Docket); see also Wilson, 2016 WL 4432690, at *1 (“It is not enough that the actions involve a common defendant, if the issues of law or fact are otherwise unrelated.”). The Court finds that this single common question of fact does not merit consolidation because Plaintiffs' claims are sufficiently distinct.
Further, even if other common questions of law or fact did exist between the two actions, the Court finds that the potential for delay, confusion, and prejudice that would result from consolidation outweighs any interest in judicial convenience. The Bell Action involves different questions of law and a broader class definition. Consolidating the two actions and requiring both sets of Plaintiffs to submit a consolidated amended complaint as requested by Defendants risks delaying the Hart Action. In addition, consolidating the two actions risks creating confusion as to the specific claims brought against Defendants. The Court does not find consolidation to be appropriate here because it would lead to inefficiency, inconvenience, and unfair prejudice to Hart Plaintiffs. See Evraz, 2013 WL 6241984, at *1.
The Court is satisfied that both Hart Plaintiffs and Bell Plaintiffs can pursue their claims independently for now. However, the Court will coordinate a joint status conference for all parties to explore a coordinated discovery schedule to eliminate potential redundancies.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, Defendants' motion to consolidate (ECF No. 18) is DENIED and Hart Plaintiffs' motion to appoint interim lead counsel (ECF No. 20) as well as Bell Plaintiffs' motion to appoint interim lead plaintiffs and interim lead counsel (ECF No. 21-1) are DENIED as moot. Defendants' and Plaintiffs' requests for oral argument are DENIED as unnecessary. See LR 7-1(d)(1).