Opinion
1:22-CV-00105-SPB-RAL
01-25-2023
JIHAAD AMORE HARRISON, Plaintiff v. SECRETARY GEORGE LITTLE, LONNIE OLIVER, SCI-ALBION SUPERINTENDENT; SKINNER, SCI-ALBION CAPTAIN; S. A. SMITH, SCI-ALBION CORRECTIONS OFFICER; MS. KEENER, AREA COORDINATOR; PATRICIA THOMPSON, SCI-ALBION DEPUTY; CARL JONES, SCI ALBION; KURT SUESSER, CCPM; MAJ JASON ZILLMAN, CHCA; MIKE EDWARDS, HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATOR; DR. CRAIG RUSH, CHIEF PSYCHIATRIST; DR. SUSAN EVANS, C. GRIDDINGS, GRIEVANCE COORDINATOR; DHU KOHLER, CORRECTIONAL OFFICER; C/O CRUM, C.O. DANIEL NOLEN, SGT MALUK, DR. LUCAS, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
ECF NO. 60
RICHARD A. LANZILLO CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 60) be denied.
Although the motion is captioned as a “MOTION for Preliminary Injunction, MOTION for Mediation Hearing,” Harrison makes no mention of a request for mediation in the actual motion. ECF No. 60. The Court will therefore construe the motion as only a motion for a preliminary injunction.
II. REPORT
A. Plaintiff's Factual Allegations
Plaintiff Jihaad Amore Harrison is an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion (“SCI-Albion”). Her pending motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 60) is one of eight such motions she has filed in this action. See ECF Nos. 4, 15, 20, 25, 33, 34, 50, 51, 60. In this motion, she asks the Court to “enjoin[] the Defendants, their successors in office, agents, and employees and all other people acting in participation with them from: putting her business out to other inmates;” “calling her a ‘He; Him; Mr; Sir;'” “trying to force men to cell up and harm/rape her;” “denying her protective custody;” and “denying her a razor and barber shop.” ECF No. 60. She also asks to have a camera put in front of her cell “24/7” or to be transferred to SCI-Benner or SCI-Mercer. Id. To support her request for injunctive relief, she alleges that “Defendant Lonnie Oliver has a known pattern of practice denying Transgender's any help,” and “continues to deny along with other defendants access to safety and security, and deny access to socially transitions.” Id.
Plaintiff has informed the Court that she identifies as female and uses the pronouns “she/her/hers.”
On December 21, 2022, the Court held a status conference to hear further argument regarding the instant motion. ECF No. 61. At this conference, the Court reviewed Harrison's previous motions for injunctive relief and reminded her that they were denied because they failed to show that she faced immediate irreparable harm. The Court then asked Harrison to explain the irreparable harm she faced based on the relief sought in the instant motion. In response, Harrison repeated many of the broad, bare, and conclusory allegations she has asserted in her prior injunctive relief requests, and she added the conclusory allegation that her food was being tampered with. Id.
B. Legal Standard
The party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians Ass'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990).
As the moving party, Harrison bears the burden of producing evidence to support the first two factors. See Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). Accordingly, she must provide facts that clearly support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to her if preliminary relief is denied. See United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990); Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989); ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987) (it is not enough to merely show irreparable harm: the plaintiff has the burden of showing immediate irreparable injury, which is more than merely serious or substantial harm and which cannot be redressed with money damages). Absent support for either of the first two factors, a court must deny the request for a preliminary injunction. See Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653 (3d Cir. 1994); Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). Thus, the grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)).
Moreover, in the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir. 1982)). Preliminary injunctive relief is “not a tool for prisoners to use to regulate ‘in every way, every day, the terms and conditions of plaintiff's confinement simply because they are “in court” . . .'”. Stiel v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2017 WL 2656646, at *4 (D.N.J. June 19, 2017) (quoting Muhammad v. Director of Corrections, 2009 WL 161075, at *1 (E.D. Ca. Jan. 22, 2009)). Thus, where a plaintiff requests an injunction that would require the Court to interfere with the administration of a prison, “appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief.” Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 379 (1976). The federal courts are not overseers of the day-to-day management of prisons. Prison officials require broad discretionary authority as the “operation of a correctional institution is at best an extraordinarily difficult undertaking.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). Accordingly, prison administrators should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that are needed to preserve internal order and to maintain institutional security. Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2578 (2006); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 527 (1979).
C. Discussion
Harrison's allegations are insufficient to meet her heavy burden of demonstrating that she is likely to succeed on the merits of her claims. While Harrison “need not prove [her] case with airtight certainty, the moving party nevertheless bears a heavy burden on a motion for a preliminary injunction of establishing a reasonable probability of success on the merits.” Burton v. Wetzel, 2017 WL 4284345, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Sep. 27, 2017) (internal citations, quotations, and additions omitted). This burden is “particularly heavy” where the requested injunction “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but . . . at providing mandatory relief,” such as the transfer requested in the instant motion. Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980).
To support the instant request for injunctive relief, Harrison states that Oliver denies help to transgender inmates, denies inmates “access to safety and security, and denies [Harrison] access to socially transition.” ECF No. 60. As explained above, at the status conference Harrison added that guards were tampering with her food; however, she did not provide any details to substantiate this allegation. In fact, Harrison has yet to provide any details to support the many allegations she has made thus far. These bare, general, and conclusory allegations are therefore insufficient to establish a likelihood of success on the merits.
Even if Harrison could establish a likelihood of success, she must still demonstrate “the probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted.” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989). As noted above, the burden on a party seeking injunctive relief is “particularly heavy” where the party is seeking to alter (rather than preserve) the status quo. Punnett, 621 F.2d at 582. See also Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1997) (“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, not to decide the issues on their merits.”). Thus, a request for mandatory proactive injunctive relief, such as Harrison's demand for a transfer, must be viewed with exacting scrutiny and extreme caution. Burton, 2017 WL 4284345, at *6.
Harrison has failed to demonstrate that the risk of harm is actually irreparable and imminent for a few reasons. First, and most notably, Harrison has not provided the Court with any information to corroborate her claims of imminent risk of irreparable harm. Synthes, Inc. v. Gregoris, 228 F.Supp.3d 421, 440 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (“Any irreparable harm must be imminent.”); Burton, 2017 WL 4284345, at *9 (declining to grant preliminary relief in the absence of evidence “that there is an imminent risk of irreparable injury”) (emphasis in original). Second, Harrison has provided the Court with evidence that she is in fact receiving mental health treatment. ECF Nos. 49, 49-1.Additionally, Harrison stated in her amended complaint that psychiatry has approved her to begin the evaluation process for Gender Dysmorphia, which takes about a year, and that her initial evaluation “can happen in the next few months.” ECF No. 49; see also ECF No. 49-1, p. 6. Finally, Harrison has yet to plausibly plead actual imminent threats to her safety and security but has documented evidence of SCI-Albion's investigation into these alleged threats finding that no such threats exist. ECF No. 60-1. Thus, Harrison has not only failed to show that she faces imminent irreparable harm, but that she faces any harm at all.
Evidence that she has received mental health treatment is documented in her amended complaint (ECF No. 49) and was discussed on the record at a November 1, 2022, telephonic status hearing (ECF No. 40) and at the status conference for the instant motion (ECF No. 61).
Harrison's failure to allege facts that support a likelihood of success on the merits and an imminent risk of irreparable harm is fatal to her motion. Therefore, it is recommended that Harrison's motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 60) be denied.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Harrison's motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF No. 60) be denied.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).
BY THE COURT: