Opinion
C. A. 9:23-03621-RMG-MHC
07-02-2024
Dea'Shawn Victor Harrison, Plaintiff, v. Mr. Phyall, Mr. Boyd, Ms. Davis, Shaw, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Dea'Shawn Victor Harrison, a pretrial detainee who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action against Defendants alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.
In a Proper Form Order, Plaintiff was directed to provide certain documents to bring his case into proper form. ECF No. 10. He has provided the required documents and this case is now in proper form. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on November 20, 2023. ECF No. 14.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is currently a pretrial detainee at the Hill-Finklea Detention Center (HFDC). He has a pending charge for charge of burglary, third degree, first offense in Berkeley County (case number 2022A0820200313). See Berkeley County 9th Judicial Circuit Public Index, https://public index.sccourts.org/Berkeley/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspxPISearch.aspx (last visited June 29, 2023).
This Court may take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government websites. See Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n. 1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. 2009); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182, 2008 WL 4185869, at * 2 (E.D. La. Sept. 8, 2008) (noting that courts may take judicial notice of governmental websites including other courts' records).
Plaintiff brings claims under § 1983 for alleged violations of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. He also appears to bring claims under South Carolina law. ECF No. 14 at 4. Plaintiff alleges:
Fraud was committed on my person within a federal court and while I have tried to express that I was not I who filed the complaint, the calls, which may have been monitored at the time, kept getting cut at the mentioning of this case (Harrison v. Wilson). Now every-time I request to report any act of fraud, I am denied assistance.Id. at 5-6 (errors in original).
Plaintiff appears to be referring to a case he filed against South Carolina Attorney General Alan Wilson (Wilson) and the State of South Carolina in this Court on June 16, 2023. See Harrison v. Wilson, No. 9:23-02745-RMG (D.S.C.).
Plaintiff claims he gave Defendant Detention Officer Shaw (Shaw) some of his paperwork (which he describes as his complaint against Wilson) to have copies made. Shaw allegedly told Plaintiff that Defendant Sgt. Davis (Davis) made copies and left the copies with the control booth officer. However, that officer said there was no paperwork in the booth. Plaintiff asserts that Davis returned about thirty minutes later with Plaintiff's paperwork, but some pages were allegedly missing. ECF No. 14 at 14.
Later that week, Plaintiff alleged found out that his complaint against Attorney General Wilson was filed in this Court. Plaintiff claims he was not the one who filed the complaint. Plaintiff contends that Davis violated his Fourth Amendment rights by illegally taking (seizing) his property and impersonating his character (which he describes as the commission of fraud by filing paperwork with this Court and forging his signature). He claims he grieved the issue with Davis and has not received any “feed back on the issue.” ECF No. 14 at 14. Plaintiff contends that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated because his property was illegally searched and seized and was made a “public use (publication/public index) within the United States District Court Docket by committing fraud on [his] person by impersonating [his] character to do so.” Id. at 15.
Court records indicate that the complaint in that case was received in Greenville, South Carolina on June 16, 2023, the same day that Plaintiff claims he gave his paperwork to officers at the HFDC in Moncks Corner, South Carolina.
Plaintiff asserts he gave permission to Shaw, and no one else, to make copies. ECF No. 14 at 16. He alleges Shaw committed fraud and broke an oral contract by giving the paperwork to Davis. Plaintiff also contends this violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Id. at 17.
Plaintiff claims he told Defendant Mr. Boyd (Boyd) and Defendant Mr. Phyall (Phyall) that either Shaw or Davis allegedly filed his complaint with the Court, Boyd and Shaw stated they would look into the alleged incident, and Boyd and Shaw failed to “get back” to Plaintiff. Additionally, he alleges he spoke to Phyall on numerous occasions, told Phyall that fraud was committed, and Phyall failed to do anything in response to his complaints. ECF No. 14 at 18.
As to injuries, Plaintiff writes that he suffered “[i]rreparable injury, malicious injury, and personal injury.” However, he fails to identify an actual injury he allegedly suffered. ECF No. 14 at 6. Plaintiff requests injunctive and monetary relief, but fails to specify what injunctive relief he is seeking. Id.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A pro se Complaint is reviewed pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
III. DISCUSSION
It is recommended that this action be summarily dismissed for the reasons discussed below.
A. Fourth Amendment Claims
Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by allegedly taking or misplacing his paperwork fails to state a constitutional claim. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “The applicability of the Fourth Amendment turns on whether ‘the person involving its protection can claim a justifiable, a reasonable, or a legitimate expectation of privacy that has been invaded by government action.'” King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d at 214 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984) (internal quotations omitted)). “[P]risoners have no legitimate expectation of privacy and ... the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on unreasonable searches does not apply in prison cells.” Hudson, 468 U.S. at 530. Thus, to the extent Plaintiff claims his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by any search or seizure of his paperwork, such allegations fail to state a claim for relief under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Carr v. Zwally, 760 Fed.Appx. 550, 557 (10th Cir. 2019) (rejecting a prisoner's claim that the search and seizure of his legal materials violated the Fourth Amendment); Perez v. Morrison, No. 5:21-CV-00097-MR, 2022 WL 414378, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Feb. 10, 2022) (dismissing the plaintiff's claims that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a correctional officer who allegedly read the plaintiff's legal papers, confiscated his legal materials, and confiscated his mail), reconsideration denied, 2022 WL 3441884 (W.D. N.C. Aug. 16, 2022).
B. Access to the Courts
If, liberally construed, Plaintiff's claims are instead ones for denial of access to the courts, they also should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court stated in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), that prisoners must have meaningful access to the courts. The “meaningful access” referred to in Bounds does not, however, entitle a plaintiff to total or unlimited access. See Moore v. Gray, No. 5:04-CT-918-FL, 2005 WL 3448047, at *1 (E.D. N.C. Jan. 26, 2005), aff'd, 133 Fed.Appx. 913 (4th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (citation omitted). The right of access to the courts only requires that prisoners have the capability of bringing challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 356-57 (1996). Moreover, as a jurisdictional requirement flowing from the standing doctrine, the prisoner must allege an actual injury. See id. at 349. “Actual injury” is prejudice with respect to contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a non-frivolous claim challenging their conviction or conditions of confinement. See id. A plaintiff's “[f]ailure to show that a ‘nonfrivolous legal claim has been frustrated' is fatal to his Bounds claim.” Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 1155 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. at 353). Although Plaintiff appears to allege that he did not file his case, he never requested dismissal of the case and he continues to prosecute the case. See Harrison v. Wilson, No. 9:23-2745-RMG (D.S.C.). Plaintiff has failed to allege any actual injury and thus any claim that he has been denied access to the courts should be summarily dismissed.
Additionally, Plaintiff has not alleged any injury to support an access to the courts claim concerning his pending criminal proceedings. Moreover, records from Berkeley County indicate that he is represented by counsel. See Blalock v. Eaker, 845 F.Supp.2d 678, 680 (W.D. N.C. 2012) (“[A] pretrial detainee who is represented by counsel, or who refuses an offer of counsel, lacks a constitutionally protected right to access and use legal materials.” (citing United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1360 (4th Cir. 1978)).
C. Fifth Amendment Claims
Plaintiff also has not alleged any claims under the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court has only allowed Fifth Amendment claims under section 1983 pursuant to the enforcement of the takings clause, Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180 (2019), and a criminal defendant's right to be free from self-incrimination, Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003). As it pertains to the right to due process, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause applies to the federal government. U.S. Const. amend V (“No person ... shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ...”); see Dusenbury v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 167 (2002); Starbuck v. Williamsburg James City Cty. School Board, 28 F.4th 529, 537 (4th Cir. 2022) (explaining the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause only applies to federal actors).
Moreover, a claim of intentional deprivation of property by a prison official does not state a constitutional due process claim, provided that the prisoner has access to an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533 (concluding that “intentional deprivations do not violate [the Due Process] Clause provided, of course, that adequate state post-deprivation remedies are available”). Plaintiff has remedies under South Carolina law to obtain relief for the alleged taking of his personal property by bringing a tort action in state court or proceeding pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, SC Code Ann. §15-78-10 et seq. See Mora v. City of Gaithersburg, 519 F.3d 216, 231 (4th Cir. 2008) (state courts are available for property claims and the State process is constitutionally adequate); see also Plumer v. State of Maryland, 915 F.2d 927, 930-31 (4th Cir. 1990) (where a state actor commits an “unauthorized act” of taking property then an adequate state post-deprivation procedure satisfies due process).
Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff asserts a claim for negligent deprivation of property by a prison official, such a claim does not implicate the Due Process Clause. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332, 335-36 (1986) (holding that “the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property”) (emphasis in original)).
D. Grievances
Liberally construed, Plaintiff also may be attempting to assert claims about the grievance process, asserting that his grievances were ignored. However, he fails to state a claim because it is well-settled that prison inmates have no federal constitutional right to have any inmate grievance system in operation at the place where they are incarcerated. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Taylor v. Lang, 483 Fed.Appx. 855 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that an inmate's claim that an officer performed an unsatisfactory investigation and consideration of his various administrative grievances was without merit as his access and participation in the prisoner's grievance process was not constitutionally protected and the officer's alleged malfeasance could not be said to have impeded on the inmate's access to the courts); Martin v. O'Brien, No. CA 6:13-335-TMC-JDA, 2013 WL 1282143 (D.S.C. Feb. 21, 2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 1281952 (D.S.C. Mar. 26, 2013) (noting that prison inmates, including pretrial detainees, have no federal constitutional rights to any inmate grievance system); Smith v. Ray, 36 Fed.Appx. 99 (4th Cir. 2002) (“[A]ccess to the grievance procedure is not a constitutionally protected right[.]”).
E. State Law Claims
Plaintiff appears to be attempting to assert claims under South Carolina law for fraud, breach of contract, and illegal search and seizure. See ECF No. 14 at 4, 5, 14-19. However, as Plaintiff fails to state any federal claim, only the state law claims would remain, and federal courts are allowed to hear and decide state-law claims only in conjunction with federal-law claims, through the exercise of “supplemental jurisdiction.” See 28 U.S.C. §1367; Wisconsin Dep't of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387 (1998). Of course, a district court may have jurisdiction of a civil action “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000...and is between - (1) citizens of different States...”. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. However, Plaintiff has not alleged complete diversity of the parties. See Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-374 (1978) (Complete diversity of parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same State as any party on the other side). Here, Plaintiff and Defendants are all citizens of South Carolina. See ECF No. 14 at 2-3.
Thus, there is no complete diversity and Plaintiff may not bring his claims pursuant to § 1332. As Plaintiff has asserted no valid federal claim and there is no diversity jurisdiction, this Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Tigrett v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 626 (4th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court's dismissal of state law claims when no federal claims remained in the case); Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999)(“[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants”).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court dismiss this action without prejudice, without leave to amend, and without issuance and service of process.
See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (noting that “when a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without providing leave to amend ... the order dismissing the complaint is final and appealable”). Here, any attempt to cure the deficiencies in the complaint would be futile for the reasons discussed above.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).