The Supreme Court denied that branch of the motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 200, but granted that branch of the motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action alleging a violation of Labor Law § 241(6). “Labor Law § 200 is a codification of the common-law duty imposed upon an owner or general contractor to maintain a safe construction site” ( McKee v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 73 A.D.3d 872, 873, 905 N.Y.S.2d 601; see Hart v. Commack Hotel, LLC, 85 A.D.3d 1117, 1118, 927 N.Y.S.2d 111). When the claim is based on alleged defects or dangers in the methods or materials used to perform the work, a plaintiff may recover against an owner or general contractor under Labor Law § 200 only upon a showing that the defendant had the authority to supervise or control the performance of the work ( see Hart v. Commack Hotel, LLC, 85 A.D.3d at 1118, 927 N.Y.S.2d 111; McKee v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 73 A.D.3d at 874, 905 N.Y.S.2d 601; Ortega v. Puccia, 57 A.D.3d 54, 61, 866 N.Y.S.2d 323). General supervisory authority for the purpose of overseeing the progress of the work and inspecting the work product is insufficient to impose liability ( see La Veglia v. St. Francis Hosp., 78 A.D.3d 1123, 1125, 912 N.Y.S.2d 611; Ortega v. Puccia, 57 A.D.3d at 62–63, 866 N.Y.S.2d 323).

However, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the owners' cross motion which was, in effect, for conditional summary judgment on their third-party cause of action for common-law indemnification. “In order to establish a claim for common-law indemnification, a party must prove not only that [it was] not negligent, but also that the proposed indemnitor ... was responsible for negligence that contributed to the accident or, in the absence of any negligence, had the authority to direct, supervise, and control the work giving rise to the injury” ( Hart v. Commack Hotel, LLC, 85 A.D.3d 1117, 1118–1119, 927 N.Y.S.2d 111 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Here, the owners made a prima facie showing that any liability to the plaintiff on their part would be purely statutory and vicarious to Atlantic's direct liability ( see Jamindar v. Uniondale Union Free School Dist., 90 A.D.3d 612, 615, 934 N.Y.S.2d 437;Hart v. Commack Hotel, LLC, 85 A.D.3d at 1119, 927 N.Y.S.2d 111; Werner v. East Meadow Union Free School Dist., 245 A.D.2d 367, 368, 667 N.Y.S.2d 386).

In Hart v Commack Hotel, LLC (85 A.D.3d 1117 [2d Dept 2011]), the Appellate Division held that the plaintiff failed to establish entitlement to summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240 (1) claim because his own submission showed the existence of triable issues of fact as to whether adequate safety devices were provided. However, the owners established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by demonstrating that they did not have the authority to supervise or control the roofing work performed by the plaintiff's employer; the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Labor Law § 200 is a codification of the common-law duty imposed upon an owner or general contractor to provide construction site workers with a safe place to work (see Comes v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp.. 82 NY2d 876,609 NYS2d 168 [1993]; Haider v Davis, 35 AD3d363, 827 NYS2d 179 [2d Dept 2006]). Where the injury allegedly arises from the means and methods of the work performed, rather than a dangerous condition on the premises, an implicit precondition to this duty is that the party charged with that responsibility have the authority to supervise or control the activity bringing about the injury (see Hart v Commack Hotel, LLC, 85 AD3d 1117, 111 8, 927 NYS2d 111 [2d Dept 2011]; Ferrero v Best Modular Homes, Inc., 33 AD3d 847, 823 NYS2d 477 [2d Dept 2006]). An out-of-possession landlord is not liable for injuries that occur on its premises unless it retains control over the premises or is contractually bound to repair unsafe conditions (see Taylor v Lastres, 45 AD3d 835, 847 NYS2d 139 [2d Dept 2007]; Lindquist v C & C Landscape Contrs., Inc., 38 AD3d 616, 831 NYS2d 523 [2d Dept 2007]; Yadegar v International Food Mkt., 37 AD3d 595, 830 NYS2d 244 [2d Dept 2007]; Scott v Bergstol, 11 AD3d 525, 782 NYS2d 793 [2d Dept 2004]).

This argument is rejected. In the recent case of Hart v Commack Hotel, LLC (85 AD3d 1117, 1118-1119 [2011]), decided on June 28, 2011, where the owners therein were not negligent and any liability on their part would be purely statutory and vicarious, and where the owners also demonstrated that Hart Roofing was hired to replace the roof at their hotel and it had the authority to direct, supervise, and control the means and methods of the roofing work, the Appellate Division, Second Department, did not find a granting of summary judgment to the owners to be premature, but, rather, held that they were entitled to summary judgment on their cause of action for conditional common-law indemnification against Hart Roofing. Thus, Sovereign's motion on its cross claim is not premature, but, instead, may be granted conditionally, as in Hart (85 AD3d at 1118-1119).

"The party seeking contractual indemnification must establish that it was free from negligence and that it may be held liable solely by virtue of statutory or vicarious liability" (Jardin v A Very Special Place, Inc., 138 AD3d 927, 931 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Graziano v Source Bldrs. & Consultants, LLC, 175 AD3d 1253, 1260; Arriola v City of New York, 128 AD3d 747, 748-749). Likewise, "[i]n order to establish a claim for common-law indemnification, a party must prove not only that [it was] not negligent, but also that the proposed indemnitor . . . was responsible for negligence that contributed to the accident or, in the absence of any negligence, had the authority to direct, supervise, and control the work giving rise to the injury" (Hart v Commack Hotel, LLC, 85 AD3d 1117, 1118-1119 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Allan v DHL Express [USA], Inc., 99 AD3d 828, 832-833). Here, although the BJ's defendants had hired Big Al's to remove snow from the parking lot, the snow removal service contract, which included plowing and salting/sanding the parking lot, only required Big Al's to perform snow removal services when the snow accumulation reached one inch in height.

1 ; Mohan v. Atlantic Ct., LLC, 134 A.D.3d 1075, 1078, 24 N.Y.S.3d 102 ; McAllister v. Construction Consultants L.I., Inc., 83 A.D.3d 1013, 1014, 921 N.Y.S.2d 556 ). Further, " ‘to establish a claim for common-law indemnification, a party must prove not only that [it was] not negligent, but also that the proposed indemnitor ... was responsible for negligence that contributed to the accident or, in the absence of any negligence, had the authority to direct, supervise, and control the work giving rise to the injury’ " ( Wahab v. Agris & Brenner, LLC, 102 A.D.3d 672, 674, 958 N.Y.S.2d 401, quoting Hart v. Commack Hotel, LLC, 85 A.D.3d 1117, 1118–1119, 927 N.Y.S.2d 111 ). Here, the indemnification provision in the contract between Granite and STAT required STAT to indemnify Granite and Kulka "from and against all claims, demands, suits, [and] damages ... arising out of or resulting from the performance of the Work, provided that such claims, demands, suits, [and] damages ... are caused in whole or in part by negligent acts or omissions of [STAT]."

Further, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of HVAC's motion which was for conditional summary judgment on its cross claim for common-law indemnification against Axis. In order to establish a claim for common-law indemnification, a party must " ‘prove not only that [it was] not negligent, but also that the proposed indemnitor ... was responsible for negligence that contributed to the accident or, in the absence of any negligence, had the authority to direct, supervise, and control the work giving rise to the injury’ " (Hart v. Commack Hotel, LLC, 85 A.D.3d 1117, 1118–1119, 927 N.Y.S.2d 111, quoting Benedetto v. Carrera Realty Corp., 32 A.D.3d 874, 875, 822 N.Y.S.2d 542 ). "Where a defendant's alleged liability is purely statutory and vicarious, conditional summary judgment in that defendant's favor on the basis of common-law indemnification ‘is premature absent proof, as a matter of law, that [the party from whom indemnification is sought] was negligent or had authority to direct, supervise, and control the work giving rise to the plaintiff's injury’ " (Nasuro v. PI Assoc., LLC, 49 A.D.3d 829, 832, 858 N.Y.S.2d 175, quoting Benedetto v. Carrera Realty Corp., 32 A.D.3d at 875, 822 N.Y.S.2d 542 ; see Markey v. C.F.M.M. Owners Corp., 51 A.D.3d 734, 738, 858 N.Y.S.2d 293 ; Yonkolowitz v. Phoenix Pharms., Inc., 40 A.D.3d 989, 990, 834 N.Y.S.2d 664 ; Perri v. Gilbert Johnson Enters., Ltd., 14 A.D.3d 681, 685, 790 N.Y.S.2d 25 ).

Upon reargument, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of MRM's cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing Hasbani's cross claim against it for common-law indemnification. “ ‘In order to establish a claim for common-law indemnification, a party must prove not only that [it was] not negligent, but also that the proposed indemnitor ... was responsible for negligence that contributed to the accident or, in the absence of any negligence, had the authority to direct, supervise, and control the work giving rise to the injury’ ” (Wahab v. Agris & Brenner, LLC, 102 A.D.3d 672, 674, 958 N.Y.S.2d 401, quoting Hart v. Commack Hotel, LLC, 85 A.D.3d 1117, 1118–1119, 927 N.Y.S.2d 111).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted those branches of the cross motions of Kit Construction Co., Inc., and Atlantic which were for summary judgment on their claims for contractual indemnification against Eagle One (see Grant v. City of New York, 109 A.D.3d 961, 972 N.Y.S.2d 86; Fernandez v. Abalene Oil Co., 91 A.D.3d 906, 910, 938 N.Y.S.2d 119). In order to establish a claim for common-law indemnification, a party must prove not only that it was not negligent, but also that the proposed indemnitor's actual negligence contributed to the accident, or, in the absence of any negligence, that the indemnitor had the authority to direct, supervise, and control the work giving rise to the injury (see Hart v. Commack Hotel, LLC, 85 A.D.3d 1117, 1118–1119, 927 N.Y.S.2d 111; Benedetto v. Carrera Realty Corp., 32 A.D.3d 874, 875, 822 N.Y.S.2d 542; Kader v. City of N.Y. Hous. Preserv. & Dev., 16 A.D.3d 461, 463, 791 N.Y.S.2d 634; Hernandez v. Two E. End Ave. Apt. Corp., 303 A.D.2d 556, 556, 757 N.Y.S.2d 65). Here, in addition to establishing that it was not negligent, Atlantic demonstrated that Eagle One had the authority to direct, supervise, and control the means and methods of Mohan's work.