It was to present to the Court for its consideration the question so raised that the demurrer to the bill was filed, which demurrer, as we have said, was overruled; the Court holding that the Act of 1898, as amended, applied, and that the surviving husband held "an estate for his life in one-third of the lands" so held by his wife at the time of her death. Section 7 of Chapter 457 of the Act of 1898 was before this Court in the case of Harris v. Whiteley, 98 Md. 430. The question presented by the record in that case was whether section 7 of the Act of 1898 — the section here involved — operated to change the expectant interest in his wife's real estate which Seth H. Whiteley took by virtue of his marriage to her in 1881, under the laws then in force, into a present vested estate for his life which was liable to be levied on by his creditors.
Grabill v. Plummer, 95 Md. 56. Harris v. Whiteley, 98 Md. 430, relied upon by the other side, holds that another statute, namely, the Act of 1898, ch. 457, sec. 7 (the terms of which are widely different from those of ch. 331), does not and could not operate retroactively so as to give a husband in his wife's lifetime a vested interest, attachable by his creditors, in real estate owned by his wife before the passage of said Act of 1898. The wife was still living, and the controversy was between her and attaching creditors of her husband.
rights are considered as being beyond the power of the Legislature to divest them"); Remington v. Metropolitan Savings Bank, 76 Md. 546, 548, 25 A. 666, 667 (1893) (Distributees' rights became vested upon the testator's death, "and could not be divested by any subsequent legislation, because it would divest vested rights"); Garrison v. Hill, 81 Md. 551, 556, 32 A. 191, 192 (1895) (The appellant was entitled to obtain certain property, and the "Legislature had no power to take from her this vested right"); Manning v. Carruthers, 83 Md. 1, 7-8, 34 A. 254, 255 (1896) (Legislation which "would entirely destroy the right of action which was vested" cannot be given retroactive effect because giving it such "effect would render it unconstitutional, as being an attempt to destroy vested rights of action"); Baumeister v. Silver, 98 Md. 418, 427, 56 A. 825, 828 (1904) (Parties "had a vested right to sue when the Act of 1894 was passed . . ., and the Legislature could not take away that right"); Harris v. Whiteley, 98 Md. 430, 442, 56 A. 823, 824 (1904) ("[I]t was beyond [the Legislature's] power to divest or impair . . . any vested rights of property acquired under previously existing laws"); Md. Jockey Club v. State, 106 Md. 413, 419, 67 A. 239, 241 (1907) ("The effect of such [subsequent] legislation [was] not only to impair vested rights, but to take the property of the contributors under the [earlier] Act of 1870, and give it to others, in clear violation of the 23rd Article [now Article 24] of our Bill of Rights"); Anne Arundel County v. United Rys. Co., 109 Md. 377, 391, 72 A. 542, 547 (1909) (The "Legislature could not under the guise of an amendment to the charter of the company divest without compensation its vested property right acquired in the legitimate exercise of the powers conferred by its charter while that instrument remained in force"); Ireland v. Shipley, 165 Md. 90, 98, 166 A. 593, 596 (1933) (The State "has not the power to destroy vested rights without compensation"); Allen v. Dovell, 193 Md. 359, 363-364, 66
Cf. 2 Tiffany, Law of Real Property (3rd Ed. 1939), § 533, p. 422. The Appellant relies upon the decision of our predecessors in Harris v. Whiteley, 98 Md. 430, 56 A. 823 (1904) but, in our opinion, that case is clearly distinguishable from the present case. In Harris the question presented was in regard to the alleged retroactive effect of the Act of 1898, Ch. 457 which, in relevant part, provided:
A contingent interest is one in which liability is not certain and absolute, but depends upon some independent event. Belcher, 282 Md. at 723, 724 n. 3, 387 A.2d at 773, 774 n. 3; Fairfax v. Savings Bank of Baltimore, 175 Md. 136, 141, 199 A. 872, 875 (1938) (survivorship trust under a will); Safe Deposit Trust Co. v. Independent Brewing Assn, 127 Md. 463, 468, 96 A. 617, 619 (1916) (spendthrift trust); Harris v. Whiteley, 98 Md. 430, 444, 56 A. 823, 825 (1904) (curtesy). An unmatured interest, however, is subject to attachment.
There are numerous decisions of this Court to the effect that a statute, even if the General Assembly so intends, will not be applied retrospectively to divest or adversely affect vested rights, to impair the obligation of contracts, or so as to violate the due process clause. See, e.g., Smith v. Westinghouse Electric, 266 Md. 52, 57, 291 A.2d 452 (1972); Janda v. General Motors, 237 Md. 161, 169, 205 A.2d 228 (1964); Harris v. Whiteley, 98 Md. 430, 442, 56 A. 823 (1904); Remington v. Metropolitan Bank, 76 Md. 546, 548, 25 A. 666 (1893); and Rock Hill College v. Jones, 47 Md. 1, 17 (1877). The instruments here involved provide in essence for a life estate in William Bauernschmidt, Jr., with remainder to his surviving children and descendants.
The policy of the law justifies the extension of the right of attachment to property which, though not strictly within the letter, is within the equity of the statute. It does not justify such an extension of that right as will be likely to result in the destruction of a paternal gift which can be of no present value to any one, and may never be of value to the debtor or his assignees.' Hill v. Boland, 125 Md. 113, 93 A. 395; Harris v. Whiteley, 98 Md. 430, 56 A. 823; Jordan v. Reynolds, 105 Md. 288, 66 A. 37; In re Gardner (D.C.) 106 Fed. 670; In re Wetmore (C.C.A.) 108 Fed. 520; In re Twaddell (D.C.) 110 Fed. 145; Shryock v. Morris, 75 Md. 72, 23 A. 68; Humphrey v. Gerard, 83 Conn. 346, 77 A. 65; Hayward v. Peavey, 128 Ill. 430, 21 N.E. 503; Ducker v. Burnham, 146 Ill. 9, 34 N.E. 558; Watson v. Dodd, 68 N.C. 528."
But prior to the passage of the Act of 1898, Chapter 457, the common law had been very materially changed in this State — even before these parties were married. It will be remembered that this was leasehold and hence personal property, and therefore the rules applicable to it are different in some respects from what they would be if it was real estate, and we were relying on the Act of 1898. In the recent case of Jeavons v. Pittman, 126 Md. 650, JUDGE PATTISON pointed out the distinction between such cases as Safe Deposit Co. v. Gittings, 103 Md. 485, and Harris v. Whiteley, 98 Md. 430, and Slingluff v. Hubner, 101 Md. 652. If the deed was made after January 1st, 1899, then of course the provisions of the Act of 1898 apply, and if it was made before that time we do not deem it necessary to prolong this opinion by determining how far they apply to leasehold property, as prior to that time the powers of married women had been sufficiently enlarged in this State to enable us to dispose of this case, as presented by the Record. By section 1 of Article 45 of Code of 1888, all property acquired by a married woman in any of the many ways mentioned and as amended by Chapter 267 of Acts of 1892, all of her property acquired in any of those ways, "or in any other manner," was protected from the debts of her husband, and not in any way liable for the payment thereof, and by Section 2 of that Article, as amended by Chapter 394 of the Acts of 1890, the property acquired or owned by her under Section 1 she held for her separate use, with power of devising the same as fully as if
It does not justify such an extension of that right as will be likely to result in the destruction of a paternal gift which can be of no present value to any one, and may never be of value to the debtor or his assignees." Hill v. Boland, 125 Md. 113; Harris v. Whiteley, 98 Md. 430; Jordan v. Reynolds, 105 Md. 288; In re Gardner, 106 Fed. R. 670; In re Wetmore, 108 Fed. R. 520; In re Twaddell, 110 Fed. R. 145; Shryock v. Morris, 75 Md. 72; Humphrey v. Gerard, 83 Conn. 346; Hayward v. Peavey, 128 Ill. 430; Ducker v. Burnham, 146 Ill. 9; Watson v. Dodd, 68 N.C. 528. In the case at bar, the defendant had no such interest in the trust estates in the hands of the trustee as could be definitely ascertained and not being susceptible of appraisement, it could not be the subject of attachment.
The Act of 1898 removed this limitation and gave to a married woman the same power to dispose of her property as that possessed by her husband over his property, provided she is eighteen years of age. The effect of this statute as to its retroactive operation upon property held prior to its adoption, has been passed upon in Harris v. Whiteley, 98 Md. 430. In that case judgment creditors of the husband claimed that under sec. 7, Art. 45 of the Code, being the Act of 1898, the husband acquired a vested estate for life in one-third of the estate of his wife, acquired prior to the passage of the Act, and that this was applicable to their judgments in the lifetime of the wife.